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JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 




Honorable Bertrand Russell 

Author of 

Justice In War Time 



JUSTICE IN 
WAR-TIME 



~ . BY 



BERTRAND RUSSELL 

Author of "German Social Democracy, " 
4 ' The Principles of Mathematics, 
"Scientific Method in Philosophy" £>'c, £'c. 



CHICAGO LONDON 

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. 

1916 






Copyright by 
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. 

1916 



Printed in the United States of America 



«. *A 



r 

FEB 3 (916 



aA4208 



PEEFACE 

The following essays, of which all except the last 
two have appeared in various magazines, were written 
at different times during the course of the war, and 
are not perhaps wholly consistent in their expecta- 
tions as to the future, or in their view as to the atti- 
tude of the ordinary citizen towards war. In such 
matters, the development of events inevitably some- 
what modifies first impressions. The view that the 
bulk of the population is naturally pacific, and is only 
incited to war by politicians and journalists, is widely 
held among pacifists, but is vehemently rejected by 
the more bellicose, who point out that men have an 
instinct of pugnacity, which demands war from time 
to time, I think it is true that many men have an 
instinct towards war, but unless it is roused by its 
appropriate stimulus it may well remain completely 
latent. The instinct, and the machinations of war- 
mongers, are both needed to bring about war ; if either 
were coped with, the other would be no longer op- 
erative for evil. In the following essays I have dealt 
sometimes with the one, sometimes with the other ; but 
both are essential factors in the problem, and neither 
can be neglected by any prudent friend of peace. 

The first of these essays, which was written before 
the Bryce Report appeared, deals in part with the 
question of atrocities. Nothing in that report tends 
to invalidate the conclusion reached in the article, 
namely : i ' No doubt both German and Russian atroci- 
ties have occurred. But it is certain that they have 



VI PREFACE 

been far less numerous, and (for the most part) less 
unnatural, than they are almost universally believed 
to have been." Those who can recall what was be- 
lieved in England in the early months of the war will 
acknowledge that the Bryce Report, bad as it is, tends 
to show that the atrocities which may be called "un- 
natural" have been much fewer than most English 
people had supposed. I think it should be added that 
some of the cases mentioned in the Bryce Report are 
admittedly based on evidence such as would not be 
accepted in a criminal prosecution. I have not seen 
the German Reports on supposed Russian atrocities, 
but they, if they are honest, presumably show exag- 
geration in what Germans believed about Russians. 
If the atrocities, however, were as bad as was believed, 
that can only increase our horror of war. It is war 
that produces atrocities, and every fresh atrocity is 
a fresh argument for peace. 

The last essay is an attempt to show how England 
might have averted the war by a wiser policy during 
the ten years preceding its outbreak. To publish, 
in war-time, a criticism of the policy of one's own 
Government, is an act which will be thought by many 
to be unpatriotic. My own deliberate belief, however, 
is that what I have to say is more likely to benefit 
England than to injure it, in so far as it produces any 
effect at all. As some readers might misunderstand 
my motives, I have thought it well to state them by 
way of introduction. 

I consider that either a serious weakening of Eng- 
land, Prance, and Italy, or a serious strengthening 
of Germany, would be a great misfortune for the 



PREFACE VII 

3 

civilisation of the world. I wish ardently to see the 
Germans expelled from France and Belgium, and led 
to feel that the war has been a misfortune for them 
as well as for the Allies. These things I desire as 
'strongly as the noisiest of our patriots. But there 
are other things, forgotten by most men in the excite- 
ment of battle, which seem to me of even greater 
importance. /It is important that peace should come *j 
as soon as possible, lest European civilisation should 
perish out of the world. It is important that, after 
the peace, the nations should feel that degree of 
mutual respect which will make co-operation possible. 
It is important that England, the birthplace of liberty 
and the home of chivalrous generosity, should adopt 
in the future a policy worthy of itself, embodying 
its best, not deviously deceptive towards the hopes of 
its more humane citizens. Because I prize civilisation, 
because I long for the restoration of the European 
community of nations, but above all because I love 
England, and because I have hopes in regard to Eng- 
land which I should feel Utopian in regard to Ger- 
many: because of these fears and these hopes, I wish 
to make the English people aware of the crimes that 
have been committed in its name, to recall it to the 
temper in which peace can be made and preserved, 
and to point the way to a better national pride than 
that of dominion. 

The British public, under the influence of an excited ^ 
Press, believes that any criticism of the past actions 
of our Foreign Office tends to interfere with our 
success in the war. This, I feel convinced, is an entire 
delusion. What has interfered with our success, is, 



VIII PREFACE 

first and foremost, the supreme organizing capacity of 
the Germans. The faults, on our side, which have 
retarded our victory, have been lack of ability in 
some of the higher commands, lack of co-ordination 
in the efforts to produce munitions, jobbery and fam- 
ily influence in Army appointments instead of the 
Napoleonic maxim of "la carriere ouverte aux 
talents" belief, on the part of our politicians, in 
expedients and clever words rather than a determined, 
concentrated vigorous effort of will. Germans who 
flatter themselves with hopes of England's decadence 
forget that we have exhibited exactly similar faults 
in all previous wars, and yet have been invariably 
victorious except against our kith and kin in America. 
There has been no failure of energy, courage and 
self-sacrifice on the part of the nation, but there has 
been failure on the part of its rulers. It is these 
same rulers, not the nation, whose past foreign policy 
I wish to call in question. And I do this in the hope 
that, after the war, England, together with France 
and America, may lead the world in a more just, a 
more humane, and a more pacific way of dealing with 
international problems. 

It will be said in England that such criticisms as 
I have made of our Foreign Office are calculated to 
estrange the sympathy of Americans. I believe this 
to be an entire mistake. Both England and Germany, 
in presenting their case to the American public, have 
erred in claiming a complete sinlessness which is not 
given to mortals, and is not credible except to the 
eyes of self-love. Both have sinned, and any citizen 
of a neutral country will take this for granted before 



PREFACE IX 

beginning to investigate the facts. No history of 
events which does not recognise this will command his 
assent. But though both have sinned, the sins of 
England sink into insignificance beside the German 
treatment of Belgium. And if any Power is to be 
supreme at sea, it must be better for international 
freedom that that Power should be England, whose 
army is too small to be a danger, rather than Germany, 
which has by far the most powerful army in the 
world. On these broad grounds, if I belonged to a 
neutral country, my sympathies would be against 
Germany. And as an Englishman, I believe that 
there is far more hope of reform in the foreign policy 
of my own country than in that of Germany. Most 
of the somewhat discreditable facts related in the 
following pages are very little known in England: 
if they were widely known, they would inspire wide- 
spread horror and determination of amendment. The 
same, I believe, is true of France. On this ground, 
also, England and France may claim the sympathy 
of America. But the best way of estranging the sym- 
pathy of neutrals is to make for ourselves pretensions 
which are obviously contrary to the truth, and to 
show that many among us have become blind to the 
claims of justice. No good cause is served by the 
suppression of truth; and those among us who show 
_^fear of truth are doing a greater disservice to the 
national cause than can be done by fearlessly pro- 
claiming even the most damaging facts.* 



♦I have been greatly helped in the investigation of facts by 
Miss Irene Cooper Willis, who, from a consecutive study of "The 
Times" during the critical periods of the years concerned, has 
been able to supply me with most of the references, all of which 
she has also verified. 



CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Preface v 

An Appeal to the Intellectuals op Europe .... 1 

The Ethics of War 20 

War and Non-Resistance 40 

Why Nations Love War 60 

The Future of Anglo-German Eivalry 67 

Is a Permanent Peace Possible ? 83 

The Danger to Civilization 105 

The Entente Policy, 1904-1915. A Reply to Pro- 
fessor Gilbert Murray. 

I. Introduction 128 

II. Morrocco 138 

III. The Anglo-Russian Entente 171 

IV. Persia 180 

V. What Our Policy Ought to Have Been. . .203 

Appendix A 216 

Appendix B ... 227 

Index 237 



JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

AN APPEAL TO THE INTELLECTUALS 

OF EUROPE.* •■) 

Leibniz, writing to a French correspondent at a time 
when France and Hanover were at war, speaks of 
"this war, in which philosophy takes no interest." 
[Philosiphische Werke, Gerhardt's edition, I., p. 420.] 
We have travelled far since those days. In modern 
times, philosophers, professors, and intellectuals gen- 
erally undertake willingly to provide their respective 
governments with those ingenious distortions and 
those subtle untruths by which it is made to appear 
that all good is on one side and all wickedness on the 
other. Side by side, in the pages of the Scientia, are 
to be read articles by learned men, all betraying 
shamelessly their national bias, all as incapable of jus- 
tice as any cheap newspaper, all as full of special 
pleading and garbled history. And all accept, as a 
matter of course, the inevitability of each other 's bias ; 
disagreeing with each other's conclusions, yet they 
agree perfectly with each other 's spirit. All agree that 
the whole of a writer's duty is to make out a case 
for his own country. 

•This article was written in April, before the Russian defeats, 
the participation of Italy, the sinking of the Lusitania, and the 
Bryce Report. I have not altered anything, though if it were 
written now some alterations would be required. It was to have 
appeared in the Italian review, Scientia, in June, and was already 
in proof, but was withdrawn in consequence of Italy's joining 
in the war. It appeared, with some omissions, in Nos. 4 and 5 
of the Swiss International Review. 



2 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

To this attitude there have been notable exceptions 
among literary men — for example, Romain Rolland 
and Bernard Shaw — and even among politicians, 
although political extinction is now everywhere the 
penalty for a sense of justice. Among men of learn- 
ing, there are no doubt many who have preserved 
justice in their thoughts and in their private utter- 
ances. But these men, whether from fear or from un- 
willingness to seem unpatriotic, have almost kept 
silence. Among those who have published their opin- 
ions, almost all have shown a complete lack of intel- 
lectual detachment. Such an article as that of V. 
Pareto in Scientia could hardly have been written by 
a professor in one of the belligerent countries.* 

I cannot but think that the men of learning, by 
allowing partiality to colour their thoughts and words, 
have missed the opportunity of performing a service 
to mankind for which their training should have spe- 
cially fitted them. The truth, whatever it may be, is 
the same in England, France, and Germany, in Russia 
and in Austria. It will not adapt itself to national 
needs: it is in its essence neutral. It stands outside 
the clash of passions and hatreds, revealing, to those 
who seek it, the tragic irony of strife with its attendant 
world of illusions. Men of learning, who should be 
accustomed to the pursuit of truth in their daily work, 
might have attempted, at this time, to make themselves 
the mouthpiece of truth, to see what was false on their 
own side, what was valid on the side of their enemies. 
They might have used their reputation and their 



•Though the article of N. Kostyleff in the April number of 
Scientia falls not far short of a completely just outlook. 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 3 

freedom from political entanglements to mitigate the 
abhorrence with which the nations have come to re- 
gard each other, to help towards mutual understand- 
ing, to make the peace, when it comes, not a mere 
cessation due to weariness, but a fraternal reconcili- 
ation, springing from realisation that the strife has 
been a folly of blindness. They have chosen to do 
nothing of all this. Allegiance to country has swept 
away allegiance to truth. Thought has become the 
slave of instinct, not its master. The guardians of the 
temple of Truth have betrayed it to idolaters, and have 
been the first to promote the idolatrous worship. 

One of the most surprising things in this war is the 
universal appeal to atavistic moral notions which, in 
times of peace, civilised men would have repudiated 
with contempt. Germans speak of England's brutal 
national egotism, and represent Germany as fighting 
to maintain a great ideal of civilisation against an 
envious world. Englishmen speak of Germany's ruth- 
less militarism and lust of dominion, and represent 
themselves as fighting to uphold the sacredness of 
treaties and the rights of small nations. In a sober 
mood, many of the men who use such language would 
recognise that it is melodramatic and mythical. All 
nations, at all times, are"egotistic. It may happen, 
accidentally, that in pursuing its own interest a nation 
is also spreading civilisation or upholding the sacred* 
ness of treaties; but no impartial person can believe 
that for such ends a nation will sacrifice a million lives 
and a thousand millions of pounds. Such sacrifices 
are only made for nationally selfish ends, and until it 
is recognised that all the nations engaged in the war 



4 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

are equally and wholly selfish, no true thought about 
the issues involved is possible. 

Moral judgments, as applied to others than oneself, 
are a somewhat subtilised police force : they make use 
of men's desire for approbation to bring self-interest 
into harmony with the interest of one's neighbours. 
But when a man is already trying to kill you, you will 
not feel much additional discomfort in the thought 
that he has a low opinion of your moral character. 
For this reason, disapproval of our enemies in war- 
time is useless, so far as any possible effect upon them 
is concerned. It has, however, a certain unconscious 
purpose, which is, to prevent humane feelings towards 
the enemy, and to nip in the bud any nascent sym- 
pathy for his sufferings. Under the stress of danger, 
beliefs and emotions all become subservient to the one 
end of self-preservation. Since it is repugnant to 
civilised men to kill and maim others just like them- 
selves, it becomes necessary to conquer repugnance by 
denying the likeness and imputing wickedness to those 
whom we wish to injure. And so it comes about that 
the harshest moral judgments of the enemy are formed 
by the nations which have the strongest impulses of 
kindliness to overcome. 

In order to support this belief in the peculiar 
wickedness of the enemy, a whole mythology of false- 
hood grows up, partly through the deliberate action 
of newspapers and governments, but chiefly through 
the inherent myth-making tendency of strong collec- 
tive emotions. Every powerful passion brings with it 
an impulse to an attendant system of false beliefs. A 
man in love will attribute innumerable non-existent 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 5 

perfections to the object of his devotion ; a jealous man 
will attribute equally non-existent crimes to the object 
of his jealousy. But in ordinary life, this tendency is 
continually held in check by intercourse with people 
who do not share our private passions, and who there- 
fore are critical of our irrational beliefs. In national 
questions, this corrective is absent. Most men meet 
few foreigners, especially in time of war, and beliefs 
inspired by passion can be communicated to others 
without fear of an unsympathetic response. The sup- 
posed facts intensify the passion which they embody, 
and are magnified still further by those to whom they 
are told. Individual passions, except in lunatics, 
produce only the germs of myths, perpetually neutral- 
ised by the indifference of others; but collective pas- 
sions escape this corrective, and generate in time what 
appears like overwhelming evidence for wholly false 
beliefs. 

Men of learning, who are acquainted with the part 
played by collective error in the history of religion, 
ought to have been on their guard against assaults 
upon their credulity. They ought to have realised, 
from the obvious falsehood of the correlative opposite 
beliefs in enemy countries, that the myth-making im- 
pulse was unusually active, and could only be repelled 
by an unusual intellectual vigour. But I do not find 
that they were appreciably less credulous than the 
multitude. In the early days of last September, when 
the Germans were carrying all before them in France, 
the need for some source of hope produced in England 
an all but universal belief that a large Russian army 
had travelled from Archangel, through England, to 



, 



6 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

Belgium. The evidence was very much better than 
the evidence for most facts of history : most men knew 
many eye-witnesses of their transit, and at last a news- 
paper published a telegram from its correspondent 
saying that he had discovered them in Belgium. 
Only then was the story officially denied, but for a 
long time many continued to believe it. And the 
intellectuals were not by any means less ready to 
believe it than the rest of the country. 

The really harmful beliefs are those which produce 
hatred of the enemy. The devastation and maltreat- 
ment of Belgium might naturally have aroused some 
qualms among humane Germans. But the instinct of 
self-protection produced a harvest of accusations 
against the Belgians: that they put out the eyes of 
wounded Germans, or cut off their hands; that they 
behaved brutally to German women in Belgium ; and, 
generally, that they had shown such depravity as 
rendered them unworthy of consideration. At the 
very same time, innumerable German atrocities were 
reported in England. It cannot, unfortunately, be 
denied that many very shocking atrocities occurred, 
but not nearly so many as the English at first believed. 
Many men stated confidently that they knew people 
in England who had staying with them Belgian chil- 
dren whose hands had been cut off by German soldiers. 
Some such cases there were in Belgium, but I know 
of no evidence that any reached England. No effect 
whatever was produced by pointing out that if there 
were so many cases, at least one with a name and 
address would have been mentioned in the newspaper. 
Such arguments have no power against a belief which 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 7 

stimulates ferocity, and is on that account felt to be 
useful. No doubt atrocities have occurred on both 
sides. But it is certain that they have been far less 
numerous, and (for the most part) less unnatural, 
than they are almost universally believed to have been. 
A correspondence in the Labour Leader for March 

18 will illustrate this point. 

Rev. J. F. Matthews, 
Glossop Road Baptist Church, 

Sheffield. 
Dear Sir, 

A correspondent informs us that on Sunday morning you 
stated in the course of a sermon delivered in Wash Lane 
Church, Latchford, Warrington, that there is a Belgian girl in 
Sheffield with her nose cut off and her stomach ripped open 
by the Germans, and that she is still living and getting better. 

I am anxious to investigate stories of German atrocities, and 
should be grateful if you could send particulars to me by 
which your statements could be authenticated. 

Faithfully yours, 

March 5, 1915. A. Fenner Brockway. 

Mr. A. Fenner Brockway. 
Dear Sir, 

Thank you for your note. I have written to our Belgian 
Consul here for the name and address of the girl whose case 
I quoted at Latchford. If all I hear is true it is far worse 
than I stated. I am also asking for another similar instance, 
which I shall be glad to transmit to you if, and as soon as, I 
can secure the facts. 

I am, yours very sincerely, 

March 9, 1915. John Francis Matthews. 

Dear Mr. Brockway, 

I enclose our Consul's letter, which I have just received. I 
am writing a letter to my old Church at Latchford, to be read 
on Sunday next, contradicting the story which I told, on what 
seemed to be unimpeachable authority. I am glad I did not 
give the whole of the alleged facts as they were given to me. 
With many thanks for your note and inquiry. 

I am, yours sincerely, 

March 12, 1915. John Francis Matthews. 

Dear Mr. Matthews, 

Replying to your letter of the 9th inst., enclosing a letter 
which you have received from the Labour Leader, although I 
have heard of a number of cases of Belgian girls being mal- 



# 



8 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

treated in one way and another, I have on investigation not 
found a particle of truth in one of them, and I know of no girl 
in Sheffield who has had her nose cut off and her stomach 
ripped open. 

I have also investigated cases in other towns, but have not 
yet succeeded in getting hold of any tangible confirmation. 

Yours very truly, 

A. Balfay, 
(Belgian Consul at Sheffield). 
March 11, 1915. 

I have not the means of giving similar illustrations 
of false beliefs in Germany and Austria. But in case 
this book should be read by any German or Aus- 
trian, I would beg him not to infer any peculiar 
English credulity, but to realise that such false stories 
are an accident of war, and that a great deal of what 
the German or Austrian public believes on apparently 
unimpeachable evidence is sure to be untrue. No man 
with any spark of justice in his nature will deliber- 
ately wish to think worse of his enemies than they 
deserve. So long as he is not on his guard, his instinct 
will play tricks with his judgment. We all perceive 
quite easily that this happens in enemy nations ; what 
I wish to point out is that it happens in all the bellig- 
erent nations. Those who remark pityingly that the 
enemy are deluded with lies ought to remember our 
common human nature, and to realise that their own 
nation is equally deluded with exactly similar " lies' ' 
— though "lies" is hardly the word, since there is very 
little deliberate deception involved. 

There is, however, another class of false beliefs, in 
which deliberate deception has played a greater part. 
These are false beliefs on political matters of fact. I 
will give two illustrations, one on each side. 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 9 

In Germany, the belief seems to be almost universal 
that England violated the neutrality of Belgium 
before Germany did so. This belief is based partly 
on the assertion that the English sent troops to Bel- 
gium before the declaration of war, partly on the 
military conversations in Brussels in 1906 and 1912. 
As to the first of these allegations, not only has it 
been denied by our Government, which Germans 
could hardly be expected to regard as evidence; not 
only is its falsehood evident from the Belgian Grey 
Book, which Germans might regard as a piece of 
skillful manipulation; not only are those among us 
who have many acquaintances in the Army, and who 
must have heard privately if any troops were sent 
abroad, able to assert with absolute certainty that no 
such event took place; but the military events of 
last August are sufficient proof, one would have sup- 
posed, even to the credulity of an enemy. No Eng- 
lish prisoners were taken by the Germans in their 
early battles with Belgians, and so far as I have 
heard they do not even allege that they encountered 
any English before they reached Mons. 

The assertion that the military conversations 
constituted a breach of neutrality is supported by 
omitting the fact that all the arrangements were 
conditional upon the Germans first invading Belgium. 
It was well known that this was likely to happen in 
the event of war, and that England and France would, 
in that case, attempt the defence of Belgium if possi- 
ble. If, when the time came, the Germans had respect- 
ed Belgian neutrality, they might have pointed to the 
conversations as proof of groundless suspicion. But 



10 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

in view of what has occurred, it is absurd to pretend 
that England and Belgium had no right to consider in 
common how they should meet a threatening danger 
which proves to have been only too real. The German 
accusation, like the charges of atrocities brought 
against Belgians, is merely a symptom of a bad 
conscience, not an outcome of any calm consideration 
of the evidence. 

My other illustration concerns the dates of 
mobilisation. It is usually asserted in England that 
Austria's general mobilisation preceded Russia's, 
whereas the opposite seems almost certainly the truth. 
At the time, the true view was generally accepted in 
England, just as Bethmann-Hollweg admitted that the 
invasion of Belgium was a wrong. But just as this 
admission was seen to constitute a fatal weakness in 
Germany's pose, so the Russian mobilisation was seen 
to constitute a weakness in the Allies' contention that 
Germany deliberately planned the war. And so each 
side set to work to explain away its earlier admissions, 
and to produce a completely comfortable state of mind 
by methods which seem hard to acquit wholly of 
deliberate falsification. But on neither side have the 
intellectuals made any appreciable attempt to resist the 
process of self-deception to which their Governments 
invited them. What little attempt at truth there has 
been has been almost wholly confined to Socialists, 
who had none of the educational advantages which 
proved so unavailing among professors. 

The beliefs which the learned have allowed them- 
selves to share with their compatriots are not only 
independent of fact in their broad outlines, but are 



1 



Z*f/to 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 11 

inspired, even in their niceties, by the instincts 
connected with combat. The Germans have strong 
hope of a separate peace with France, some hope of a 
separate peace with Russia, and no hope of a separate 
peace with England. It follows from this that the 
French are not wicked at all, the Russians are only 
moderately wicked, while the English are a blot upon 
the human race. The English feel quite certain that 
the Allies can crush the Turks, fairly confident that 
they can prevent the Austrians from ever again 
becoming a danger, but not all sure that they can 
break the spirit of Germany. They deduce that the 
Turks are brave misguided, the Austrians the mere 
tools of Prussia, while the Germans deserve to be 
condemned to the lowest pit of hell. It is useless to 
urge that the Turks have been for ages a by-word of 
cruelty, that the Austrians have prima facie more 
responsibility for the war than the Germans, or that 
the Germans have contributed much of what is most 
valuable in the civilisation of the world/' Such mere 
facts carry no weight : moral reprobation is nothing but 
an embodiment of hatred, and hatred is a mechanical 
product of biological instinct. It is unworthy of men 
who pretend to freedom of thought to be caught in the 
toils of this purely animal mechanism. There is no 
reason to expect an unusual degree of humane feeling 
from professors; but some pride of rationality, some 
unwillingness to let judgment be enslaved by brutal 
passions, we might have hoped to find. But we should 
have hoped in vain. 

The fundamental irrational belief, on which all the 
others rest, is the belief that the victory of one 's own 






12 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

side is of enormous and indubitable importance, and 
even of such importance as to outweigh all the evils 
involved in prolonging the war. It is possible, in view 
of the uncertainty of all human affairs, that the victory 
of one side or the other might bring great good to 
humanity. But even if this be the case, the beliefs of 
the combatants are none the less irrational, since there 
is no evidence such as would convince an impartial 
outsider. The Allies are convinced that their victory 
is for the good of mankind, and the Germans and 
Austrians are no less convinced in the opposite sense. 
When a large mass of men hold one opinion, and 
another large mass hold another, and when in each 
case the opinion is in accordance with self-interest, it 
is hardly to be supposed that it is based on rational 
grounds either on the one side or on the other. 
Meanwhile the evils produced by the war increase from 
day to day, and they, at least, must be admitted by 
both sides equally. 

The difference of opinion as to the desirable issue 
of the war is not wholly due to self-interest, though 
that is no doubt the chief cause. The difference is due in 
part to divergent ideals embodying divergent desires. 
Putting the matter crudely, and considering only the 
Western war, we may say that the Germans love order, 
learning, and music, all of which are good things, 
while the French and English love democracy and 
liberty, which are also good things. In order to force 
their respective ideals upon nations which do not value 
them, the Germans are willing to replace order in 
Europe by the universal chaos of war, and to send the 
young men who pursue learning or music to be killed 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 13 

on the battlefield, while the French and English have 
found it necessary to suppress democracy and liberty 
for the present, without any guarantee that they will 
be restored when the war is over. If the war lasts long, 
all that was good in the ideals of Germany, France, 
and England will have perished, as the ideals of 
Spartans and Athenians perished in the Peloponne- 
sian War. All three races, with all that they have 
added to our civilisation, will have become exhausted, 
and victory, when it comes, will be as barren and as 
hopeless as defeat. 

Under the distorting influence of war, the doubtful 
and microscopic differences between different Euro- 
pean nations have been exaggerated when it has be- 
come treason to question their overwhelming import- 
ance. Every educated man knew and acknowledged 
before the war began, and every educated man now 
knows without acknowledging, that the likenesses 
among European nations are immeasurably greater 
than their differences. Congresses, conferences, and 
international bodies of many kinds testified to the dif- 
fused consciousness of a common purpose, a common 
task in the life of civilisation. Suddenly, between 
one day and the next, all this is forgotten: German 
scholars repudiate English honours, English scholars 
say that Germany has done nothing of importance in 
learning. In a moment, all the great co-operative 
work for which academic bodies exist is set aside for 
the pleasure of indulging a bitter and trivial hatred. 

Thisjcar is trivial, for all its vastness. No great 
principle is at stake, no great human purpose is in- 
volved on either side. The supposed ideal ends for 



14 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

which it is being fought are merely part of the myth. 
Every nation is fighting in self-defence, every nation 
is fighting to destroy the tyranny of armaments, 
every nation is fighting to show that unprovoked 
aggression cannot be practised with impunity. 
Every nation pays homage to peace by maintaining 
that its enemies began the war. The fact that these 
assertions carry equal conviction on both sides shows 
that they are not based on reason, but are merely in- 
spired by prejudice. But besides these common ob- 
jects, there are some in which the two sides differ. 
Probably the two Kaisers would say, and perhaps be- 
lieve, that they are fighting to prove it a crime to 
assassinate heirs to thrones. It can hardly be sup- 
posed that the Tsar would deny that this is a crime, 
but he would say, as the English do, that it is a crime 
for a great nation to oppress a small one. This 
proposition, however, is only true in certain latitudes ; 
it does not apply to Finland or Persia. The English 
and French say they are fighting in defence of de- 
mocracy, but they do not wish their words to be 
heard in Petrograd or Calcutta. And, oddly enough, 
those who most bitterly hate democracy at home are 
the most ferocious in defending it against Germany. 
This war is not being fought for any rational end : 
it is being fought because, at first, the nations wished 
to fight, and now they are angry and determined to 
win victory. Everything else is idle talk, artificial 
rationalising of instinctive actions and passions. "When 
two dogs fight in the street, no one supposes that 
anything but instinct prompts them, or that they are 
inspired by high and noble ends. But if they were 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 15 

capable of what is called thought, if they had been 
taught that Dog is a rational animal, we may be sure 
that a superstructure of belief would grow up in them 
during the combat. They fight really because some- 
thing angers them in each other's smell. But if their 
fighting were accompanied by intellectual activity, the 
one would say he was fighting to promote the right 
kind of smell (Kulter), and the other to uphold the 
inherent canine right of running on the pavement 
(democracy). Yet this would not prevent the by- 
standers from seeing that their action was foolish, 
and that they ought to be parted as soon as possible. 
And what is true of dogs in the street is equally true 
of nations in the present war. 

The original impulse towards war, though by now 
it has spent its force, was very strong in the first days. 
Fighting and killing are among the natural activities 
of males, both of human beings and of the higher 
animals. The spectacle of males killing each other in 
sexual combat is pleasant, presumably, to animal 
females, and certainly to many of those of the species 
homo sapiens. Owing to the activities of the police, 
opportunities for these pleasures are much curtailed 
in civilised countries. For this reason, when war is 
coming there is a liberation of a whole set of in- 
stinctive activities normally repressed. This brings 
with it an exhilaration comparable to that of falling 
in love, Instead of being oppressed by the prospect 
of the horrors of war — friends and relations killed 
or maimed, countries ravaged, civilisation bleeding in 
the mire — most men, in the first days, were excited 
and happy, feeling an unusual freedom, and invent- 



16 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

ing, with unconscious hypocrisy, all sorts of humane 
reasons to excuse their joy. In this mood there is no 
great hatred of the enemy: he has his uses, since 
without him there could be no fighting. The injury 
to him is a merely incidental and almost regrettable 
result of the battle. Primitive poetry is full of this 
mood, and the early days of August showed that it 
is still possible to civilised men. 

But when, as in this war, neither side wins decisive 
successes, and the utmost effort is required to avert 
disaster, the honeymoon intoxication of the first 
moments is soon succeeded by a sterner mood. Checks 
cause fury, and injuries suffered produce hatred. 
More and more men 's thought become concentrated on 
humbling the pride of their enemies. If the war re- 
mains undecided for a long time, if the new levies on 
both sides are exterminated without either victory or 
defeat, there will be a growing ferocity, leading to 
horrors such as even this war has not yet brought into 
the imaginations of men. One by one soldiers will 
pass suddenly from ferocity to apathy, the spring 
of will will break, leaving millions of derelicts fit only 
for the hospital or the asylum. This is what the 
German military authorities mean when they say that 
the war will be decided by nervous endurance. They 
hope that a smaller percentage of the Germans than 
of the Allies will be broken by the strain. Militarists 
on both sides look forward cheerfully to the extinction, 
for all purposes of national life, of most of the men 
now between twenty and forty. And yet they con- 
tinue to pretend that the victory of their side is more 
important than an early peace. And in this infamy 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 17 

their professorial parasites support them and egg 
them on. 

The worst disasters would have been averted if 
either side had won a rapid victory, and are even now 
not inevitable if the war comes to an end during this 
year. But if peace is not made soon, if no military 
decision is reached, there will have to be an increasing 
passionate concentration of will in all countries upon 
the one common purpose of mutual destruction. As 
the effort of will required grows greater and more 
difficult through weariness, the vital force of the 
nations will be more and more weakened. When at 
last peace comes, it is to be feared that no stimulus 
will be adequate to rouse men to action. After the 
fierce tension of combat, nothing will seem important ; 
a weak and relaxed dissipation will succeed the ter- 
rible unnatural concentration. There is no parallel 
in history to the conflict in which the world is now 
engaged. Never before have so large a proportion of 
the population been engaged in fighting, and never 
before has the fighting been so murderous. All that 
science and organisation have done to increase the 
efficiency of labour has been utilised to set free more 
men for the destructive work of the battlefield. Man's 
greater command over Nature has only magnified the 
disaster, because it has not been accomplished by geater 
command over his own passions. And if he does 
not acquire command over his own passions, what- 
ever destruction is not achieved now is only postponed 
to a later day. 

The degradation of science from its high function in 
ameliorating the lot of man is one of the most painful 



18 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

aspects of this war. Savage man, like the brutes, lives 
in bondage to matter: the task of securing a bare 
subsistence absorbs his energies, leaving no leisure for 
art and thought and the goods of the mind. From this 
bondage science has been progressively liberating the 
populations of civilized countries. One man's labour 
now will produce a great deal more than one man's 
food. Out of the time set free in this way have grown 
literature and music, poetry and philosophy, and the 
intoxicating triumphs of science itself. On the basis 
of the greater productivity of labour, education, 
democracy, and all the political advances of the modern 
State have been built. Suddenly, now, because a 
madness of destruction has swept over Europe, the 
men of science have abandoned their beneficent 
activities : physicists invent swifter aircraft, chemists 
devise more deadly explosives, and almost all who can, 
devote themselves to the labour of death. The place 
of science in human development, one is compelled to 
think, has never become present to their minds, since 
they are willing to prostitute it to the undoing of its 
own work. 

Knowledge with elevation of mind is the chief 
instrument of human progress; knowledge without 
elevation of mind easily becomes devilish, and increases 
the wounds which man inflicts on man. Men of 
learning should be the guardians of one of the sacred 
fires that illumine the darkness into which the human 
spirit is born: upon them depends the ideal of just 
thought, of disinterested pursuit of truth, which, if it 
had existed more widely, would have sufficed alone to 
prevent the present horror. To serve this ideal, to 



AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS 19 

keep alive a purpose remote from strife, is more worthy 
of the intellectual leaders of Europe than to help 
Governments in stimulating hatred or slaughtering 
more of the young men upon whom the future of the 
world depends. It is time to forget our supposed 
separate duty toward Germany, Austria, Russia, 
France, or England, and remember that higher duty 
to mankind in which we can still be at one. 



THE ETHICS OF WAR.* 

The question whether war is ever justified, and if so 
under what circumstances, is one which has been 
forcing itself upon the attention of all thoughtful men. 
1% seems to me that no single one of the combatants is 
justified in the present war, and yet I cannot believe 
that war is under all circumstances a crime. Opinions 
on such a subject as war are the outcome of feeling 
rather than of thought: given a man's emotional 
temperament, his convictions, both on war in general 
and on any particular war which may occur during his 
lifetime can be predicted with tolerable certainty. 
The arguments used will merely reinforce what comes 
out of a man's nature. The fundamental facts in this 
as in all ethical questions are feelings ; all that thought 
can do is to clarify and harmonise the expression of 
those feelings, and it is such clarifying and harmo- 
nising of my own feelings that I wish to attempt in 
the present article. 

I. 
The question of the rights and wrongs of a particular 
war is generally considered from a juridical or quasi- 
juridical standpoint: A certain country broke a 
certain treaty, crossed a certain frontier, committed 
certain technically unfriendly acts, and, therefore, by 
the rules, it is permissible to Mil as many of the 
soldiers of that country as modern armaments render 

■^ — ^ ^— ^ ^— — ■ ■ I ■■■■ III! ■ I I .■■■■■■■MMI.^ — — — ^^^^— II I I. I 'H I I— .11 I I. ^ 

•Reprinted from the International Journal of Ethics. January, 
1915. 



/ 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 21 



possible. There is a certain unreality, a certain lack 
of imaginative grasp about this way of viewing 
matters. It has the advantage, always dearly prized 
by lazy men, of substituting a formula, at once am- 
biguous and easily applied, for the vital realisation 
of the consequences of acts. The judicial point of 
view is properly applicable to the relations of indi- 
viduals within a State, but not, as yet, to the relations 
between States. Within a State, private war is for- 
bidden, and the disputes of private citizens are settled, 
not by their own force, but by the force of the police, 
which, being overwhelming, very seldom needs to be 
explicity displayed. There have to be rules according 
to which the police decide, who is to be considered 
in the right in a private dispute, and these rules con- 
stitute law. The chief gain derived from the law and 
the police is the abolition of private wars, and this 
gain is secured even if the law as it stands is not the 
best possible. It is therefore in the public interest 
that the man who goes against the law should be 
considered in the wrong, not because of the excellence 
of the law, but because of the importance of pre- 
venting individuals within the State from resorting 
to force. 

In the interrelations of States nothing of the same 
sort exists. There is, it is true, a body of conventions 
called "international law," and there are innumerable 
treaties between High Contracting Powers. But the 
conventions and the treaties differ from anything that 
could properly be called law by the absence of sanc- 
tion : there is no police force able or willing to en- 
force their observance. It follows from this that 



22 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

every nation concludes multitudes of divergent and 
incompatible treaties, and that, in spite of the high 
language one sometimes hears, the main purpose of 
the treaties is in actual fact to afford the sort of pre- 
text which is considered respectable for engaging in 
war with another Power. A Great Power is consid- 
ered unscrupulous when it goes to war without 
previously providing itself with such a pretext — 
unless, indeed, its opponent is a small country, in 
which case it is only to be blamed if that small country 
happens to be under the protection of some other 
Great Power. England and Russia may partition 
Persia immediately after guaranteeing its integrity 
and independence, because no other Great Power has 
a recognised interest in Persia, and Persia is one of 
those small States in regard to which treaty obliga- 
tions are not considered binding. France and Spain, 
under a similar guarantee to Morocco, must not 
partition it without first compensating Germany, 
because it is recognised that, until such compensation 
has been offered and accepted, Germany, though not 
Morocco, has a legitimate interest in the preserva- 
tion of that country. All Great Powers having 
guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, England has a 
recognised right to resent its violation — a right which 
is exercised when it is believed to be to England's 
interest, and waived when England's interest is not 
thought to be involved. A treaty is therefore not to 
be regarded as a contract having the same kind of 
binding force as belongs to private contracts ; it is to 
be regarded only as a means of giving notice to rival 
Powers that certain acts may, if the national inter- 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 23 

est so demand, form one of those reasons for war 
which are recognised as legitimate. If the faithful 
observance of treaties were a frequent occurrence, 
like the observance of contracts, the breach of a treaty- 
might be a real and not merely a formal ground for 
war, since it would tend to weaken the practice of 
deciding disputes by agreement rather than by armed 
force. In the absence of such a practice, however, 
appeal to treaties is only to be regarded as part of 
the diplomatic machinery. A nation whose diplom- 
acy has been skilfully conducted will always be able 
to find some treaty or agreement bringing its inter- 
vention within the rules of the diplomatic game when 
it believes that its interests demand war. But so 
long as treaties are only observed when it is conven- 
ient to do so, the rules of the diplomatic game have 
nothing to do with the question whether embarking or 
participating in a war will or will not be for the good 
of mankind, and it is this question which has to be 
decided in considering whether a war is justified or not. 

II. 
It is necessary, in regard to any war, to consider 
not its paper justification in past agreements, but its 
real justification in the balance of good which it is 
to bring to mankind. At the beginning of a war 
each nation, under the influence of what is called 
patriotism, believes that its own victory is both cer- 
tain and of great importance to mankind. The praise- 
worthiness of this belief has become an accepted 
maxim: even when war is actually in progress it is 
held to be natural and right that a citizen of an enemy 
country should regard the victory of his side as 



24 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

assured and highly desirable. By concentrating at- 
tention upon the supposed advantages of the victory 
of our own side, we become more or less blind to the 
evils inseparable from war and equally certain which- 
ever side may ultimately prove victorious. Yet so 
long as these are not fully realised, it is impossible to 
judge justly whether a war is or is not likely to be 
beneficial to the human race. Although the theme is 
trite, it is necessary briefly to remind ourselves what 
the evils of war really are. 

To begin with the most obvious evil : large numbers 
of young men, the most courageous and the most 
physically fit in their respective nations, are killed, 
bringing great sorrow to their friends, loss to the 
community, and gain only to themselves, since they 
escape the horror of existence in this world of strife. 
Many others are maimed for life, some go mad, and 
others become nervous wrecks, mere useless and help- 
less derelicts. Of those who survive many will be 
brutalised and morally degraded by the fierce busi- 
ness of killing, which, however much it may be the 
soldier's duty, must shock and often destroy the most 
humane instincts. As every truthful record of war 
shows, fear and hate let loose the wild beast in a 
certain proportion of combatants, leading to strange 
cruelties, which must be faced, but not dwelt upon if 
sanity is to be preserved. 

Of the evils of war to the non-combatant popula- 
tion in the regions where fighting occurs, the recent 
misfortunes of Belgium have afforded an example 
upon which it is not necessary to enlarge. It is neces- 
sary, however, to combat the common belief of Eng- 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 25 

lish people that the misfortunes of Belgium afford a 
reason in favour of war. By a tragic delusion, hatred 
perpetuates the evils from which it springs. The 
sufferings of Belgium are attributed to the Ger- 
mans, not to war, and thus the very horrors of 
the war are used to make men desire to increase their 
area and intensity. Even assuming the utmost pos- 
sible humanity in the conduct of military operations, 
it cannot be doubted that if the troops of the Allies 
penetrate into the industrial regions of Germany, the 
German population will have to suffer a great part 
of the misfortunes which Germany has inflicted upon 
Belgium. To men under the influence of hate this 
thought is a cause of rejoicing, but to men in whom 
humane feeling is not extinct it shows that our 
sympathy with Belgium should make us hate war 
rather than Germany. 

The evils which war produces outside the area of 
military operations are perhaps even more serious, 
for, though less intense, they are far more widespread. 
Passing by the anxiety and sorrow of those whose sons 
or husbands or brothers are at the front, the extent 
and consequences of the economic injury inflicted by 
war are much greater than is usually realised. It is 
common to speak of economic evils as merely material, 
and of desire for economic progress as grovelling and 
uninspired. This view is perhaps natural in well-to-do 
people, to whom economic progress means setting up 
a motor car or taking holidays abroad instead of at the 
seaside. But with regard to the poorer classes of 
society, economic progress is the first condition of 
many spiritual goods, and even often of life itself. An 



26 JUSTICE IN "WAR-TIME 

overcrowded family, living in a slum in conditions of 
filth and immorality, where half the children die from 
ignorance of hygiene and bad sanitation, and the 
remainder grow up stunted and ignorant — such a 
family can hardly make progress mentally or 
spiritually, except through an improvement in its 
economic condition. And without going to the very 
bottom of the social scale, economic progress is neces- 
sary for a good education, for a tolerable existence for 
women, and for that breadth and freedom of outlook 
upon which any solid and national advance must be 
based. It is not the most oppressed or the most ill-used 
who make an effective plea for social justice, for some 
reorganization of society which shall give less to the 
idler and more to the common man. Throughout the 
Napoleonic wars, while the landowners of England 
continually increased their rent-rolls, the mass of the 
wage-earning population sank into greater and greater 
destitution. It was only afterwards, during the long 
peace, that a less unjust distribution began to be 
possible. It cannot be doubted that the desire on the 
part of the rich to distract men's minds from the 
claims of social justice has been more or less un- 
consciously one of the motives leading to war in 
modern Europe. Everywhere the well-to-do, and the 
political parties which represent their interests, have 
been the chief agents in stirring up international 
hatred and in persuading the working man that his 
real enemy is the foreigner. Thus war, and the fear 
of war, has a double effect in retarding social progress : 
it diminishes the resources available for improving 
the condition of the wage-earning classes, and it dis- 



THE ETHICS OF WAE 27 

tracts men's minds from the need and possibility of 
general improvement by persuading them that the 
way to better themselves is to injure their comrades 
in some other country. It is as a protest against this 
delusion that international Socialism has arisen; and 
whatever may be the thought of Socialism as an 
economic doctrine, its internationalism makes it the 
sanest force in modern politics, and the only large 
body which has preserved some degrees of judgment 
and humanity in the present chaos. 

But of all the evils of war the greatest is the purely 
spiritual evil: the hatred, the injustice, the repudia- 
tion of truth, the artificial conflict, where, if the na- 
tions could once, overcome the blindness of inherited 
instincts and the sinister influence of anti-social in- 
terests, such as those of armaments with their sub- 
servient press, it would be seen that there is a real 
consonance of interest and essential identity of hu- 
man nature, and every reason to replace hatred by 
love. Mr. Norman Angell has well shown how un- 
real, as applied to the conflicts of civilised States, is 
the whole vocabulary of international conflict, how 
illusory are the gains supposed to be obtained by 
victory, and how fallacious are the injuries which na- 
tions, in times of peace, are supposed to inflict upon 
each other in economic competition. The importance 
of this thesis lies not so much in its direct economic 
application as in the hope which it affords for the 
liberation of better spiritual impulses in the rela- 
tions of different communities. To love our enemies, 
however desirable, is not easy, and therefore, it is 
well to realise that the enmity springs only from 



28 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

blindness, not from any inexorable physical necessity. 

III. 

Are there any wars which achieve so much for the 
good of mankind as to outweigh all the evils we have 
been considering ? I think there have been such wars 
in the past, but they are not wars of the sort with 
which our diplomatists are concerned, for which our 
armies and navies have been prepared, and which are 
exemplified by the present conflict. For purposes of 
classification we may roughly distinguish four kinds 
of wars, though, of course, in any given case a war is 
not likely to be quite clearly of any one of the four 
kinds. With this proviso we may distinguish: (1) 
Wars of Colonisation; (2) Wars of Principle; (3) 
Wars of Self-defence; (4) Wars of Prestige. Of 
these four kinds I should say that the first and sec- 
ond are fairly often justified; the third seldom, ex- 
cept as against an adversary of inferior civilisation; 
and the fourth, which is the sort to which the present 
war belongs, never. Let us consider these four kinds 
of war in succession. 

By a "war of colonisation' ' I mean a war whose 
purpose is to drive out the whole population of some 
territory and replace it by an invading population of 
a different race. Ancient wars were very largely of 
this kind, of which we have a good example in the 
Book of Joshua. In modern times the conflicts of 
Europeans with American-Indians, Maories, and 
other aborigines in temperate regions, have been of 
this kind. Such wars are totally devoid of technical 
justification, and are apt to be more ruthless than any 
other war. Nevertheless, if we are to judge by re- 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 29 

suits, we cannot regret that such wars have taken 
place. They have the merit, often quite fallaciously 
claimed for all wars, of leading in the main to the 
survival of the fittest, and it is chiefly through such 
wars that the civilised portion of the world has been 
extended from the neighbourhood of the Mediterran- 
ean to the greater part of the earth's surface. The 
eighteenth century, which liked to praise the virtues 
of the savage and contrast them with the gilded cor- 
ruption of courts, nevertheless had no scruple in 
thrusting the noble savage out from his North- Ameri- 
can hunting grounds. And we cannot at this date 
bring ourselves to condemn the process by which the 
American continent has been acquired for European 
civilisation. In order that such wars may be justified, 
it is necessary that there should be a very great and 
undeniable difference between the civilisation of the 
colonisers and that of the dispossessed natives. It is 
necessary, also, that the climate should be one in which 
the invading race can flourish. When these conditions 
are satisfied the conquest becomes justified, though 
actual fighting against the dispossessed inhabitants 
ought, of course, to be avoided as far as is compatible 
with colonising. Many humane people will object in 
theory to the justification of this form of robbery, but 
I do not think that any practical or effective objection 
is likely to be made. 

Such wars, however, belong now to the past. The 
regions where the white man live are all allotted, 
either to white races or to yellow races to whom the 
white man is not clearly superior, and whom, in any 
case, he is not strong enough to expel. Apart from 



30 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

small punitive expeditions, wars of colonisation, in the 
true sense, are no longer possible. What are nowa- 
days called colonial wars do not aim at the complete 
occupation of a country by a conquering race; they 
aim only at securing certain governmental and trad- 
ing advantages. They belong, in fact, rather with 
what I call wars of prestige than with wars of coloni- 
sation in the old sense. There are, it is true, a few 
rare exceptions. The Greeks in the second Balkan 
war conducted a war of colonisation against the Bul- 
garians; throughout a certain territory which they 
intended to occupy they killed all the men, and car- 
ried off all the women. But in such cases the only 
possible justification fails, since there is no evidence 
of superior civilisation on the side of the conquerors. 
In spite of the fact that wars of colonisation belong 
to the past, men's feelings and beliefs about war 
are still those appropriate to the extinct conditions 
which rendered such wars possible. When the pres- 
ent war began, many people in England imagined that 
if the Allies were victorious Germany would cease to 
exist: Germany was to be " destroyed " or " smashed/ 
and since these phrases sounded vigorous and cheer- 
ing, people failed to see that they were totally devoid 
of meaning. There are some seventy million Ger- 
mans ; with great good fortune we might, in a success- 
ful war, succeed in killing two millions of them. There 
would then still be sixty-eight million Germans, and 
in a few years the loss of the population due to the 
war would be made good. Germany is not merely a 
State, but a nation, bound together by a common lan- 
guage, common traditions, and common ideals. What- 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 31 

ever the outcome of the war, this nation will still exist 
at the end of it, and its strength cannot be perma- 
nently impaired. But imagination in what pertains to 
war is still dominated by Homer and the Old Testa- 
ment; men who cannot see that circumstances have 
changed since those works were composed are called 
"practical" men, and are said to be free from illu- 
sions, while those who have some understanding of 
the modern world, and some capacity for freeing their 
minds from the influence of phrases, are called dreamy 
idealists, Utopians, traitors, and friends of every 
country but their own. If the facts were understood, 
wars amongst civilised nations would cease owing to 
their inherent absurdity. Men's passions always lag 
behind their political organisation, and facts which 
leave no outlet for passions are not readily admitted. 
In order that hatred, pride, and violence may find an 
outlet, men unconsciously blind themselves to the 
plainest facts of politics and economics, and modern 
war continues to be waged with the phrases and 
theories invented by simpler men in a simpler age. 

IV. 
The second type of war which may sometimes be 
justified is what may be called "the war of principle." 
To this kind belong the wars of Protestant and Catho- 
lic, and the English and American civil wars. In 
such cases, each side, or at least one side, is honestly 
convinced that the progress of mankind depends upon 
the adoption of certain beliefs or institutions, which, 
through blindness or natural depravity, the other side 
will not regard as reasonable, except when presented 
at the point of the bayonet. Such wars may be justi- 



32 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

fied; for example, a nation practising religious toler- 
ation may be justified in resisting a persecuting nation 
holding a different creed. On this ground we might 
justify the resistance of the Dutch to the English and 
French combined in the time of Charles II. But wars 
of principle are much less often justified than is be- 
lieved by those in whose age they occur. It is very 
seldom that a principle of genuine value to mankind 
can only be propagated by military force: as a rule, 
it is the bad part of men's principles, not the good 
part, which makes it necessary to fight for their de- 
fence. And for this reason the bad part rather than 
the good rises to prominence during the progress of 
the war of principle. A nation undertaking a war in 
defence of religious toleration would be almost certain 
to persecute those of its citizens who did not believe in 
religious toleration. A war on behalf of democracy, 
if it is long and fierce, is sure to end in the exclusion 
from all share of power of those who do not support 
the war. Mr. George Trevelyan in an eloquent passage 
describes the defeat which, as the ultimate outcome 
of our civil war, overtook alike the ideals of the Round- 
heads and the ideals of the Cavaliers. ' ' And this was 
the curse of the victors, not to die, but to live, and 
almost to lose their awful faith in God, when they saw 
the Restoration, not of the old gaiety that was too 
gay for them, and the old loyalty that was too loyal 
for them, but of corruption and selfishness that had 
neither country nor king. The sound of the Round- 
head cannon has long ago died away, but still the 
silence of the garden is heavy with unalterable fate, 
brooding over besiegers and besieged, in such haste to 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 33 

destroy each other and permit only the vile to sur- 
vive/ '* This common doom of opposite ideals is the 
usual, though not the invariable, penalty of support- 
ing ideals by force. While it may therefore be con- 
ceded that such wars are not invariably to be con- 
demned, we must, nevertheless, scrutinise very scep- 
tically the claim of any particular war to be justified 
on the ground of the victory which it brings to some 
important principle. 

There are some who maintain that the present war 
is a war in defence of democracy. I do not know 
whether this view is adopted by the Tsar, and for the 
sake of the stability of the Alliance I sincerely hope 
that it is not. I do not, however, desire to dispute the 
proposition that democracy in the western nations 
would suffer from the victory of Germany. What I do 
wish to dispute is the belief not infrequently enter- 
tained in England that if the Allies are victorious 
democracy can be forced upon a reluctant Germany as 
part of the conditions of peace. Men who think thus 
have lost sight of the spirit of democracy in worship 
of the letter. The Germans have the form of govern- 
ment which they desire, and any other form, imposed 
by alien victors, would be less in harmony with the 
spirit of democracy, however much it might conform 
to the letter. Men do right to desire strongly the vic- 
tory of ideals which they believe to be important, but 
it is almost always a sign of yielding to undue im- 
patience when they believe that what is valuable in 
their ideals can be furthered by substituting force for 

•George M. Trevelyan, Clio, A Muse, and other Essays, literary 
and pedestrian, London, 1913, pages 26-27. 



34 JUSTICE IN WAE-TIME 

peaceful persuasion. To advocate democracy by war 
is only to repeat, on a vaster scale and with far more 
tragic results, the error of those who have sought it 
hitherto by the assassin's knife and the bomb of the 
anarchist. 

V. 
The next kind of war to be considered is the war of 
self-defence. This kind of war is almost universally 
admitted to be justifiable, and is condemned only by 
Christ and Tolstoy. The justification of wars of self- 
defence is very convenient, since so far as I know there 
has never yet been a war which was not one of self- 
defence. Every strategist assures us that the true 
defence is offence ; every great nation believes that its 
own overwhelming strength is the only possible 
guarantee of the world's peace and can only be se- 
cured by the defeat of other nations. In the present 
war, Servia is defending itself against the brutal 
aggression of Austria-Hungary; Austria-Hungary is 
defending itself against the disruptive revolutionary 
agitation which Servia is believed to have fomented; 
Russia is defending Slavdom against the menace of 
Teutonic aggression ; Germany is defending Teutonic 
civilisation against the encroachments of the Slav; 
France is defending itself against a repetition of 
1870; and England, which sought only the preserva- 
tion of the status quo, is defending itself against a 
prospective menace to its maritime supremacy. The 
claim on each side to be fighting in self-defence ap- 
pears to the other side mere wanton hypocrisy, be- 
cause in each case the other side aims at conquest as 
the only means of self-defence. So long as the prin- 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 35 

ciple of self-defence is recognised as affording always 
a sufficient justification for war, this tragic conflict 
of irresistible claims remains unavoidable. In cer- 
tain cases, where there is a clash of differing civilisa- 
tions, a war of self-defence may be justified on the 
same grounds as a war of principle. But I think that, 
even as a matter of practical politics, the principle of 
non-resistance contains an immense measure of wis- 
dom, if only men would have the courage to carry it 
out. The evils suffered during a hostile invasion are 
suffered because resistance is offered: the Duchy of 
Luxenburg, which was not in a position to offer re- 
sistance, has escaped the fate of the other regions 
occupied by hostile troops. What one civilised nation 
can achieve against another by means of conquest 
is very much less than is commonly supposed. It 
is said, both here and in Germany, that each side is 
fighting for its existence; but this phrase covers a 
great deal of confusion of thought induced by un- 
reasoning panic. We cannot destroy Germany even 
by a complete military victory, nor could Germany 
destroy England even if our navy were sunk and 
London occupied by the Prussians. English civilisa- 
tion, the English language, English manufactures 
would still exist, and as a matter of practical politics 
it would be totally impossible for Germany to establish 
a tyranny in this country. If Germans, instead of 
being resisted by force of arms, had been passively 
permitted to establish themselves wherever they 
pleased, the halo of glory and courage surrounding 
the brutality of military success would have been 
absent, and public opinion in Germany itself would 



36 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

have rendered any oppression impossible. The his- 
tory of our own dealings with our colonies affords 
abundant examples to show that under such circum- 
stances the refusal of self-government is not possible. 
In a word, it is the means of repelling hostile aggres- 
sion which make hostile aggression disastrous and 
which generate the fear by which hostile nations come 
to think aggression justified. As between civilised na- 
tions, nonresistance would seem not only a distant 
religious ideal, but the course of practical wisdom. 
Only pride and fear stand in the way of its adoption. 
But the pride of military glory might be overcome 
by a nobler pride, and the fear might be overcome by 
a clearer realisation of the solidity and indestructi- 
bility of a modern civilised nation. 

VI. 
The last kind of war we have to consider is what I 
have called "the war of prestige.' ' Prestige is seldom 
more than one element in the causes of a war, but it 
is often a very important element. In the present 
war, until the war had actually broken out, it was 
almost the only thing involved, although as soon as 
the war began other and much more important mat- 
ters came to be at stake. The initial question between 
Austria and Russia was almost wholly one of prestige. 
The lives of Balkan peasants could not have been 
much affected for good or evil by the participation 
or non-participation of Austrian officials in the trial 
of supposed Servian accomplices in the Sarajevo 
murders. This important question, which is the one 
on which the war is being fought, concerns what is 
called the hegemony of the Balkans, and this is en- 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 37 

tirely a question of prestige. Men desire the sense of 
triumph, and fear the sense of humiliation which they 
would have in yielding to the demands of another 
nation. Rather than forego the triumph, rather than 
endure the humiliation, they are willing to inflict upon 
the world all those disasters which it is now suffering 
and all that exhaustion and impoverishment which it 
must long continue to suffer. The willingness to in- 
flict and endure such evils is almost universally 
praised: it is called high-spirited, worthy of a great 
nation, showing fidelity to ancestral traditions. The 
slightest sign of reasonableness is attributed to fear, 
and received with shame on the one side and with 
derision on the other. In private life exactly the same 
state of opinion existed so long as duelling was 
practised, and existed still in those countries in which 
this custom still survives. It is now recognised, at 
any rate in the Anglo-Saxon world, that the so-called 
1 ' honour ' ' which made duelling appear inevitable was 
a folly and a delusion. It is perhaps not too much to 
hope that the day may come when the honour of 
nations, like that of individuals, will be no longer 
measured by their willingness to inflict slaughter. It 
can hardly be hoped, however, that such a change will 
be brought about while the affairs of nations are left 
in the keeping of diplomats, whose status is bound up 
with the diplomatic or military triumph of the coun- 
tries from which they come, and whose manner of life 
renders them unusually ignorant of all political and 
economic facts of real importance and of all the 
changes of opinion and organisation which make the 



38 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

present world different from that of the eighteenth 
century. If any real progress is to be made in intro- 
ducing sanity into international relations, these rela- 
tions must henceforth be in the hands of men less aloof 
and less aristocratic, more in touch with common life, 
and more emancipated from the prejudices of a by- 
gone age. And popular education, instead of inflam- 
ing the hatred of foreigners and representing even the 
tiniest triumph as worthy of even the greatest sacri- 
fices, must learn to aim rather at producing some sense 
of the solidarity of mankind and of the paltryness of 
those objects to which diplomatists, often secretly, 
think fit to pledge the manhood and heroism of nations. 
The objects for which men have fought in the past, 
whether just or unjust, are no longer to be achieved 
by wars amongst civilised nations. A great weight of 
tradition, of financial interests, of political insincerity, 
is bound up with the anachronism of war. But it is 
perhaps not chimerical to hope that the present war, 
which has shocked the conscience of mankind more 
than any war in previous history, may produce a re- 
vulsion against antiquated methods, and may lead the 
exhausted nations to insist upon that brotherhood and 
co-operation which their rulers have hitherto denied 
them. There is no reason whatever against the settle* 
ment of all disputes by a Council of the Powers de- 
liberating in public. Nothing stands in its way except 
the pride of rulers who wish to remain uncontrolled by 
anything higher than their own will. When this great 
tragedy has worked itself out to its disastrous conclu- 
sion, when the passions of hate and self-assertion have 



THE ETHICS OF WAR 



39 



given place to compassion with the universal misery, 
the nations will perhaps realise that they have fought 
in blindness and delusion, and that the way of mercy 
is the way of happiness for all. 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE* 

The principle that it is always wrong to employ force 
against another human being has been held in its 
extreme form by Quakers and by Tolstoy, but has 
always been rejected by the great majority of mankind 
as inconsistent with the existence of civilised society. 
In this, no doubt, the majority of mankind are in the 
right. But I think that the occasions where forcible 
resistance is the best course are much fewer than is 
generally believed, and that some very great and im- 
portant advances in civilisation might be made if this 
were more widely recognised. The so-called " right 
of self -defence, ' ' in particular, seems to have only a 
very limited sphere of application, and to be often sup- 
ported by arguments involving both mistakes as to 
political questions and a wrong conception of the best 
type of character.* 

No one who holds that human conduct ought to be 
such as to promote certain ends — no matter what ends 
may be selected— will expect any absolute hard-and- 
fast rules of conduct to which no possible exception 
can be found. Not to lie, not to steal, not to murder, 
are very good precepts for ordinary cases : it may be, 
in view of the likelihood of biassed judgments, that 
most men will act better if they always follow these 

•Reprinted from the Atlantic Monthly, August, 1915. 
I touched upon this subject in a former article, in the Inter- 
national Journal of Ethics (January, 1915), but as my discus- 
sion was very brief, it was misunderstood, and seems in need of 
expansion. The present article is a partial reply to Professor 
Perry in the April Number of that Journal, but I have thought 
it better to make the reply explanatory rather than controversial. 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 41 

precepts unquestioningly than if they consider each 
case on its merits. Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
there are cases where lying and stealing are justifiable, 
and the same must be said of murder by those who 
hold that some wars are righteous. Tolstoy does not 
judge conduct by its consequences: he considers 
actions inherently right or wrong. This makes it pos- 
sible for him to say that no use of force is ever right. 
But if we judge conduct, as I think we ought, by its 
power of promoting what we consider a good life or a 
good society, we cannot expect such simplicity in our 
moral precepts, and we must expect all of them to be 
subject to exceptions. Whatever we may have to say 
must be regarded as in the nature of practical maxims, 
to be applied with common sense, not as logically 
universal rules to be tested by extreme cases.* 

Broadly speaking, I think the use of force is 
justifiable when it is ordered in accordance with law 
by a neutral authority, in the general interest and not 
primarily in the interest of one of the parties to the 
quarrel. On this ground, the use of force by the police 
is justifiable, provided (as is no doubt sometimes the 
case) the authorities are employing the police in the 
general interest and not merely in the interest of the 
holders of power. In international affairs, if there 
were a Council of the Powers, strong enough to re- 
strain any aggressive nation without great difficulty, 
any army or navy employed in obedience to its orders 
might be regarded as a police force, and justified on 

♦Professor Perry (page 311) confronts me with an extreme 
case. But I had provided for such cases by admitting that a 
war of self-defence is sometimes a war of principle, and justifi- 
able on that ground. 



42 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

the same grounds on which the police are justified. I 
think there is more hope of ultimately achieving 
universal peace by this method than by the adoption 
of non-resistance. But this has no bearing upon the 
question whether non-resistance would be a good 
policy, if any nation could be induced to adopt it. So 
long as no Council of the Powers exists, there is no 
neutral authority to order resistance, and we have to 
consider the justification of repelling an attack when 
the nation attacked is the judge in its own cause. 

The justification of non-resistance is more easily 
seen in the case of quarrels between individuals. If 
I encountered the traditional highwayman, and he 
demanded my money or my life, I should unhesitat- 
ingly give him my money, even if it were in my power 
to shoot him before he shot me. I should do this, not 
from cowardice or lack of spirit, but because I would 
rather part with money than have a man's blood on 
my conscience. And for the same reason, if I were 
compelled to engage in a duel, I would rather let my 
adversary shoot me than shoot him. In this I believe 
all humane people would agree. At the same time, 
if he were a worthless fellow, and I had just made an 
important mathematical discovery which I had not 
yet had time to record, it might be right to preserve 
my life at his expense. Arguments of this sort would 
justify civilised communities in defending themselves 
against savages. But conflicts between civilised 
nations are more like conflicts between rival meta- 
physicians, each of whom considers his own system 
admirable and the other man's abominable, while to 
outsiders it is obvious that both are equally fantastic. 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 43 

In private life, most situations can be met by the 
double principle of neither employing force nor obey- 
ing it. It is a familiar Platonic thesis that the man 
who inflicts injustice is more to be pitied than the man 
who suffers it. But such statements are read with a 
smile, as charming literary paradoxes, and are not 
taken as practical wisdom for the guidance of life. Yet 
the use of force to coerce another man's will, even in 
those rare cases in which it is justifiable, produces a 
brutal and tyrannous state of mind, and is more de- 
structive of inward peace than any misfortune that can 
be inflicted from without. The greatest good that can 
be achieved in this life is to have will and desire di- 
rected to universal ends, purged of the self-assertion 
which belongs to instinctive will. A man who has once 
known this good will not consider any private end 
important enough to be fought for : he may be willing 
to enter upon a contest of force, but if so, it will be 
for some end outside his own life, since what is best 
in his own life cannot be taken from him by another. 
But although he will not dictate to others for his own 
ends, he will also not be turned aside from universal 
ends by others: he will be no more willing to obey 
than to command. He will preserve his own liberty 
as scrupulously as he respects the liberty of others. 

Exactly similar considerations apply to the conduct 
of nations, but they are obscured by traditional 
phrases about "honour," "patriotism," " sacred tra- 
ditions," or "the protection of women and children." 
It is assumed that a nation which does not oppose force 
with force must be actuated by cowardice, and must 
lose whatever is valuable in its civilisation. Both 



44 JUSTICE IN WAE-TIME 

these are illusions. To oppose force by passive non- 
obedience would require more courage, and would be 
far more likely to preserve the best elements of the 
national life. It would also do far more to discourage 
the use of force. This would be the way of practical 
wisdom, if men could be brought to believe it. But 
I fear men are too much wedded to the belief that 
patriotism is a virtue, and too fond of proving their 
superiority to others in a contest of force. People who 
object to the doctrine that might is right always con- 
tend that it will be disproved by showing that might 
is on their own side. Yet that would only be a dis- 
proof if their side were in the wrong, and their argu- 
ment shows that they really believe the doctrine they 
are pretending to combat. Those who genuinely 
disbelieve the doctrine will not attempt to disprove it 
by getting might on their side. 

Let us imagine that England were to disband its 
army and navy, after a generation of instruction in 
the principles of passive resistance as a better defence 
than war. Let us suppose that England at the same 
time publicly announced that no armed opposition 
would be offered to an invader, that all might come 
freely, but that no obedience would be yielded to any 
commands that a foreign authority might issue. What 
would happen in this case ? 

Suppose, to continue the argument, that the German 
Government wished to take advantage of England's 
defenceless condition. It would be faced, at the out- 
set, by the opposition of whatever was not utterly 
brutal in Germany, since no possible cloak could be 
found to hide the nakedness of aggression. All 



WAR AND NON-EESISTANCE 45 

civilised countries, when they engage in war, find some 
decent excuse: they fight, almost always, either in 
self-defence or in defence of the weak. No such 
excuse could be found in this case. It could no longer 
be said, as the Germans now say, that England's 
naval preponderance keeps other nations in bondage, 
and threatens the very existence of any nation which 
depends upon imported food. It could no longer be 
said that we were oppressing India, since India would 
be able to separate from the British Empire whenever 
it wished to do so. All the usual pretexts by which 
aggression is justified would be lacking. When 
America attacked Spain, it was to liberate the Cubans, 
against whom Spain was carrying on a war. When 
England attacked the Transvaal, the Poet Laureate, 
the Times, Messrs. Werner, Beit and Co., and the 
other imperialist magnates who represented the 
ancient traditions of the British race, solemnly assured 
us that our intervention was necessary for the safety 
of English women in Johannesburg, and for the libera- 
tion of the natives from virtual slavery to the Boers. 
These pleas deceived many people who, though no 
doubt not unwilling to be deceived, would yet have 
shrunk from an aggression which could not be in any 
way disguised. And it was said that the Boers aimed 
at the conquest of the whole of South Africa : we were 
told that, if ever England found itself entangled in a 
European war, Cape Colony would be overrun, and its 
English colonists would be subjected to a tyranny. In 
any civilised country, arguments of this kind are 
always used in justifying even the most aggressive 
war. 



46 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

If England had no army and no navy, the Germans 
would be hard put to it to find a pretext for invasion. 
All the Liberal elements in Germany would oppose 
any such enterprise ; so would all other nations, unless 
Germany offered them a share of the plunder. But 
let us suppose all home opposition overcome, and a 
force despatched to England to take possession of the 
country. Such a force, since it would meet with no 
military opposition, would not need to be large, and 
would not be in the state of mingled fear and ferocity 
which characterises an invading army among a hostile 
population. There would be no difficulty in preserving 
military discipline, and no opportunity for the rape 
and rapine which have always been displayed by 
troops after victory in battle. There would be no glory 
to be won, not even enough to earn one iron cross. The 
Germans could not congratulate themselves upon their 
military prowess, or imagine that they were displaying 
the stern self-abnegation believed to be shown by 
willingness to die in the fight. To the soldierly mind, 
the whole expedition would be ridiculous, causing a 
feeling of disgust instead of pride. Perhaps a few 
impudent street-boys might have to have their ears 
boxed, but otherwise there would be nothing to lend 
dignity to the expedition. 

However, we will suppose the invading army 
arrived in London, where they would evict the King 
from Buckingham Palace and the Members from the 
House of Commons. A few able bureaucrats would 
be brought over from Berlin to consult with the Civil 
Servants in Whitehall as to the new laws by which the 
reign of Kultur was to be inaugurated. No difficulty 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 47 

would be expected in managing so tame a nation, and 
at first almost all the existing officials would be con- 
firmed in their offices. For the government of a large 
modern State is a complicated matter, and it would be 
thought well to facilitate the transition by the help of 
men familiar with the existing machinery. 

But at this point, if the nation showed as much 
courage as it has always shown in fighting, difficulties 
would begin. All the existing officials would refuse 
to co-operate with the Germans. Some of the more 
prominent would be imprisoned, perhaps even shot, in 
order to encourage the others. But if the others held 
firm, if they refused to recognise or transmit any order 
given by Germans, if they continued to carry out the 
decrees previously made by the English Parliament 
and the English Government, the Germans would have 
to dismiss them all, even to the humblest postman, 
and call in German talent to fill the breach. 

The dismissed officials could not all be imprisoned 
or shot: since no fighting would have occurred, such 
wholesale brutality would be out of the question. And 
it would be very difficult for the Germans suddenly, 
out of nothing, to create an administrative machine. 
Whatever edicts they might issue would be quietly 
ignored by the population. If they ordered that 
German should be the language taught in schools, the 
schoolmasters would go on as if no such order had been 
issued; if the schoolmasters were dismissed, the 
parents would no longer send the children to school. 
If they ordered that English young men should under- 
go military service, the young men would simply re- 
fuse ; after shooting a few, the Germans would have to 



48 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

give up the attempt in despair. If they tried to raise 
revenue by customs duties at the ports, they would 
have to have German customs officers ; this would lead 
to a strike of all the dock labourers, so that this way 
of raising revenue would become impossible. If they 
tried to take over the railways, there would be a strike 
of the railway servants. Whatever they touched 
would instantly become paralysed, and it would soon 
be evident, even to them, that nothing was to be made 
out of England unless the population could be con- 
ciliated. 

Such a method of dealing with invasion would, of 
course, require fortitude and discipline. But fortitude 
and discipline are required in war. For ages past, 
education has been largely directed to producing these 
qualities for the sake of war. They now exist so 
widely that in every civilised country almost every 
man is willing to die on the battlefield whenever his 
Government thinks the moment suitable. The same 
courage and idealism which are now put into war 
could quite easily be directed by education into the 
channel of passive resistance. I do not know what 
losses England may suffer before the present war is 
ended, but if they amount to a million no one will be 
surprised. An immensely smaller number of losses, 
incurred in passive resistance, would prove to any 
invading army that the task of subjecting England to 
alien domination was an impossible one. And this 
proof would be made once for all, without dependence 
upon the doubtful accidents of war. 

In internal politics, in all democratic countries, the 
very method we have been considering is constantly 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 49 

practised, with continually increasing success. Even 
in Russia, it was the general strike which secured the 
Constitution of 1905. For a generation, terrorists had 
uselessly copied the methods of militarists by bomb- 
throwing and assassination; they had achieved 
nothing except to afford the authorities an excuse for 
ruthless repression — an excuse not only to the public, 
but also to their own consciences, since they appeared 
to themselves, as soldiers do, to be brave men facing 
death in the public service. After all the years of 
fruitless violence, it was the method of passive non- 
obedience which secured the momentary victory, after- 
wards lost through disunion and a return to violence. 
And in all the dealings of democratic Governments 
with labour troubles or with irreconciliable minorities, 
it is this same power of passive resistance that comes 
into play. In a civilised, highly organised, highly 
political State, government is impossible without the 
consent of the governed. Any object for which a con- 
siderable body of men are prepared to starve and die 
can be achieved by political means, without the need 
of any resort to force. And if this is true of objects 
only desired by a minority, it is a thousand times more 
true of objects desired unanimously by the whole 
nation. 

But it may be said that, even if the Germans could 
not actually take over the government of England, or 
rob us of internal self-government, they could do two 
things which would injure us vitally : they could take 
away our Empire, and they could levy a tribute by 
the threat of depriving us of food supplies. 

The Germans could not take away the self-governing 



50 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

parts of our Empire, since they would encounter there 
the same difficulties as would prevent them from 
governing England. They could take away those 
parts of our Empire which we hold by force, and this 
would be a blow to our pride : the oppression of subject 
races is one of the chief sources of patriotic satisfac- 
tion, and one of the chief things for which Germany 
envies us. But it is not a source of pride to any 
rational or humane man. European rule over un- 
civilised races is, in fact, a very sordid affair. The 
best of the men whom it employs are those engaged in 
the attempt at government, who live in exile and 
usually die of fever; the rest grow rich selling rum 
to natives or making them work in mines. Meanwhile 
the natives degenerate: some die of drink, some of 
diseases caught from white men, some of consumption 
in the mines; those who survive contract the vices of 
civilisation without losing the vices of barbarism. It 
can only be a blessing to any nation to be deprived of 
this source of pride, which is a canker of corruption 
and immorality in the life of democratic communities. 
That the Germans could levy a tribute on England 
by threatening our food supplies is obviously true. 
The ethics of such a demand would be exactly the 
same as that of the highwayman who demands "your 
money or your life. ' ' The same reasons which would 
lead a reasonable man to give his money rather than 
shoot or be shot would also lead a reasonable nation 
to give a tribute rather than resist by force of arms. 
The greatest sum that foreigners could theoretically 
exact would be the total economic rent of the land and 
natural resources of England. In fact, economic rent 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 51 

may be defined as what can be, and historically has 
been, extorted by such means. The rent now paid to 
landowners in England is the outcome of the exactions 
made by William the Conquerer and his barons. The 
law-courts are the outcome of those set up at that 
time, and the law which they administer, so far as 
land is concerned, represents simply the power of the 
sword. From inertia and lack of imagination, the 
English at the present day continue to pay to the land- 
owners a vast sum to which they have no right but 
that of conquest. The working classes, the shop- 
keepers, manufacturers, and merchants, the literary 
men, and the men of science — all the people who make 
England of any account in the world — have at most an 
infinitesimal and accidental share in the rental of 
England. The men who have a share use their rents 
in luxury, political corruption, taking the lives of 
birds, and depopulating and enslaving the rural dis- 
tricts. This way of life is that which almost all Eng- 
lish men and women consider the most admirable: 
those who are anywhere near achieving it struggle to 
attain it completely, and those who are more remote 
read serial stories about it as their ancestors would 
have read of the joys of Paradise. 

It is this life of the idle rich which would be cur- 
tailed if the Germans exacted a tribute from England. 
Everything in England that is not positively harmful 
would be untouched : wages and other earned incomes 
could not be diminished without diminishing the pro- 
ductivity of English labour, and so lessening Eng- 
land's capacity for paying tribute. Our snobbish in- 
stincts, if the idle rich were abolished, might be driven, 



52 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

by want of other outlet, into the admiration of real 
merit. And if the Germans could effect this for us, 
they would well deserve their tribute. 

It is very doubtful, indeed, whether the Germans 
would exact from us a larger tribute than we exact 
from ourselves in resisting them. There is no know- 
ing what this war will have cost England when it ends, 
but we shall probably not exaggerate if we place the 
cost at a thousand million pounds.* This represents 
an annual payment of forty million pounds. All this, 
together with the annual expenditure on our Army 
and Navy, we might have paid to the Germans without 
being any poorer than we shall be when the war ends. 
This represents an incredibly larger tribute than we 
derive from India; yet the Germans assure us that 
we are full of commercial cunning, and that we govern 
India solely for our own profit. If they believe this, 
it is hardly to be supposed that the receipt of such a 
tribute would fail to satisfy them. Meanwhile we 
should have avoided the death of our young men, the 
moral degradation of almost our whole population, 
and the lowering of the standard of civilisation slowly 
achieved through centuries which were peaceful in 
comparison with our present condition. 

But, of course, all that I have been saying is fan- 
tastic, degrading, and out of touch with reality. I 
have been assuming that men are to some extent- 
guided by reason, that their actions are directed to 
ends such as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi- 
ness.' ' This is not the case. Death, slavery, and 

♦It is now (September, 1915) evident that this is an under- 
estimate. 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 53 

unhappiness (for others) are the chief ends pursued 
by States in their external relations. It is the prefer- 
ence of such ends to one's own happiness that consti- 
tutes patriotism, that shows a man to be free from 
materialism, and that raises him above the commercial, 
money-grubbing level of the mere shopkeeper. The 
Prussian feels himself noble because he is willing to 
be killed provided men of other nations are killed at 
the same time. His nobility and his freedom from 
commercialism consists in the fact that he desires the 
misery of others more than his own happiness. And 
there is a Prussian lurking in each of us, ready to 
make us reject any national advantage which is not 
purchased by injury to some other nation. It is this 
lurking Prussian in our instincts who assures us that a 
policy of non-resistance would be tame and cowardly, 
unworthy of a great and proud nation, a failure to per- 
form our duty of chastising an exactly similar pride 
in other nations. 

Pride has its place among virtues, in the lives of 
individuals as well as in the lives of nations. Pride, 
in so far as it is a virtue, is a determination not to be 
turned aside from the ends which a man thinks good, 
no matter what outside pressure may be brought to 
bear upon him. There is pride in Condorcet, sen- 
tenced to the guillotine, spending his last days in 
writing a book on human progress. There is pride in 
those who refuse to recant their religious convictions 
under persecution. Such pride is the noblest form of 
courage: it shows that self-determination of the will 
which is the essence of spiritual freedom. But such 
pride should have as its complement a just conception 



54 JUSTICE IN WAK-TIME 

of what constitutes human welfare, and as it correla- 
tive a respect for the freedom of others as absolute as 
the determination to preserve freedom for ourselves. 
Exactly the same kind of pride is good in the life of a 
nation. If we think ill of war, while some other nation 
thinks well of it, let us show our national pride by 
living without war, whatever temptations the other 
nation may put in our way to live according to their 
ideals rather than according to our own. The Ger- 
mans, we are given to understand, hate us with a 
bitter hatred, and long to believe that we feel towards 
them as they feel towards us; for unrequited hatred 
is as bitter as unrequited love. They have made it 
increasingly difficult not to gratify their desire; but 
in so far as we can keep our resistance free from bitter- 
ness we win a spiritual victory over what deserves to 
be combated in the enemy, which is far more impor- 
tant than any victory to be won by guns and bayonets. 
But this kind of pride is not the kind which patriots 
exhort us to display. The pride that they admire is 
the kind which aims at thwarting others ; it is the pride 
of power. Having suspected that the Germans desired 
Morocco and Mesopotamia, we were proud of the fact 
that we prevented them from acquiring either. 
Having found that the Boers desired independence, 
we were proud of the fact that we made them submit 
to our rule. This kind of pride consists merely in love 
of dominion. Dominion and power can only be con- 
clusively shown by compelling others to forego what 
they desire. By a natural consequence, those in whom 
the love of power is strong are led to inflict pain and 
to use force against the perfectly legitimate desires of 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 55 

those whom they wish to subdue. In nations, this 
nation's history are not those who have benefited man- 
kind, but those who have injured other nations. If 
we prided ourselves upon the good and not the harm 
that we have done, we should have put Shakespeare 
in the Nelson Monument, and given Apsley House to 
Darwin. But the citizens whom every nation honours 
most are those who have killed the greatest number 
of foreigners. 

It is this pride of power which makes us unwilling to 
yield to others in matters of no intrinsic importance. 
The Germans cherish a desire to own African swamps, 
of which we have a superfluity. No one in England 
benefits by the possession of them, except a few finan- 
cial magnates, mostly of foreign origin. If we were 
reasonable, we should regard the German desire as a 
curious whim, which we might gratify without any 
real national loss. Instead of that, we regard the Ger- 
man desire as a crime, and our resistance to it as a 
virtue. We teach school children to rejoice because so 
much of the map is painted red. In order that as much 
as possible may be painted red, we are willing to sacri- 
fice those ideals of freedom which we have led 
mankind, and, if necessary, to adopt all the worst 
features of the Prussian spirit. This is because we 
fear the external enemy, who kills the body, more than 
the internal enemy, who kills the soul. The soul of a 
nation, if it is a free soul, without slavishness and with- 
out tyranny, cannot be killed by any outward enemy. 
And if men would realize this, the panic fear which 
the nations feel one toward another would be expelled 



56 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

by a better pride than that of diplomatists and war- 
lords. 

The armies and navies of the world are kept up by 
three causes: cowardice, love of dominion, and lust 
for blood. 

It is cowardice that makes it difficult to meet 
invasion by the method of passive resistance. More 
courage and discipline is needed for the successful 
practice of this method than for facing death in the 
heat of battle. But I am persuaded that there is 
in England enough courage and enough capacity for 
discipline to make success in passive resistance possi- 
ble, if education and moral teaching is directed to 
that end instead of to warlike prowess. It is cowardice 
also that makes men prefer the old method of trying 
to be stronger than your adversary (in which only one 
party can succeed), rather than a new method requir- 
ing imagination and a readjustment of traditional 
standards. Yet, if men could think outside the well- 
worn grooves, there are many plain facts which show 
the folly of conventional statesmanship. Why has 
Germany invaded Prance ? Because the French have 
an army. Why has England attacked Germany ? Be- 
cause the Germans have a navy. Yet people persist in 
thinking that the French army and the German navy 
contribute to national safety. Nothing could be more 
obvious than the facts ; nothing could be more univer- 
sal than men 's blindness to them. 

The second reason for keeping up the armies and 
navies of the world is love of dominion. The Germans, 
in the Morocco controversy, announced that nothing 
of importance was to happen anywhere without their 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 57 

being consulted. We regarded this as monstrous 
arrogance ; but for two centuries we had advanced the 
same claim as a matter of course. The matters about 
which diplomatists raise a pother are usually of only 
microscopic importance to the welfare of ordinary 
citizens: they are matters involving national 
" prestige," that is to say, the power of the State to 
prevent other States from doing as they wish. This 
power is sometimes partly based on money, but in the 
main it rests on armies and navies. If our navy had 
been smaller, we should not have been able to defeat 
the German desire for an Atlantic port in Morocco. It 
would have done us no harm if the Germans had 
acquired Casablanca, but we enjoyed the thought that 
our fiat kept them out. The procuring of such pleas- 
ures is the second purpose served by armies and navies. 
The third purpose of armaments— indeed their 
primary and original purpose, from which all others 
are derivative— is to satisfy the lust for blood. Fight- 
ing is an instinctive activity of males, both animal and 
human. Human males, being gregarious, naturally 
fight in packs. It has been found that the pack tends 
to be more successful against other packs when fighting 
within the pack is as far as possible prevented. For 
this purpose, the law and the police have been insti- 
tuted. But the shedding of human blood is still con- 
sidered the most glorious thing a man can do, provided 
he does it in company with the rest of his pack. War, 
like marriage, is the legally permitted outlet for a 
certain instinct. But the instinct which leads to war, 
unlike the instinct which leads to marriage, so far from 
being necessary to the human race, is wholly harmful 



58 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

among civilised men. It is an instinct which easily 
becomes atrophied in a settled community : many men 
have hardly a trace of it. Unfortunately, as men grow 
older, their affections and their powers of thought de- 
cay. For this reason, and also because power stimu- 
lates the love of power, the men who have most influ- 
ence in government are usually men whose passions 
and impulses are less civilised than those of the aver- 
age citizen. These men — the great financiers, the 
Ministers, and some editors of daily papers — use their 
position, their knowledge, and their power of dissem- 
inating misinformation, to arouse and stimulate the 
latent instinct for bloodshed. When they have suc- 
ceeded, they say that they are reluctantly forced into 
war by the pressure of public opinion. Their activities 
are exactly analogous to those of men who distribute 
indecent pictures or produce lascivious plays. They 
ought to be viewed in the same light; but because of 
the notion that a wish to kill foreigners is patriotic 
and virtuous, they are honoured as men who have de- 
served well of their country. They provide an outlet 
for the impulse to homicide. To gratify this impulse 
is the third and ultimate purpose of armies and navies. 
All these three motives for armaments — cowardice, 
love of dominion, and lust for blood — are no longer in- 
eradicable in civilised human nature. All are dimin- 
ishing under the influence of modern social organisa- 
tion. All might be reduced to a degree which could 
make them almost inocuous, if early education and 
current moral standards were directed to that end. 
Passive resistance, if it were adopted deliberately by 
the will of a whole nation, with the same measure of 



WAR AND NON-RESISTANCE 59 

courage and discipline which is now displayed in war, 
might achieve a far more perfect protection for what 
is good in national life than armies and navies can ever 
achieve, without demanding the courage and waste 
and welter of brutality involved in modern war. 

Nevertheless, it is hardly to be expected that prog- 
ress will come in this way, because the imaginative 
effort required is too great. It is much more likely 
that it will come as the reign of law within the State 
has come, by the establishment of a central govern- 
ment of the world, able and willing to secure obedience 
by force, because the great majority of men will recog- 
nise that obedience is better than the present inter- 
national anarchy. A central government of this kind 
will command assent, not as a partisan, but as the 
representative of the interests of the whole. Very 
soon, resistance to it would be seen to be hopeless, and 
wars would cease. Force directed by a neutral author- 
ity is not open to the same abuse, or likely to cause the 
same long-drawn conflicts, as force exercised by quar- 
relling nations each of which is the judge of its own 
cause. Although I firmly believe that the adoption of 
passive instead of active resistance would be good if a 
nation could be convinced of its goodness, yet it is 
rather to the ultimate creation of a strong central 
authority that I should look for the ending of war. 
But war will only end after a great labour has been 
performed in altering men's moral ideals, directing 
them to the good of all mankind, and not only of the 
separate nations into which men happen to have been 
born. 



WHY NATIONS LOVE WAR* 

When the war broke out, many normally pacific peo- 
ple, headed by Mr. H. G. Wells, proclaimed their belief 
that "this is a war which will end war." Yet they 
were unintentionally illustrating, by their state of 
mind, the chief reason for doubting whether this war 
will end war and the chief obstacle which pacifists will 
have to overcome if their efforts are ever to be crowned 
with success. It was obvious that those who pro- 
claimed their belief that there would never be another 
great war were actually enjoying the present war and 
that, in spite of a conventional recognition that 
war is a misfortune, they were happier, more alive, 
suffering less from what Mr. Graham Wallas calls 
" balked disposition," than in times of peace. Their 
belief that this war will end war was obviously not 
based on reason, but on an unconscious effort to 
reconcile their present enjoyment with their sincere 
but not deeply felt belief that war is an evil. My 
object is to analyse and try to understand this wide- 
spread enjoyment of war — a phenomenon, as I think, 
of the very greatest importance, which, from homage 
to humanitarian ideals, men in this country have not 
sufficiently emphasised or allowed for, either in their 
expectations or in their views as to what has occurred 
throughout Europe. 

. In the days of crisis preceding the war every nation 
in Europe (if one can judge by the newspapers, inter- 

* Reprinted from War and Peace, November, 1914. 



WHY NATIONS LOVE WAR 61 

pre ted in the light of what was occurring in England) 
went through a certain instinctive development as 
definite as falling in love, though much more complex. 
It might have been expected that the populations 
which must suffer by war would have urged upon their 
Governments the importance of attempting to find a 
diplomatic solution. But in fact what occurred was 
exactly the opposite: every Government became in- 
creasingly popular as war drew nearer, the advantages 
of peace were forgotten or recalled coldly without 
conviction, and the desire to have done with negotia- 
tions was everywhere loudly expressed by enthusiastic 
crowds. If a diplomatic solution had been found at 
the last moment, there would have been almost univer- 
sal disappointment, and every Government would 
have had to face fierce attacks for its weakness in 
yielding to the arrogance and unscrupulousness of the 
enemy. 

This whole collective state of mind illustrated an 
instinctive disposition of human nature, stronger, no 
doubt, in some nations, such as the Germans, than 
in others, but present, to some degree, wherever vigour 
and vital energy are to be found. 

The basis of the whole state of mind is the instinct 
of every gregarious animal to co-operate with mem- 
bers of its own herd and to oppose members of other 
herds. There is in the natural man an instinctive dis- 
like and distrust of men whose ways are different, who 
are felt as foreign ; and round this instinctive dislike 
a whole set of appropriate beliefs tend to congregate — 
that the foreigner is wicked, that he has hostile de- 
signs, and that his customs are impious. With the 



62 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

instinctive dislike and distrust goes an impulse to co- 
operate, for defence or attack, with those who are 
recognised as not foreigners. It is this double dispo- 
sition to co-operation and hostility which forms the 
motive power in patriotism, though it is perhaps sur- 
prising that so primitive a feeling can attach itself to 
somewhat artificial aggregations such as modern States 
or even alliances of States. 

Round this entirely primitive feeling a number of 
others are grouped in the civilised man's desire for 
war. There is first of all the desire for excitement — 
that is to say, for the exercise, actually or in imagina- 
tion, of instinctive activities normally kept in check by 
the restraints of civilised life. Love of excitement is 
not a primitive impulse : it is a desire for the letting 
loose of some instinct, no matter what, as a relief from 
a life unduly full of inhibitions. In modern urban 
populations this is no doubt one of the most powerful 
incentives to war; but it could not operate without 
the other more direct and more primitive impulse as 
its foundation. 

Strong incentives, to many men, are derived from 
the desires for triumph, for honour, and for power. 
Under the influence of national self-esteem, every great 
country believes itself superior to all others in fighting 
capacity and in courage. Englishmen in times of 
peace chafe at the thought that their Navy, the great- 
est in the world, has no opportunity of showing its 
merits; Germans, similarly, have longed to show the 
excellence of their Army. Every man believes that the 
fighting forces of his own country will prove, on the 
battlefield, to be far better than the enemy has sup- 



WHY NATIONS LOVE WAR 63 

posed, and will win honour at the expense of the 
enemy. This is a widespread popular feeling, prob- 
ably more operative among ordinary citizens than 
among those who direct policy or have a close knowl- 
edge of public affairs. On the other hand the pleasure 
in the contemplation of the power which victory will 
bring operates most among those who have an intimate 
knowledge of modern history or current politics : the 
pleasure of redrawing (in imagination) the map of 
Europe has blinded many of the educated classes both 
here and in Germany to the ravages and inhumanity 
of war. All these pleasures, which, if they stood 
alone, would be recognised as somewhat base, are lib- 
erated and excused by the fear of what the enemy 
would do if he were not defeated. 

War is felt to be the ultimate test of a nation's 
manhood, the ultimate proof of its vigour and of its 
right to exist. In war there can be no doubt that 
both sides are in earnest; to force one's will on the 
enemy in so terrific a contest is regarded as unanswer- 
able evidence of superiority in those qualities of 
courage and determination which most men honour 
above all others and above all others wish to be known 
to possess. For this reason the victorious side always 
tries to persuade itself that its victory has not been 
due to superior numbers; and for this reason victory 
with the bayonet gives more pleasure than victory 
by a more skilful use of artillery. 

With this desire to prove the nation 's manhood goes 
the feeling which makes it so difficult to give way in 
negotiations, the fear of seeming craven or mean- 
spirited. Even if reason clearly shows the desirability 



64 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

of giving way, * even if the point is one which would 
be readily conceded if not demanded with overt or 
covert threats, it becomes impossible to give way as 
soon as fear may be supposed to be the motive. The 
feeling of shame that would accompany yielding under 
such circumstances is one of the strongest reasons for 
the popular clamour in favour of war which arises as 
soon as a crisis becomes acute. 

Besides all these motives there is another, more 
idealistic, almost religious: a passionate devotion to 
the Nation, conceived as an entity with a life of its 
own, surviving the lives of the present citizens, and 
passing on to their children, the better or the worse for 
what is done now. With this passionate devotion goes 
a desire for self-sacrifice, for immolation to further 
an end greater than anything in any individual life. 
This impulse of heroism for the welfare of the nation 
is more widespread than any other kind of subordi- 
nation to something outside Self, with the sole 
exception of parental affection. It is by far the 
noblest of the motives that make for war, and it ought 
not to be combated by merely material considerations 
such as the economic exhaustion produced by war. 

Being itself in essence religious, like the impulses 
that lead to martyrdom, it can only be adequately com- 
bated by a wider religion, extending the boundaries of 
one's country to all mankind. But by this extension it 
loses the support and reinforcement of the primitive 
gregarious instinct underlying patriotism, and thus 
becomes, except in a few men gifted with an excep- 
tional power of love, a very pale and thin feeling com- 
pared to the devotion that leads a man to face death 



WHY NATIONS LOVE WAR 65 

willingly on the battlefield. It is this fact, more per- 
haps than any other, which causes the difficulties of 
pacifism. 

I do not wish, however, to suggest any pessimism 
as to the possibility of leading civilised nations to 
abandon the practice of war. The primitive instinct 
of collective hostility to strangers, which is at the basis 
of popular love of war, depends, like other instincts, 
upon its appropriate stimulus. No hostility is more 
instinctive than that of cat and dog, yet a cat and a 
dog brought up together will become good friends. In 
like manner, familiarity with foreigners, absence of 
journalistic incitements to fear and suspicion, realisa- 
tion that their likeness to ourselves is much greater 
than their unlikeness, will entirely prevent the growth 
of the impulse to go to war. The desires for triumph 
and power can be satisfied by the ordinary contests of 
football and politics, unless the nation's pride is 
embodied in large and efficient armaments. The 
feeling that war is the ultimate test of a nation's man- 
hood depends upon a rather barbarous standard of 
values, a belief that superiority in physical force is 
the most desirable form of superiority. This belief has 
largely died out as between individuals in a civilised 
country, and it seems not Utopian to hope that it may 
die out as between nations. The day may come when 
we shall be as proud of Shakespeare as of Nelson. 

The same change in a nation's standard of values 
will alter the direction of the quasi-religious devotion 
to one's native country. If victory in a contest of 
material force ceases to be considered the supreme 
good for a nation, the desire to be of service will find 



66 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

other channels than war and will no longer be bound 
up with injury to other nations. Patriotism in its 
present form is essentially an ideal involving strife 
and therefore partial and inadequate; with a better 
conception of what constitutes a nation's good the 
element of strife would disappear. 

It is important, in any case, to arrive at a true 
diagnosis of the impulses which lead nations to war. 
There are times — especially the time immediately 
after a war — when nations are in a pacific mood and 
anxious to find ways of preventing future conflicts. 
It may be hoped that Europe as a whole will be in a 
pacific mood for some time after the end of the present 
war; and if the utmost permanent good is to result 
from the hopes of such a period, it is before all things 
necessary that the cause of war should be thoroughly 
understood. I do not believe this is to be found 
merely in the sins of statesmen, but rather in the 
standards and desires which civilised nations have 
inherited from a barbarous past. If this is the case, 
a stable peace can only be attained by a process of 
popular education and by a gradual change in the 
standards of value accepted by men who are con- 
sidered to be civilised. 



FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY 

If the Germans are to be believed, their only im- 
placable and unappeasable enmity in the war is 
against England. 

Toward France they express a kind of brutal, con- 
temptuous liking. As providing opportunities for 
military glory in 1870 and again last August, France 
has deserved well of the Fatherland. Toward Russia 
they have the tolerance of merely momentary hostility, 
with the consciousness that the grounds of quarrel are 
finite and capable of adjustment. But toward 
England they express a hatred which nothing can 
satisfy except the utter destruction of England's 
power. Portugal, Spain, Holland, were once great 
maritime and colonial empires, but they are fallen 
from their high estate; so England is to fall, if 
Germany in its present mood is to have its way. 

This attitude is not confined to journalists or the 
thoughtless multitude ; it is to be found equally in the 
deliberate writings of learned men. Very instructive 
from this point of view is an article by the historian 
Eduard Meyer, in the Italian periodical Scientia, 
on England's war against Germany and the problems 
of the future.* The erudite professor, following 
Mommsen, considers Germany as the analogue of 
Rome and England as the analogue of Carthage. He 
hardly hopes for a decisive victory now, but looks 

•Reprinted from the Atlantic Monthly, July, 1915. 
•"Englands Krieg gegen Deutschland und die Probleme der 
Zukunft" ; March, 1915, pp. 286-300. 



68 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

forward to a succession of conflicts like the Punic 
Wars, ending, we are to suppose, in an equally final 
triumph. "Especially in America," he says, "but 
also in Europe, above all in the neutral countries, 
there are not a few well-meaning people who believe 
that this tremendous war will be the last for a long 
time to come, that a new era of peaceful development 
and of harmonious international peace will follow. I 
regard these views as a Utopian dream. Their realis- 
ation could be hoped for only in case we should 
succeed in really casting England to the ground, 
breaking her maritime dominion, and thereby con- 
quering the freedom of the seas, and at the same time 
in so controlling our other enemies that they would 
lose for ever the desire to attack us again. But so 
high our hopes can hardly rise; it seems far more 
probable that we shall have to be content with much 
less, even if we remain victorious to the end. But 
then, so far as one can foresee, this peace will only 
be a short truce; England will use the first oppor- 
tunity of beginning the fight again, better prepared, 
at the head of a new coalition if not of the old one, 
and a long series of difficult and bloody wars will 
follow, until at last the definite decision is obtained. ' ' 
He adds that modern civilisation, from now on, is to 
decline, as ancient civilisation declined; that the era 
of attempts at international friendship is definitely 
past, and that "the characteristic of the next century 
will be unconquerable opposition and embittered hate 
between England and Germany.' ' 

Very similar sentiments are expressed by English 
professors, except that their military hopes are less 



FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY 69 

modest, and they expect to achieve in this war that 
crushing victory which, like Eduard Meyer, they 
regard as the only possible road to a permanent peace. 
They hope, at any rate, to crush German militarism, 
and Professor Meyer assures us that "whoever intends 
to destroy German militarism must destroy the 
German nation."* 

Are the professors of England and Germany in the 
right? Is it certain that these two nations will con- 
tinue to fight and hate each other until one of them 
is utterly broken? Fortunately, no country consists 
wholly of professors, not even Germany; and it may 
be hoped that more sanity is to be found among those 
who have not been made mad by much learning. For 
the moment, both countries are wholly blind to their 
own faults, and utterly fantastic in the crimes which 
they attribute to the enemy. A vast but shadowy 
economic conflict has been invented to rationalise their 
hostility, which in fact is as irrational and instinctive 
as that of dogs who snarl and fly at each other in the 
street. The cynic who said, "Speech has been given 
us to conceal our thoughts, ' ' might well have added, 
'Thought has been given us to conceal our passions 
from ourselves. " At least I am sure that this is true 
of thought in war-time. 

In this article, I wish to examine, in a neutral spirit, 
the causes and supposed justifications of Anglo- 
German enmity, and to suggest ways by which it may 
be possible hereafter to avoid the appalling conse- 
quences contemplated by Professor Meyer. 

* English professors now (September, 1915) have come into 
almost exact agreement with Eduard Meyer. 



70 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

The first thing that must strike any impartial 
observer of England and Germany in war-time is their 
amazing similarity in myth and melodrama. France 
and Russia each has its myth, for without myth no 
great national upheaval is possible. But their myths 
are different from ours, whereas the myths of England 
and Germany are all but identical. Each believes 
itself a great peace-loving nation, powerful, but 
always using its power to further worthy ends. Each 
believes that the other, with an incredible perfidy 
inspired by the basest jealousy, suddenly stirred up 
the war, after many years of careful preparation, 
military in the one case, diplomatic in the other. 
Each believes that only the utter humiliation of the 
other can secure the peace of the world and the 
ordered progress of civilisation. In each, a pacifist 
minority urges moderation in the use of victory, while 
yielding to none in the conviction that victory is the 
indispensable preliminary to any future reconstruc- 
tion. Each is absolutely confident of victory, and 
prepared for any sacrifice, however great, in order to 
secure victory. Each is quite unable to believe that 
the other is sincere in the opinion which it professes : 
its own innocence and the other's guilt are as clear as 
noonday, and can be denied only by the most abject 
hypocrisy. 

Both cannot be right in these opinions, and a priori 
it is not likely that either is right. No nation was 
ever so virtuous as each believes itself, and none was 
ever so wicked as each believes the other. If these 
beliefs survive the war, no real peace will be possible. 
Both nations have concentrated their energies so 



FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY 71 

wholly on making war that they have rendered it 
almost impossible to make peace. In normal times 
civilised and humane people find a difficulty in be- 
lieving that they do well to butcher each other. In 
order to overcome this feeling, journalists have filled 
the minds of their readers with such appalling 
accounts of the enemy's crimes that hatred has come 
to seem a noble indignation, and it has grown difficult 
to believe that any of our opponents deserve to live. 
Yet peace, if it is to be real, must be accompanied by 
respect, and must bring with it some sense of justice 
toward rival claims. "What these claims are, and what 
justice demands if they are to be reconciled, must be 
realised in some degree before the peace, if the peace 
is to heal the wounds which the war is inflicting. 

Apart from accusations of crime connected with the 
war, what have been the grounds of England's oppo- 
sition to Germany in recent years ? 

Far the most important ground has been fear of the 
German navy, not as it has hitherto been, but as it 
may become. It is said on the Continent — not only 
by Germans — that jealousy of Germany's economic 
development was an equal cause of hostility; but I 
believe this to be an entire mistake. America's eco- 
nomic development has been quite as remarkable as 
that of Germany, but it has not produced the slightest 
ripple of political hostility. The government in 
power, as free traders,* do not believe that the pros- 
perity of one country is economically injurious to that 
of another, and in this opinion a majority of the 

♦This was written before the Coalition Government was 
formed. 



72 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

nation agree with them. Most Germans think of trade 
in nationalist terms, but in England this habit is not 
very common. And whatever may be thought abroad, 
it is contrary to British political instincts to allow 
trade rivalry to cause diplomatic opposition — largely, 
no doubt, because we realise that a nation's trade is 
not necessarily injured by defeat in war. 

But whoever threatens our naval supremacy touches 
a sensitive nerve, awakening an instinctive movement 
of self -protection in all classes, even the most unedu- 
cated and the least conscious of international compli- 
cations. When the Germans, with their usual incau- 
tious explicitness, made the announcement, "Our 
future is on the sea," most Englishmen felt, almost 
without conscious thought, that the Germans might as 
well have announced that their future lay through the 
death of England's greatness and the starvation of 
our population. In vain the Germans protested that 
their navy was purely defensive, and was not intended 
to be as strong as ours. As we watched the carrying 
out of their Navy Law, as we realised how the era of 
dreadnoughts had diminished our superiority, some- 
thing not far removed from apprehension began to be 
felt; and in a proud nation apprehension inevitably 
shows itself in hostility. Because the apprehension 
was real and deep-seated, the hostility was rather 
blind and instinctive ; although, in the region of con- 
scious thought, the hopes of an understanding were 
not abandoned, yet in that deeper region out of which 
effective action springs, the belief in a future conflict 
had taken root and could no longer be dislodged. 

At the same time Germany's growing friendship 



FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY 73 

with Turkey produced uneasiness in our governing 
classes, with whom the consciousness of Indian prob- 
lems has become almost as much part of the texture of 
everyday thought as the need of naval supremacy. 
Our traditional policy of protecting the Turk, while it 
had caused untold misery in the Balkans, had been 
maintained chiefly on account of the Mohammedan 
population of India. When the Kaiser supplanted us 
at Constantinople, and announced himself the pro- 
tector of all Mohammedans, we dreaded the effect on 
the most warlike races of India; and our dread was 
not diminished by the Bagdad Railway, with the pros- 
pect which it opened of German colonisation in Meso- 
potamia and a German naval base on the Persian Gulf. 
But this motive, although it affected our government 
and that small section of the population which is alive 
to Indian problems, did not, like the challenge to our 
sea-power, affect all classes or attain the status of a 
question to be discussed at general elections. More- 
over, this whole problem was in its nature capable of 
diplomatic adjustment by mutual concessions ; indeed, 
we are told that an agreement had almost been con- 
cluded when the war broke out. 

Let us now try to see the history of the past fifteen 
years from the German point of view. Before speak- 
ing of their supposed grievances, I wish to say that I 
regard the whole theory out of which they spring as 
wholly mistaken : I do not believe that it is of any real 
importance to a nation to possess colonies or to develop 
either its military or its naval forces beyond the point 
which is necessary to prevent invasion. This, how- 
ever, is not the official English view; and the official 



74 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

German view seems, apart from questions of method, 
merely an echo of the principles by which English 
policy has been governed for centuries. It is only this 
similarity — not absolute validity — that I wish to 
exhibit in stating the German case. 

The Germans are commonly regarded as an excep- 
tionally aggressive nation. This is no doubt true of 
their spirit, but when we come to inquire into their 
actual acquisitions, we find that in recent years their 
gains of territory have been insignificant in compari- 
son with those of England and Russia, and approxi- 
mately equal to those of France. Since 1900, we have 
gained the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, we 
have consolidated our position in Egypt, and we 
have secured a protectorate over Southern Persia and 
its oil wells. The French, meanwhile, have gained 
about four-fifths of Morocco, and the Russians, though 
they have lost a small portion of Manchuria, have 
gained more than half of Persia. The Germans, in 
the same period, have gained only a not very valuable 
colony in West Africa.* Their designs in Morocco 
and Mesopotamia have been thwarted, largely by 
England's efforts. Yet they feel that their economic 

♦The following figures are not without interest: — 

Total area of colonies. 

Great Britain 11,429,078 square miles 

France 4,512,543 

Germany 1,027,820 

Increase in area of colonies since 1900. 

Great Britain 324,500 square miles 

Germany 100,820 

France 92,180 

The British increase consists almost wholly of the Transvaal, 
tion of the Congo ceded to Germany in 1911 ; and the German 
French increase consists almost wholly of Morocco, less the por- 
the Orange Free State, and the British sphere in Persia. The 
increase consists wholly of this portion of the Congo, less a 
small area in the Cameroons, ceded to France in 1911. The Rus- 
sian sphere in Persia contains 305,000 square miles and 6,400,000 
inhabitants. 



FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY 75 

progress and their growing population make the need 
of colonies far greater for them than for the French. 

I am not for a moment denying that we had weighty- 
reasons for our opposition to German expansion, 
though perhaps weightier reasons could have been 
found for not opposing it. I am only concerned, for 
the moment, with the way in which our actions im- 
pressed the Germans, not with the justification of our 
actions. The Germans, in spite of their progress, 
their energy, and their population, are very inferior 
in colonial possessions, not only to England and Rus- 
sia, but also to France. This seems to them unjust; 
but wherever they turn to try to acquire new colonies, 
England and England's navy block the way, because 
of our friendship with France, or our sensitiveness 
about India, or some other interest in the complicated 
web of our foreign policy. 

German aggressiveness, real and obnoxious as it has 
become, is the result of experience. Germany cannot, 
as we do, acquire colonies absent-mindedly, without 
intention, and almost without effort. When colonies 
were easier to acquire than they are now, Germany 
had not yet entered into the competition; and since 
Germany became a great Power, it has been handi- 
capped by naval inferiority and by the necessity of 
defending two frontiers. It is these accidents of his- 
tory and geography, rather than innate wickedness, 
which have produced German aggressiveness. The 
aims of German policy are closely similar to those 
which we have always pursued, but its methods cannot 
be the unobtrusive methods which we have usually 



76 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

adopted, because such methods, in the circumstances, 
would achieve nothing. 

Colonial ambitions are no doubt one reason why- 
Germany has developed a navy ; but another and still 
more imperative reason is the necessity of safe- 
guarding foreign trade. 

In the time of Bismarck, Germany had not yet 
become a great industrial nation : it was independent 
of foreign food, and its exports of manufactures were 
insignificant. Its industrial expansion dates from the 
introduction of the Bessemer process in 1879, by which 
its supplies of iron became possible to work at a profit. 
From that time onward, German industrial progress 
has been extraordinarily rapid; more and more, Ger- 
many has tended to become dependent, like England, 
upon the possibility of importing food and exporting 
manufactures. In this war, as we see, Germany is 
just able, by very painful economy, to subsist upon the 
stock of food in the country ; but another ten years of 
such development as was taking place before the war 
would have made this impossible. High agrarian pro- 
tection, which alone could have retarded the process, 
was naturally disliked by the manufacturers and the 
working classes, and could not be carried beyond a 
certain point for fear of leading to a triumph of 
Socialism. 

It thus became obvious that, in a few years' time, 
Germany would be liable to defeat by starvation in 
any war with a superior naval power. In 1900, when 
the Germans decided to build a great navy, the Triple 
Alliance was weaker than France and Russia on the 
sea. The wish not to be inferior to France and Russia 



FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY 77 

is enough to account for the beginnings of the German 
navy; the rivalry with us may perhaps have been no 
part of the original intention, but merely a result of 
the suspicions produced in England by the German 
programme. However that may be, it ought to have 
been obvious to the Germans that a strong navy was 
sure to make us hostile, and would therefore not serve 
the purposes for which it was intended unless it was 
stronger than our navy. But it could not be supposed 
that we should submit to the existence of a navy 
stronger than our own, unless we had first been utterly 
and hopelessly defeated; and there was no way of 
defeating us except by first having a navy stronger 
than ours. For these reasons, the German policy was 
inherently incapable of success. And yet, without 
success, all industrial progress and all colonial expan- 
sion remain perpetually at England's mercy. If we 
ask ourselves how we should feel if we were similarly 
at the mercy of Germany, we shall perhaps begin to 
understand why the Germans hate us. And yet we 
can hardly feel any sense of guilt, because a supreme 
navy is for us a matter of life and death. 

This dilemma must be faced, if we are to understand 
the conflict of England and Germany, and not regard 
it as merely due to wickedness on one side or on the 
other. After the war, sooner or later, exactly the 
same problem will have to be faced again. The native 
energy of the Germans cannot be permanently checked 
by defeat : after a longer or shorter period of recuper- 
ation, they will again feel that commercial safety and 
colonial expansion demand a strong navy, if they are 
not to be content to live on sufferance and to be com- 



78 JUSTICE IN WAE-TIME 

pelled to bow to England's will on all occasions of 
serious dispute. The problem is a new one, since 
hitherto England has been the only nation dependent 
for subsistence on food imported by sea, and England 
has had unquestioned naval supremacy. But if we 
are to avoid the century of internecine warfare con- 
templated by Eduard Meyer, we must find some solu- 
tion of the problem, and not be content merely to 
hope that, whenever war comes, we shall be victorious. 
Germany's industrial ambitions, at least, are entirely 
legitimate; and they alone make some security for 
German trade an imperative necessity. It is not only 
justice that makes it necessary to find a solution, but 
also self-preservation. It is impossible to know how 
submarines may develop; perhaps, in future, no 
degree of naval power will be sufficient to protect sea- 
borne trade. Even now, our position might be preca- 
rious if all the men and money which Germany has 
devoted to useless dreadnoughts had been devoted to 
the multiplication of submarines. After the war, our 
own future safety, as well as the peace of the world, 
will demand some new and statesmanlike development 
in our naval policy. 

No solution will be possible until it grows clear to 
the Germans that they cannot reasonably hope to 
become superior to us at sea. So long as that hope 
remains with them, they will go on struggling to 
acquire that complete world-dominion which they 
believe would result from possession of both the 
strongest navy and the strongest army in the world. 
It is to be expected that the present war will persuade 
them of the futility of their hopes. They speak to 



FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY 79 

neutrals of their wish to secure for all nations "the 
freedom of the sea," but the neutrals remain deaf to 
all their blandishments. The neutrals do not see how 
there would be more freedom under German suprem- 
acy than under that of England, and they do see 
that, so long as any nation has naval supremacy, it is 
better that it should be a nation without a strong army 
or the means of invasion. This will enable us to avoid 
hostile coalitions, and to make a German victory over 
us at some future date exceedingly unlikely. But it 
will not, by itself, prevent Germany from hating us, 
or from seeking every possible means of injuring us. 
And if Germany's industrial development continues, 
it will leave Germany increasingly dependent upon 
us for its means of subsistence in any war in which 
Russia is on our side. 

Such a situation will be full of danger to the peace 
of Europe and of possible harm to ourselves as well as 
to Germany. For the sake of the progress of civilisa- 
tion, and also for the sake of our security as well as 
Germany's, both nations, if they have any statesman- 
ship, will be driven to seek some means by which food- 
supply can be secured from the menace of attack by 
a hostile Power. 

Before this war, many would have thought that abo- 
lition of the right of capture at sea would achieve this 
object. But it is now evident that no reliance can be 
placed upon paper guarantees which are not backed 
by force. If it could be expected that a nation which 
resorted to capture at sea would have to face a coali- 
tion of neutrals, the practice of capture might be 
effectively abolished. But so long as neutrals do not 



80 JUSTICE IN WAE-TIMB 

intervene by force of arms to protect international 
law, it cannot be expected that its provisions will be 
observed; nor would they be observed if neutrals 
should intervene, unless they were sufficiently power- 
ful to turn the scale. If Germany's submarine 
blockade could have been made effective, all the neu- 
trals in the world would have been powerless to 
prevent it. 

In this matter, as also in regard to armies, the 
future of civilisation depends on the discovery of 
means which will make nations strong for defence but 
weak for attack. The naval problem is particularly 
urgent, because, if submarines develop as may be 
expected, navies will become strong for attack and 
weak for defence, "attack" being understood as in- 
cluding the capture or destruction of merchant ships. 

There is one obvious solution, which would be 
adopted if any large section of mankind were actuated 
by humanity or reason or even self-interest. If this 
were the case, national armies and navies would be 
abolished, and only an international army and navy 
would be retained, for police purposes. But among 
all the great Powers, pride is stronger than self- 
interest; men prefer the risk of death for themselves 
and their sons, the certainty of impoverishment and 
the possibility of national disaster, to loss of the oppor- 
tunity for bullying which is afforded by an army and 
a navy. Under these circumstances, there is probably 
no chance of a theoretically complete solution of the 
problem. The best hope is that through the expe- 
rience of the present war men will acquire a more firm 
resolve to preserve the peace, and neutrals will realise 



FUTURE OF ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY 81 

that war is a disaster even to those who do not take 
part in it. It may be that, in time, the powers not 
directly interested in a quarrel will insist upon its 
being always submitted to an international tribunal, 
and will make their insistence effective by threatening 
war if it is disregarded. In that case, any Power 
could secure safety by merely abstaining from aggres- 
sion. At present, no great Power wishes to make 
aggression impossible. But experience of war, the 
progress of democracy, and the growing economic 
interdependence of different countries, are causing 
rapid changes in public opinion. It is at least as 
rational to expect that the next hundred years will 
see the growth and victory of an international council 
for the settlement of all disputes between nations, as 
it is to expect, with Eduard Meyer, that they will see 
civilisation engulfed in a futile contest for supremacy 
between England and Germany. 

The learned historian, I am confident, does injus- 
tice to his compatriots; I know that he does injustice 
to the English. "Without hope, nothing will be 
achieved; but with hope, no limits can be set to 
what may be achieved toward realising the ideal of 
international co-operation. Is the victory of either 
side in this war likely to bring a stable peace ? Both 
in England and in Germany, men who have pro- 
fessed a horror of war, but who do not wish it thought 
that they oppose this war, have argued that their own 
country is notorious for its love of peace, of which it 
has given repeated proofs, laying it open to the 
charge of weakness; but that it has been attacked by 
unscrupulous enemies, and must quell their ruthless 



82 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

pride before the world can be relieved from the dread 
of war. This language is not insincere, but is the 
result of a very superficial analysis of the events and 
passions which led up to the conflict. Such an analy- 
sis, if allowed to pass unchallenged, is dangerous, 
since it leaves untouched all the misjudgment, suspi- 
cion, and pride out of which future wars, equally dev- 
astating, may be expected to grow in the course of 
the years. Something more than the mere victory 
of one party is necessary for a secure peace, and 
something deeper than a belief in the enemy's wicked- 
ness is necessary if the nations are to move towards 
that goal. I shall attempt first an analysis of the 
causes of modern war, and then a discussion of means 
of preventing future wars between civilised States. 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE !• 

I. 

The present war springs from the rivalry of States. 
And the rivalry of States springs from certain erron- 
eous beliefs, inspired and encouraged by pride and 
fear, and embodied in a political machinery intended 
to make the power of a State quick, effective, and 
terrible. If wars between civilised States are to 
cease, these beliefs must be seen to be mistaken, pride 
must take a different form, fear must become ground- 
less, and the machinery of international relations must 
no longer be designed solely for rivalry. 

In surveying the larger causes of the war, the 
diplomacy of the last fortnight may be left altogether 
out of account. Ever since the conclusion of the 
Anglo-French entente in 1904 the war had been on 
the point of breaking out, and could only have been 
avoided by some radical change in the temper of 
nations and Governments. The annexation of Alsace- 
Lorraine had produced a profound estrangement be- 
tween France and Germany. Russia and Germany 
became enemies through the Pan-Slavist agitation, 
which threatened the Austrian influence in the Bal- 
kans and even the very existence of the Austro-Hun- 
garian State. Finally the German determination to 
build a powerful Navy drove England into the arms 
of Russia and France. Our long-standing differences 
with those two countries were suddenly discovered 

•Reprinted from the Atlantic Monthly, March, 1915. 



84 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

to be unimportant, and were amicably arranged with- 
out any difficulty. By a treaty whose important arti- 
cles were kept secret, the French withdrew their oppo- 
sition to our occupation of Egypt, and we undertook 
to support them in acquiring Morocco — a bargain 
which, from our own point of view, had the advantage 
of reviving the hostility between France and Germany 
at a time when there seemed a chance of its passing 
away. As regards Russia, our deep-rooted suspicions 
of its Asiatic designs were declared groundless, and 
we agreed to the independence of Tibet and the parti- 
tion of Persia in return for an acknowledgment of 
our suzerainty in Afghanistan. Both these arrange- 
ments show that, if good will and reason presided over 
international affairs, an adjustment of differences 
might have been made at any time; as it is, nothing 
but fear of Germany sufficed to persuade us of the 
uselessness of our previous hostility to France and 
Russia. 

No sooner had this grouping of the European 
Powers been brought about than the Entente and the 
Alliance began a diplomatic game of watchful ma- 
noeuvring against each other. Russia suffered a blow 
to her pride in the Austrian annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina j Germany felt humiliated by hav- 
ing to acknowledge, though with compensation, the 
French occupation of Morocco. The first Balkan war 
was a gain to Russia, the second afforded some con- 
solation to Austria. And so the game went on, with 
recurring crises and alternate diplomatic victories 
first for one side, then for the other. 

In all this struggle, no one on either side thought 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 85 

for a moment of the welfare of the smaller nations 
which were the pawns in the struggle. The fact that 
Morocco appealed to Germany for protection against 
French aggression was not held to put England and 
France in the wrong. The fact that the Persians — 
the intellectual aristocracy of the Moslem world — had 
freed themselves from the corrupt Government of the 
Shah and were becoming Liberal and Parliamentary 
was not regarded as any reason why their northern 
provinces should not be devastated by Cossacks and 
their southern regions occupied by the British. The 
fact that the Turks had for ages displayed a suprem- 
acy in cruelty and barbarism by torturing and 
degrading the Christians under their rule was no 
reason why Germany should not, like England in for- 
mer times, support their tottering despotism by 
military and financial assistance. All considerations 
of humanity and liberty were subordinated to the 
great game: first one side threatened war, then the 
other ; at last both threatened at once, and the patient 
populations, incited cynically by lies and clap-trap, 
were driven on to the blind work of butchery. 

A world where such cruel absurdities are possible 
is not to be put right by a mere treaty of peace. War 
between civilised States is both wicked and foolish, 
and it will not cease until either the wickedness or 
the folly is understood by those who direct the policy 
of nations. Most men do not mind being wicked, and 
the few who do have learnt ways of persuading them- 
selves that they are virtuous. But, except in moments 
of passion, men do mind being foolish. There is more 
hope of preventing war in future by persuading men 



86 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

of its folly than by urging its wickedness. To a 
dispassionate observation its folly is evident, but most 
observation is not dispassionate: unconsciously men 
tend to adopt the opinions which will justify them in 
indulging their passions. Just as a libertine, in order 
to excuse himself, comes to think that women have 
no deep feelings, so a militant patriot comes to think 
that the interests of his country are vitally opposed 
to those of some other country, in order that he may 
iiave an opportunity to indulge pride, the desire for 
triumph, and the lust of dominion. What the pacifist 
has to contend against is a system of false beliefs, 
inspired by unrecognised evil passions which are 
thought to be justified by the beliefs. If the beliefs 
are seen to be false, there is some hope that the 
passions may be recognised as evil. And the falsehood 
of the belief in the essential conflict of interests be- 
tween nations is easily recognised by any candid mind. 
Among men, as among all gregarious animals, there 
are two kinds of economic relation: co-operation and 
competition. There is co-operation when the activities 
which the one undertakes in his own interests tend 
to benefit the other; there is competition when they 
tend to injure the other. Neither co-operation nor 
competition need be conscious ; it is not even necessary 
that either should be aware of the existence of the 
other. But in so far as they are conscious they bring 
into play quite different sets of feelings. On the one 
side we have affection, loyalty, gratitude ; on the other 
fear, hatred, triumph. The emotions out of which war 
springs result from a combination of the two sets : they 
are the emotions appropriate to co-operation against 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 87 

a common competitor. In the modern world, where 
men are grouped by States, these emotions are summed 
up in patriotism. Co-operation and competition have 
governed the lives of our ancestors since the days 
before they were human, and in the course of the 
struggle for existence our emotional nature has de- 
veloped so as to respond deeply and instinctively to 
these ancient stimuli. There is in all men a disposi- 
tion to seek out occasions for the exercise of instinctive 
feelings, and it is this disposition, rather than any 
inexorable economic or physical fact, which is at the 
bottom of enmities between nations. The conflicts of 
interest are invented to afford an excuse for feelings 
of hostility ; but as the invention is unconscious, it is 
supposed that the hostility is caused by some real 
conflict of interests. 

The cause of this absence of harmony between our 
instincts and our real needs is the modern develop- 
ment of industry and commerce. In a savage com- 
munity, where each family lives by its own labour, 
there is no occasion for peaceful co-operation in any 
group larger than the family. But there is often 
occasion for ivar-like co-operation : if all the members 
of some other tribe can be killed, it is possible to appro- 
priate their hunting grounds and their pastures. In 
such a state of things, war is profitable to the victors, 
and the vanquished leave no descendants. The human 
race is descended from a long line of victors in war; 
for, although there have been just as many van- 
quished, they failed in early days to leave any pos- 
terity. The feelings which men now have on the 
subject of war and international relations are feelings 



88 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

which were in agreement with facts, so far as the 
victors were concerned, in those primitive internecine 
combats of savage tribes. But in the modern world 
our economic organisation is more civilised than our 
emotions, and the conflicts in which we indulge do not 
really offer that prospect of gain which lets loose 
the brute within us. The brute within us refuses to 
face this disappointing fact, and turns upon those 
who bring it forward with savage accusations of un- 
manliness or lack of patriotism. But it remains a 
fact none the less. 

The international character of our economic organi- 
sation is due to division of labour, taking partly the 
form of exchange, partly the form of multiplying 
stages in production. Consider some quite simple 
example : say a loaf of bread baked in Holland from 
Argentine wheat grown by the help of English agri- 
cultural machinery made from Spanish ore. Holland, 
Argentina, England, and Spain all, through this loaf 
of bread, have an interest in each other's welfare; 
any misfortune to any one of the four is likely to 
cause some injury to the other three. And so it hap- 
pens that times of good trade and times of bad trade 
are both world-wide. Yet in spite of the fact that when 
Germany is prosperous England is prosperous, and 
when Germany has hard times England has hard 
times, men persist, both in England and in Germany, 
in concentrating attention on the comparatively small 
amount of economic competition, to the exclusion of 
the very much greater amount of economic co-opera- 
tion. It is thought that if Germany were ruined 
England would be enriched, and vice versa. Yet 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 89 

every tradesman knows that the ruin of his customers 
is an injury to him, which cannot be compensated by 
the ruin of his competitors. Instinct makes us want 
a nation to hate, and diplomatists have decided that, 
for the last ten years, that nation should be Germany ; 
and since we hate Germany, we imagine its interests 
opposed to ours. But one moment's thought without 
hatred shows that the whole opposition is merely 
imaginary. 

The diplomatic conflict is even more unreal and 
disproportionate to any possibility of gain than the 
economic conflict. Apart from the satisfaction of a 
somewhat childish pride, what does it matter to either 
France or Germany which of them owns Morocco? 
Neglecting the fact that France had to promise the 
open door in order to win Germany's acquiescence, 
the extreme limit of possible advantage would be the 
capture of the whole foreign trade of Morocco. This 
is a limit which cannot, in practice, be reached, since, 
even with the most restrictive tariff, there will be some 
commodities which will have to be imported from 
elsewhere. But even if it could be reached, it is a 
mere fallacy to suppose that the necessary restrictions 
would be advantageous to France. England, after 
much experience, has abandoned the attempt to impose 
any restrictions on foreign trade in its Crown Colonies, 
because they hamper the development of colonies, 
diminish their purchasing power, and in the long run 
injure English trade more than they benefit it. With 
every desire to profit by injury to others, experience 
has taught us that our own profit is best secured by 
allowing equal opportunities to other nations, and that 



90 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

injury to others, however delightful in itself, has to be 
paid for by a corresponding injury to ourselves. But 
even if we adopt, for the sake of argument, the view 
that a nation owning a colony can profit by securing 
the whole trade of that colony to itself, what propor- 
tion is there between the gain and the cost ? 

In order that the French might acquire Morocco, 
England and France, in 1905 and again in 1911, were 
brought to the verge of war with Germany, causing 
huge increases in the French Army and the English 
Navy, embittering the relations of both with Germany, 
and producing a state of public feeling which made 
the present war possible. A solemn international con- 
ference deliberated at Algeciras, and arrived at deci- 
sions which England and France regarded as " scraps 
of paper." Finally Germany, as the price of aban- 
doning its claims, acquired a bit of African territory, 
at the expense of a similar increase of armaments, a 
similar exacerbation of public feeling, and an exhibi- 
tion of bullying methods which prepared the whole 
world to view all Germany's proceedings with suspi- 
cion. And as everybody knows, the loss due to mere 
uncertainty, produced in industry and finance by a 
"Vigorous" policy, was so great that the German 
business world at last compelled the Government to 
give way. And all this turmoil was on the question 
whether France should have the empty right to call 
Morocco ' ' French ' ' ! 

Viewed as a means of obtaining any tangible gain, 
a diplomatic contest such as that which was waged 
over Morocco is a childish absurdity. The diplo- 
matists who conduct it, and the journalists who 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 91 

applaud their ridiculous activities, are ignorant men 
—ignorant, I mean, in all that is really important to 
the welfare of nations. Their only training is in the 
kind of skill by which a horse-dealer palms off a bad 
bargain upon a foolish customer, and in the knowledge 
of. personalities which is required in all games of 
intrigue. But such training, though it had its impor- 
tance in simpler times, grows less and less useful as 
the organisation of society becomes more complex and 
as the interdependence of men in widely severed parts 
of the world increases. More and more the important 
facts are dry, statistical, impersonal ; less and less are 
they of the sort that lends itself to expression in 
traditional literary form. Men's imaginations are 
governed to an extraordinary extent by literary tradi- 
tion : the fact that the really important knowledge can 
only be acquired by industrious investigation makes it 
" vulgar' ' and not such as any aristocratic diplo- 
matist would condescend to know. 

The economic absurdity of ourl diplomatic and 
military conflicts is not denied by well-informed advo- 
cates of international strife. They will admit that, 
in a war between civilised States, even the victor 
can no longer hope to gain in wealth. But they reply 
that such considerations are sordid, and that they, the 
war-like party, have nobler ideals than mere money- 
grubbing. This is an even more preposterous absurd- 
ity than the pretence of trading advantages to be 
obtained by victory. Let us admit at once that the 
interest which most people felt in the Moroccan ques- 
tion was not, except in a very small degree, an 



92 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

economic interest. But was it something higher than 
an economic interest? 

The main thing involved in all such contests, and 
the thing that makes the average man tolerate them, 
is national pride. The Germans felt that France had 
failed to treat them with proper respect by not 
informing them officially of the Anglo-French agree- 
ment; the English and French felt the sending of the 
Panther to Agadir an act of aggression which must 
be resented ; the Germans felt Mr. Lloyd George 's high 
language at the Mansion House in 1911 a threat to 
which no great Power could yield with dignity. This 
is the nobler stuff with which the idealists of war 
confront the money-grubbing economists ! Compared 
with this schoolboy desire for cheap triumphs, money- 
grubbing is humane, enlightened, and noble. The man 
who builds up an industry confers benefits upon 
countless others in the course of pursuing his own 
advantage : he becomes rich because he is doing some- 
thing of real use to the community. But the pride 
that wishes to humiliate, and the pride that can be 
humiliated by yielding trivial diplomatic advantages 
rather than risk war, are alike childish and barbarous, 
springing from low ambitions, and enviously regard- 
ing one man's gain as consisting in another's loss. 
Diplomatic victory rests with the side most willing 
to risk war : so long as men feel proud of their country 
on account of its victories, and not on account of its 
contributions to civilisaton and the welfare of man- 
kind, so long they will feel humiliated when their 
country is reasonable, and elated when it is brutal, 
overbearing, ready to plunge the world into the chaos 



IS A PEKMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 93 

of armed conflict. As against this state of mind, the 
man who urges the economic loss involved, nowadays, 
even in successful war, is a humane advocate of sane 
co-operation, not a man blinded by sordid consider- 
ations to the supposed splendours of what is really 
the most degraded form of " patriotism. ' ' 

The disease from which the civilised world is 
suffering is a complex one, derived from the failure 
of men's instincts to keep pace with changing material 
conditions. Among savages, where there is no trade 
and little division of labour, the only economic rela- 
tion between different tribes is that of competition 
for the food supply. The tribe which attacks with 
most cunning and ferocity exterminates the greatest 
number of others, and leaves the largest posterity. 
Disposition to ferocity and cunning is, at this stage, 
a biological advantage; and the instincts of civilised 
men are those developed during this early stage. But 
through the growth of commerce and manufactures it 
has come about that nine-tenths of the interests of one 
civilised nation coincide with nine-tenths of the 
interests of any other. So long as the disposition to 
primitive ferocity is not excited, men are able to see 
their community of interest, as, for example, most 
men do in America. But there remains in the back- 
ground a readiness to enmity and suspicion, a capacity 
for all the emotions of the savage on the war-path, 
which can be roused by any skillful manipulator ; and 
there remain many men who, from a brutal nature or 
from some underground effect of self-interest, are 
unable to see that friendship between nations is pos- 
sible and that hostility has lost whatever raison d'etre 



94 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

it once possessed. And so the old rivalries, now 
become an unmeaning and murderous futility, go on 
unchecked, and all the splendid heroism of war is 
wasted on a tragic absurdity. 

n. 

The old methods have brought us to the present 
disaster, and new and better methods must be found. 
So much is agreed on all hands. 

But as soon as we attempt to specify better methods, 
disagreement breaks out — partly from disagreement as 
to the facts which have brought about the present 
situation, partly from desire to find an heroic solution 
which shall once for all make war impossible by some 
mechanical arrangement. 

The steps to be taken for securing a lasting peace 
fall into three parts: (1) the conditions of peace; (2) 
the subsequent machinery for adjusting international 
disputes; (3) measures for producing, throughout 
Europe, a more sane, well-informed, and pacific public 
opinion. 

(1) Nine men out of ten, in the combatant nations, 
consider, or at least considered when the war broke 
out, that the conditions of peace are the only question 
of importance. Nine out of ten Englishmen believe, 
or believed, that England, France, and Eussia are 
essentially peace-loving countries; that they made 
every conceivable effort for the preservation of peace ; 
and that the one thing necessary to secure the per- 
manent peace of the world is that they should smash 
the military power of Germany and Austria. Nine out 
of ten Germans believe, or believed, that Germany and 
Austria are essentially peace-loving countries; that 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE 95 

while they were struggling to preserve the peace, 
Russia, secretly encouraged by England treach- 
erously mobilised under cover of negotiations between 
the Tsar and the Kaiser; and that the one thing 
necessary to secure the permanent peace of the world 
is that Germany and Austria should smash the mili- 
tary power of the Allies. These opposing views are 
merely melodramatic: no nation is quite black, and 
none is quite white, but all are of varying shades of 
grey. Like every one else in Europe, I think my own 
nation of the lightest shade of grey; but no member 
of the game of Alliance and Entente, which statesmen 
have played for the last ten years, ought to flatter 
itself that it is wholly unspotted. And in any case, 
as a solution, the complete destruction of the enemy 
has the defect of being impossible. England and 
Germany will both exist after the war : if they fought 
each other for five centuries, like England and France, 
they would still both exist. This fact is beginning to 
be realised on both sides, and to compel even the most 
bellicose to seek for some way by which they can learn 
to endure each other's existence with equanimity. 
What is wanted is a change of heart, leading to a 
change of political methods; and victory or defeat 
must be considered in the light of their power of 
producing a change of heart. 

From this point of view, it is important that no 
nation should make such great gains as to feel that it 
was worth while going to war, and that none should 
suffer such humiliating losses as to be impelled to 
revenge. The result of 1870 was the worst possible 
from the point of view of mankind. The Germans 



96 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

were encouraged in militarism by success, the French 
were goaded into militarism by the intolerable shame 
of defeat and dismemberment. Whatever happens at 
the peace, there should be no new Alsace-Lorraines : 
any transfer of territory should be such as can be 
recommended to neutral opinion on the ground of the 
wishes of the inhabitants. So far as the West is con- 
cerned, it may be reasonably hoped that this condition 
will be carried out ; but in the East it is to be feared 
that none of the combatants will respect it. No one 
supposes that any part of the Turkish Empire will be 
allowed any voice in deciding its fate ; but it must be 
admitted that the Turks, throughout all the centuries 
since their rise, have done as little to deserve consider- 
ation as any nation on earth. 

(2) But changes of territory are the least important 
part of what may be hoped from the peace. In all 
nations, every sane man and woman will desire a 
completely new system in international affairs. The 
only men who will desire to prolong the present system 
are statesmen, sensational journalists, and armament 
makers — the men who profit by slaughter, either in 
credit or in cash, without running any risk of being 
slaughtered themselves. Since these men will control 
the actual Congress, they will be able to postpone the 
inauguration of a happier age, unless America under- 
takes the championship of mankind against the 
warring governments. All humane people in Europe 
would wish America to participate : if possible, they 
would wish the Congress to take place in the neutral 
atmosphere of Washington, with Mr. Wilson as its 
President. The Governments may oppose this plan, 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 97 

from the wish of officials to retain power in their own 
hands, and of combatants to avoid having to hear the 
voice of reason. But public opinion is against the 
Governments in this question, though for the moment 
it has difficulty in expressing itself. 

New methods in international affairs are required 
not in the interests of one side or the other, but in the 
interests of mankind, lest civilisation and humanity 
should perish from the world. It would be disastrous 
if new methods were imposed by the victors upon the 
vanquished as part of the humiliation of defeat : they 
ought to be adopted by all, at the suggestion of neu- 
trals, as an escape from the tragic entanglement which 
has dragged a horrified Europe, as though by the 
compulsion of an external Fate, into a cataclysm not 
desired beforehand by one man in a hundred in any 
of the nations involved in the struggle. In every 
nation, men believe they are fighting for the defence 
of home and country against wanton aggression, 
bcause they know that they themselves have not 
desired war, and they know or suspect the sins of 
foreign governments while they are ignorant of the 
sins of their own. In every nation when this war 
comes to an end, men will welcome any means of 
avoiding the risk of another such war in the future. 

Most of the friends of peace are agreed in advocat- 
ing some kind of International Council to take 
cognisance of all disputes between nations and to 
urge what it regards as a just solution. But it is 
not easy to agree either as to the powers or as to the 
composition of Council. 

The Council ought not to be composed merely of 



98 JUSTICE IN WARTIME 

diplomatists. A diplomatist represents national 
prestige, and his credit among his confreres depends 
upon his skill in securing supposed advantages for his 
own nation. He focusses in his own person the spirit 
of rivalry between States which is the chief obstacle 
to internationalism. The mental atmosphere in which 
he lives is that of the eighteenth century, with its 
"Balance of Power" and other shibboleths. Classi- 
fication by nations is only one way of classifying man- 
kind, but the diplomatic machine ignores all other 
ways. The world of finance, the world of learning, 
the world of Socialism — to take only three examples — 
are international, each of great importance in its own 
way, each having certain interests which cut right 
across the divisions of States. If each nation appointed 
to the Council not only a diplomatist but also a 
financier, a representative of learning, and a cham- 
pion of labour, there would often be cross-divisions, 
and the voting would not always be by nations. Inter- 
national interests, as opposed to merely national 
advantage, would have some chance of a hearing in 
such a Council, and it might occasionally happen that 
the welfare of civilisation would be the decisive con- 
sideration. Foreign policy has remained everywhere 
the exclusive domain of an aristocratic clique. What 
they have made of it, we see. It is time to secure a 
less ignorant and less prejudiced conduct of affairs 
by the admission of the democracy to an active admin- 
istrative share. 

The deliberations of the Council should be public 
and it should refuse to regard as binding any treaty, 
agreement, or understanding of which the terms had 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 99 

been kept secret. By means of secrecy, an air of 
mystery and hocus-pocus is preserved, of which the 
sole use and purpose is to keep power in official hands, 
and to prevent the intrusion of common sense into the 
arcana of diplomacy. The public is hoodwinked by the 
assurance that secrecy is essential to national security. 
Hitherto, on this plea, even the most democratic 
countries of Europe have handed over their destinies 
blindfold to men who have abused their trust by poli- 
cies diametrically opposed to what their followers 
desired. Only publicity can prevent a repetition of 
this crime. 

In urging that men who are not professional diplo- 
matists ought to take part in the International 
Council, I am not wishing to suggest that diplomatists, 
as individuals, are any worse than other men, but only 
that their training, their traditions, their way of life, 
and the fact that they represent the national interest 
to the exclusion of all other considerations, must tend 
to close their minds to an order of ideas which lies 
outside the scope of their official duties. Even men 
who are wholly estimable in private life will be gov- 
erned in their political ideas by the interest which 
they represent. The secretary of the Automobile 
Association — I speak hypothetically, since I do not 
know who he is — may be an ardent patriot, and 
anxious, as an individual, to bear his share of the 
expense of the Navy, but he will infallibly protest 
when it is proposed to put a tax on petrol. The 
editor of the Licensed Victuallers' Gazette may be a 
zealous temperance man in his private capacity, but 
as an editor he is bound to raise an outcry when any 



100 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

fresh burden is placed upon ' ' The Trade. " So a diplo- 
matist may, during his holidays, be an international 
pacifist, but in his working hours he will struggle 
to obtain small advantages for his country, even by 
threatening war if necessary. This is the inevitable 
effect of the interest which he represents, and can only 
be counteracted by men who represent interests which 
conflict less with those of civilisation in general. 

Should the powers of the Council include military 
intervention for the enforcement of its awards ? Very 
strong arguments may be urged on both sides. 

It is assumed that, when a dispute arises, the Coun- 
cil will at once invite the Powers concerned to submit 
to its arbitration, and that, if one party expresses 
willingness to abide by its award while the other does 
not, it will throw whatever weight it possesses against 
the intractable party. It should also have the power 
of examining questions likely to cause disputes in the 
future, and of suggesting such adjustments and com- 
promises as may seem just. But if its authority is 
flouted, shall it rely upon moral force alone, or shall 
it have power to invoke the armed support of all those 
neutrals which send delegates to it? 

In favour of armed intervention, it may be urged 
that otherwise the Council will be futile, and will 
afford no security against an aggressive' military 
Power. It will therefore not allay panics, prevent 
wars, or tend to diminish armaments. If, on the other 
hand, neutrals can be relied upon to be willing to 
threaten armed intervention, and if their intervention 
would always secure an overwhelming preponderance 
of force on one side, then the mere threat would be 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 101 

sufficient, and actual war would be prevented. 

But this argument involves many doubtful 
hypotheses, and is perhaps inspired less by a sober 
review of the facts than by the wish to find a short 
cut to universal peace. Unless almost all the Powers 
sincerely desire peace, an alliance among the more 
bellicose Powers might be strong enough to flout all 
the others, and in that case the only result of the 
Council would be to make the war world-wide. Also 
it is much to be feared that neutrals could not be 
trusted to intervene by force of arms in a dispute in 
which they had no interest beyond the desire to pre- 
serve the peace : the whole system would be in danger 
of breaking down just when it was most needed. The 
most pacific Powers — notably the United States — 
would probably refuse altogether to enter a system 
entailing such vast and manifold obligations. And 
within each nation, the necessity of being constantly 
prepared to go to war would run counter to the 
wishes of peaceful people, although it would be from 
such people that the scheme would have to derive 
its support, since its aim would be the revention of 
war. For these reasons, it does not seem desirable at 
present that the decisions of the International Council 
should be enforced by military intervention. 

I do not think the decisions of the Council would 
have no weight if they rested upon moral force alone. 
The efforts made by both sides in the present war to 
persuade the United States of the justice of their 
cause show how much the sympathy of neutrals is 
valued, even when there is hardly a thought of their 
abandoning neutrality. And the mere existence of 



102 JUSTICE IN WAR-TIME 

an impartial tribunal, to which each side could yield 
without loss of dignity, would in most cases suffice to 
prevent the diplomatic deadlock which precedes war. 
Public opinion, which at present has no means of 
hearing any unbiassed statement, would be powerfully 
influenced by an authoritative award, and the pacific 
forces in the countries concerned could bring pressure 
to bear on the government to bow to the decisions of 
the Council. If the pacific forces were strong, this 
pressure would probably be sufficient; if not, no sys- 
tem could make peace secure. For, in the last resort, 
peace can only be preserved if public opinion desires 
peace in most of the great nations. 

(3) Far more important than any question of 
machinery is the problem of producing in all civilised 
nations such a horror of war that public opinion will 
insist upon peaceful methods of settling disputes. 
When this war ends, probably every nation in Europe 
will feel such an intense weariness of the struggle that 
no great war will be probable for another generation. 
The problem is, so to alter men's standards and out- 
look that, when the weariness has passed away, they 
shall not fall back into the old bad way, but shall 
escape from the nightmare into a happier world of 
free co-operation. 

The first thing to make men realise is that modern 
war is an absurdity as well as a crime, and that it can 
no longer secure such national advantages as, for 
example, England secured by the Seven Years' War. 
After the present war, it should be easy to persuade 
even the most ignorant and high-placed persons of this 
truth. 



IS A PERMANENT PEACE POSSIBLE? 103 

But it is even more necessary to alter men's 
conceptions of ' ' glory " and " patriotism. ' ' Beginning 
in childhood, with the school text-books of history, 
and continuing in the Press and in common talk, men 
are taught that the essence of ''glory" is successful 
robbery and slaughter. The most "glorious" nation 
is the one which kills the greatest numbers of for- 
eigners and seizes the greatest extent of foreign terri- 
tory. The most "patriotic" citizen is the one who 
most strongly opposes any attempt at justice or mercy 
in his country's dealings with other countries, and who 
is least able to conceive of mankind as all one family, 
struggling painfully from a condition of universal 
strife towards a society where love of one's neighbor 
is no longer thought a crime. The division of the 
world into nations is a fact which must be accepted, 
but there is no reason to accept the narrow nationalism 
which envies the prosperity of others and imagines it 
a hindrance to our own progress. If a better and saner 
world is to grow out of the horror of futile carnage, 
men must learn to find their nation's glory in the 
victory of reason over brute instincts, and to feel the 
true patriotism which demands that our country 
should deserve admiration rather than extort fear. If 
this lesson can be taught to all, beginning with the 
children in the schools, we may hope for a lasting 
peace, and the machinery for securing it will grow out 
of the universal desire. So long as hate and fear and 
pride are praised and encouraged, war can never 
"become an impossibility. But there is now, if men 
liave the courage to use it, an awakening of heart and 
mind such as the world has never known before : men 



104 JUSTICE IN WAE-TIME 

see that war is wicked and that war is foolish. If the 
statesmen will play their part, by showing that war 
is not inevitable, there is hope that our children may 
live in a happier world, and look back upon us with 
the wondering pity of a wiser age. 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, men 
commonly congratulated themselves that they lived 
in an era of enlightenment and progress, very far 
removed from the ignorance, superstition and bar- 
barity of the dark ages. Progress in civilisation came 
to seem natural and certain, no longer needing de- 
liberate effort for its realisation. Under the influence 
of a fancied security, men gradually came to value 
less consciously the effort after mental advancement. 
But history gives no justification for the sense of 
security, and the present war, to those who view it 
as an historical event, not simply as a vehicle for 
their own passions, affords grave reason for fear 
that the civilisation we have slowly built up is in 
^'danger of self-destruction. This aspect of the war 
has been too little considered on both sides, the fear 
of defeat and the longing for victory have made 
men oblivious of the common task of Europe and of 
the work which Europe had been performing for 
mankind at large. In all that has made the nations 
of the West important to the world, they run the risk 
of being involved in a common disaster, so great and 
so terrible that it will outweigh, to the historian in 
the future, all the penalties of military defeat and 
all the glories of military victory. 

Over and over again, in the past, the greatest 
civilisations have been destroyed or degraded by war. 
The fighting which Homer has taught Us to regard 



108 THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

as glorious swept away the Mycenean civilization, 
which was succeeded by centuries of confused and 
barbarous conflict. The speech of Pericles to the 
Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war 
has been thought worthy of a place among recruit- 
ing appeals in the London Underground Railway; 
yet the war which he recommended by recalling the 
greatness of Athenian civilisation proved in fact to 
be its end, and Athenians born after the war added 
almost nothing to the world's permanent possessions. 
It is impossible to imagine a more sinister precedent 
than that war, in which the most fruitful and splen- 
did civilisation the world has known was brought 
to an end for ever by pride of power and love of 
battle. The Roman civilisation which succeeded it, 
though less productive, might have seemed secure 
by its great extent, yet it perished almost completely 
in the barbarian invasion. The remnants out of which 
the modern world has grown were preserved, not 
by the men who fought against the barbarians, but 
by monks who retired from the strife and devoted 
their lives to religion. And in more modern times, 
the Thirty Years' War had an influence, impossible 
to overestimate, in brutalising the German char- 
acter and making the level of humane feeling lower 
than that of nations less subject to the degrading 
influence of invasion and rapine. 

When we consider the world in a broad historical 
retrospect, it is what nations have added to civilisa- 
tion that makes us permanently honour them, not 
what they have achieved in conquest and dominion. 
Great conquerors, such as Attila, Timur and Zenghis 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 107 

I Khan, trample across the pages of history full of 
noise and fury, signifying nothing: like an earth- 
quake or a plague, they come and pass, leaving only 
a record of destruction and death. The Jews and 
Greeks, the Romans, and the modern nations of 
Western Europe, have contributed almost everything 
that has been added in historical times to creation 
and diffusion of what is permanently valuable in hu- 
man life. The Romans spread throughout their Em- 
pire what had been created by the Jews in religion, 
by the Greeks in art and science ; on this foundation, 
after a long interval of barbarism, the Italians, the 
French, the English and the Germans built the world 
in which we have hitherto lived. The progress in which 
we have rejoiced has not grown up by itself: it has 
been created and sustained by individual and col- 
lective effort. What great men have done in litera- 
ture, in art, in natural knowledge, has been made 
available to large numbers by education. Private 
violence has been suppressed ; the rudiments of learn- 
ing have become more and more accessible to all 
classes; and mental activity has been continually 
stimulated and broadened as the progress of science 
liberated more and more men from the need of man- 
ual labour. 

It is this achievement, imperfect as it has hitherto 
been, which chiefly entitles the Western nations to 
respect. It is the furtherance of civilisation which 
makes us admire the Roman Empire more than that 
of Xerxes, or the British Empire more than that of 
China. It is this service to mankind that is being 
jeopardised by the present war. Whether, when it 



108 THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

ends, the English, the French, or the Germans will 
still have the energy and will to carry on the progress 
of the past, is a very doubtful question, depending 
chiefly upon the length of the war and the spirit 
fostered by the settlement. Of all the reasons for de- 
siring an early peace, this is, to my mind, the strong- 
est. The danger, great and pressing as I believe it 
to be, is obscured amid the clash of national ambi- 
tions, because it requires us to fix our attention on 
individuals, not on States. There is some risk of 
forgetting the good of individuals under the stress of 
danger to the State: yet, in the long run, the good 
of the State cannot be secured if the individuals have 
lost their vigor. In what follows, I shall ignore po- 
litical issues, and speak only of the effect on separate 
men and women and young people ; but a correspond- 
ing effect on the State must follow in the end, since 
the State lives only by the life of its separate citizens. 
This war, to begin with, is worse than any previous 
war in the direct effect upon those who fight. The 
armies are far larger than they have ever been be- 
fore, and the loss by death or permanent disable- 
ment immensely exceeds what has occurred in the 
past.* The losses are enhanced by the deadlock, which 
renders a purely strategical decision of the war 
almost impossible. /We are told to regard it as a 
war of attrition, which means presumably that victory 
is hoped from the gradual extermination of the Ger- 
man armies. ' Our military authorities, apparently, 

•According to Mr. Balfour, Great Britain, which has suffered 
far less than France, Russia, Germany or Austria-Hungary, has 
had more casualties in the first year than Germany had in the 
war of 1870. 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 109 

contemplate with equanimity a three years' war, end- 
ing only by our excess of population: when prac- 
tically all Germans of military age have been killed 
or maimed, it is thought that there will still remain 
a good many English, Russians, and Italians, and 
perhaps a sprinkling of Frenchmen. But in the 
course of such destruction almost all that makes the 
Allied nations worth defending will have been lost: 
the enfeebled, impoverished remnants will lack the 
energy to resume the national life which existed be- 
fore the war, and the new generation will grow up 
listless under the shadow of a great despair. I hope 
that the men in authority are wiser than their words ; 
but everything that has been said points to this re- 
sult as what is intended by those who control our 
fate. 

The actual casualties represent only a small part 
of the real loss in the fighting. In former wars, 
seasoned veterans made the best soldiers, and men 
turned from the battlefield with their physical and 
mental vigour unimpaired. In this war, chiefly ow- 
ing to the nerve-shattering effect of shell-fire and con- 
tinual noise, this is no longer the case. All troops 
gradually deteriorate at the front: the best troops 
are those who are fresh, provided they are adequately 
trained. In all the armies, a number of men go mad, 
a much larger number suffer from nervous collapse, 
becoming temporarily blind or dumb or incapable of 
any effort of will and almost all suffer considerable 
nervous injury, causing loss of vitality, energy, and 
power of decision. In great part, no doubt, this effect 
is temporary; but there is no reason to think that 



110 THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

in most men something of it will be permanent, and 
in not a few the nervous collapse will remain very 
serious. I fear it must be assumed that almost all 
who have seen much fighting will have grown inca- 
pable of great effort, and will only be able, at best, 
to slip unobtrusively through the remaining years 
of life. Since the fighting will, if the war lasts much 
longer, absorb the bulk of the male population of 
Europe between 18 and 45, this cause alone will 
make it all but impossible to maintain and hand on 
the tradition of civilisation which has been slowly 
acquired by the efforts of our ancestors. 

We are told by advocates of war that its moral 
effects are admirable ; on this ground, they say, we 
ought to be thankful that there is little prospect of an 
end to wars. The men who repeat this hoary false- 
hood must have learnt nothing from the reports of 
friends returned from the war, and must have re- 
frained from talking with wounded soldiers in hos- 
pital and elsewhere. It is true that, in those who 
enlist of their own free will, there is a self-devotion 
to the cause of their country which deserves all 
praises; and their first experience of warfare often 
gives them a horror of its futile cruelty which makes 
them for a time humane and ardent friends of peace. 
If the war had lasted only three months, these good 
effects might have been its most important moral 
consequences. But as the months at the front pass 
slowly by, the first impulse is followed by quite 
other moods. Heroism is succeeded by a merely 
habitual disregard of danger, enthusiasm for the na- 
tional cause is replaced by passive obedience to orders. 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 111 

Familiarity with horrors makes war seem natural, 
not the abomination which it is seen to be at first. 
Humane feeling decays, since, if it survived, no man 
could endure the daily shocks. In every army, re- 
ports of enemy atrocities, true or false, stimulate fer- 
ocity, and produce a savage thirst for reprisals. On 
the Western front at least, both sides have long ceased 
to take prisoners except in large batches. Our news- 
papers have been full of the atrocities perpetrated 
by German soldiers. Whoever listens to the conver- 
sation of wounded soldiers returned from the front 
will find that, in all the armies, some men become 
guilty of astonishing acts of ferocity. Will even the 
most hardened moralist dare to say that such men 
are morally the better for their experience of war? 
If the war had not occurred, they would probably 
have gone through life without ever having the wild 
beast in them aroused. There is a wild beast slum- 
bering in almost every man, but civilised men know 
that it must not be allowed to awake. A civilised man 
who has once been under the domain of the wild 
beast has lost his moral self respect, his integrity 
and uprightness : a secret shame makes him cynical 
and despairing, without the courage that sees facts as 
they are, without the hope that makes them better. 
War is perpetrating this moral murder in the souls 
of vast millions of combatants; every day many are 
passing over to the dominion of the brute by acts 
which kill what is best within them. Yet, still our 
newspapers, parsons, and professors prate of the en- 
nobling influence of war. 
The war, hitherto, has steadily increased in ferocity, 



112 THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

and has generated a spirit of hatred in the armies 
which was absent in the early months. If it lasts 
much longer, we may be sure that it will grow still 
worse in these respects. The Germans, hitherto, have 
prospered, but if the tide turns, it is to be feared 
that their ' ' f rightfulness ' ' in the past will be child's 
play compared with what will happen when they be- 
gin to anticipate defeat. They have already aroused 
among the Allies a hatred which is the greatest danger 
that now menaces civilisation; but if the war lasts 
much longer, and if the Germans are driven by fear 
into even greater crimes against humanity than they 
have hitherto committed, it is to be expected that a 
blind fury of destruction will drive us on and on 
until the good and evil of the old world have perished 
together in universal ruin. For this reason, if for 
no other, it is of the last importance to control hatred, 
to realise that almost all that is detestable in the 
enemy is the result of war, is brought out by war, 
in a greater or less degree, on our side as well as on 
the other, and will cease with the conclusion of peace 
but not before. If the terrible deeds that are done 
in the war are merely used to stimulate mutual 
hatred, they lead only to more war and to still more 
terrible deeds: along that road, there is no goal but 
exhaustion. If universal exhaustion is to be avoided, 
we must, sooner or later, forget our resentment, and 
remember that the war, whatever its outcome, is 
destroying on both sides the heritage of civilisation 
which was transmitted to us by our fathers and 
which it is our duty to hand on to our children as 
little impaired as possible. 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 113 

When the war is over, the men who have taken 
part in it will not easily find their place again among 
the occupations of peace. They will have become 
accustomed to act under the strong stimulus of 
danger, or in mere obedience to orders; and they 
will be physically and mentally exhausted by the ter- 
rible strain of life in the trenches. For both reasons, 
they will have little will-power, little capacity for 
self-direction. It will be hardly possible to find room 
for them all in the labour market, and the first im- 
pulses of patriotism in their favour will probably 
soon die down. We cannot hope that very many of 
them will ever again be as useful citizens as they 
would have been if the war had not occurred. The 
habit of violence, once acquired, however legitimately, 
is not easily set aside, and the respect for law and 
order is likely to be much less after the war than it 
was before. If this state of mind concurs, as is 
likely, with serious distress and labour troubles 
ruthlessly repressed by a government grown used 
to autocratic power, the effect upon the national 
life will be disastrous and profound. 

In the minds of most men on both sides, the strong- 
est argument for prolonging the war is that no other 
course will secure us against its recurrence in the 
near future. In the opinion of Englishmen and Ger- 
man alike, their enemies have such a thirst for war 
that only their utter overthrow can secure the peace 
of the world. We are an essentially peace-loving na- 
tion—so both contend— and if we had the power, we 
should prevent such a war as this from occurring 
again. On this ground, it is urged by both that the 



114 THE DANGEE TO CIVILIZATION 

war must continue, since both believe that their own 
side will ultimately be completely victorious. 

I believe that in this both sides are profoundly 
mistaken. I shall not discuss the question from a 
political point of view, though I believe the political 
argument is overwhelming. What I wish to urge is 
the effect of war upon the imaginative outlook of men, 
upon their standard of international conduct, and 
upon the way in which they view foreign nations. 
Individual passions and expectations in ordinary 
citizens are at least as potent as the acts of govern- 
ments in causing or averting wars, and in the long 
run it is upon them that the preservation of peace 
in future will depend. It is commonly said that 
punishment will have an effect that nothing else can 
have in turning the thoughts of our enemies away 
from war and making them henceforth willing to 
keep the peace. This argument assumes, quite falsely, 
that men and nations are guided by self-interest in 
their actions. Unfortunately this is not the case, 
and the motives which do guide them are often worse 
than self-interest. It is as clear as noonday that 
no one of the nations involved in the present war 
would have fought if self-interest had been its prin- 
ciple of action. Pride, prestige, love of dominion, 
unwillingness to yield a triumph to others or to be- 
have in a way which would be thought dishonourable, 
these are among the motives which produced the war. 
Each motive, no doubt, wove a myth of self-interest 
about it, since people do not wish to think their 
actions harmful to their own interests; but if self- 
interest had been genuinely operative, the nations 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 115 

would have made friends and co-operated in the works 
of peace. And if self-interest has not prevented 
this war, why should we expect that it will prevent 
future wars? Yet it is only by an appeal to self- 
interest that punishment can hope to be effective. 

It is peace, not war, that in the long run turns 
men's thoughts away from fighting. No doubt when a 
great war ends there is a weariness which ensures a 
number of years of peace and recuperation; however 
this war may end, and, if it ended tomorrow, no mat- 
ter on what terms, it would not break out again at 
once, because the impulse to war is exhausted for the 
moment. But for the future every additional month 
of war increases the danger, since it makes men in- 
creasingly view war as a natural condition of the 
world, renders them more and more callous to its 
horrors and to the loss of friends, and fills their 
imagination, especially the imagination of those who 
are now young, with war as something to be expected 
and with the thought that some foreign nations are so 
wicked as to make it our duty to destroy them. 

If the war is brought to an end by reason, by a 
realisation on all sides that it is an evil, it may be 
possible to combat the imaginative outlook which it 
is engendering and to bring about an effective will 
to peace. But if only exhaustion ends the war, any 
revival of energy may lead to its renewal, especially 
if the positive ideals which make for peace have 
perished meanwhile in the universal death of all hu- 
mane and civilised aspirations. 

Through the effects of the war upon education, 
the mental calibre of the next generation is almost 



116 THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

certain to be considerably lower than that of genera- 
tions educated before the war. Education, from the 
highest to the lowest, is in constant danger of be- 
coming a mere mechanical drill in which the young 
are taught to perform certain tasks in the way that 
is considered correct, and to believe that all intel- 
lectual questions have been decided once for all in 
the sense declared by the text-books. The education 
inspired by this spirit destroys the mental activity 
of the young, makes them passive in thought and 
active only in pursuing some humdrum ambition. 
It is this spirit which is the most insidious enemy 
of progress in an old civilisation, since it inculcates 
constantly, with a great parade of knowledge and 
authority, a Byzantine attitude of superstitious re- 
spect for what has been done and contempt for the 
credit of what is attempted in our own day. The 
mental life of Europe has only been saved from com- 
plete subjection to this spirit by a small percentage 
of teachers, more full of vitality than most, and more 
filled with a genuine delight in mental activity. These 
men are to be found almost exclusively among the 
younger teachers, the men whose hopes have not yet 
faded, who have not yet become the slaves of habit, 
who have enough spring of life to take lightly the 
weariness and expense of spirit in their daily task. 
It is this comparatively small number of teachers who 
keep alive the mental vigour that leads to new dis- 
coveries and new methods of dealing with old prob- 
lems. Without them, there would be no progress; 
and without progress, we could not even stand still. 
What is known bears now such a large proportion 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 117 

to what our own age can hope to discover that the 
danger of traditionalism is very great; indeed it has 
only been averted by the continual triumph of the 
men of science. 

After the war, the number of teachers with any 
power of stimulating mental life must be enormously 
diminished. Many of the younger teachers will have 
been killed, many others incapacitated; of those who 
remain, most will have lost hope and energy. For 
a number of years, teaching will be much more in the 
hands of the old and middle-aged, while those teach- 
ers who are still young in years will have lost much 
of the spirit of youth in the strain of the war. The 
result will be that the new generation will have less 
expectation of progress than its predecessors, less 
power of bearing lightly the burden of knowledge. 
It is only a small stock of very unusual energy that 
makes mental progress ; and that small stock is being 
wasted on the battle-field. 

"What is true in the purely intellectual sphere is 
equally true in art and literature and all the creative 
activities of our civilisation. In all these, if the war 
lasts long, it is to be expected that the great age of 
Europe will be past and that men will look back to 
the period now coming to an end as the later Greeks 
looked back to the age of Pericles. Who then is 
supreme in Europe will be a matter of no importance 
to mankind; in the madness of rivalry, Europe will 
have decreed its own insignificance. 

All the difficulties of restoring civilisation when 
the present outburst of barbarism has passed will be 
increased by economic exhaustion. Hitherto, in Eng- 



118 THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

land, most men have hardly begun to feel the econom- 
ic effects of the war, and if peace were to come 
this autumn it is possible that the economic effects in 
this country would not be very profound or very 
disastrous. But if the war drags on after the period 
of easy borrowing is past, great and general impover- 
ishment must result. Those who still have capital 
will be able to exact a continually increasing rate of 
interest ; probably it will become necessary to borrow 
largely in America, and the interest will represent a 
perpetual tribute which Europe will have to pay 
to America as the price of its indulgence in war. 
The enormous production of munitions will either 
cease suddenly with a violent dislocation of the labour 
market, or will be continued out of deference to vested 
interests, causing a constant stimulus to new wars and 
to mutual suspicions and fears on the part of the 
rival states. The reabsorption of the men who have 
been fighting will be difficult, especially as their 
places will have been largely taken by women at lower 
wages, and casualties will have increased the number 
of widows and single women anxious to earn their 
own living. The men who return from the front will 
have grown accustomed to a higher standard in food 
than that of the ordinary workingman, and will feel 
themselves heroes; both causes will make it difficult 
for them to settle down to a poorer living than they 
had before the war, yet it is almost certain that that 
is what they will have to do. The Government, hav- 
ing grown accustomed to almost absolute power dur- 
ing the war, having unlimited soldiers under its 
orders, and having no organized opposition to fear, 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 119 

will be far more ruthless than it has hitherto been 
in suppressing strikes and enforcing submission. This 
will probably lead to much revolutionary feeling, 
without the energy or the ability that could make 
revolution successful. 

In these circumstances, there will be little money 
available for education or the promotion of art and 
science. In order to be able still to keep up huge 
armaments, the governing classes will diminish ex- 
penditure on the objects they consider least import- 
ant; among these, education is sure to be included. 
Their object will be to produce a proletariat un- 
skilled in everything except shooting and drill, docile 
through ignorance and formidable through military 
discipline. This must result in either apathy or civil 
war. (Unless the war ends soon, it is apathy that 
will result; but in either event, our civilisation is 

imperiled. ' 

There are some who hold that the war will result 
in a permanent increase in the rate of wages. But 
there are several broad grounds for thinking that this 
view is mistaken. To begin with, many young and 
vigorous workers will have been killed or disabled 
in the war, and the population will contain a larger 
proportion than before of old men, women and chil- 
dren. The more productive sections of the population 
will be diminished, and the production of goods per 
head will be less than it was when the war broke out. 
As there will be less to divide, some one must suffer. 
The capitalist is not likely to suffer, since the demands 
of war enable him to secure a good rate of interest 
now, and the reconstruction of what the war has 



120 THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

destroyed will cause a great demand for capital for 
some time after the war. It is unlikely that the 
land-owner will suffer, since he will be able to impose 
tariffs on the plea of revenue and protection against 
German competition. It seems inevitable that the 
loss must fall upon wage-earners. In bringing about 
this loss, capitalists will find the growth of cheap 
female labour during the war a great help, and this 
opportunity will be improved by the enormous num- 
bers of discharged soldiers and munitions workers 
seeking employment. I do not see how this situation 
can result otherwise than in a great fall of wages. 

To sum up : the bad results which we have been 
considering do not depend upon the question of vic- 
tory or defeat: they will fall upon all the nations, 
and their severity depends only upon the length and 
destructiveness of the war. If the war lasts much 
longer, very few healthy men of military age will 
have failed to be injured physically to a greater or 
less extent in any of the nations involved; the moral 
level everywhere will be lowered by familiarity with 
horrors, leading, in most men, to an easy acquiescence ; 
the mental efficiency of Europe will be greatly dimin- 
ished by the inevitable deterioration of education and 
by the death or nervous weakening of many of the 
best minds among the young; and the struggle for 
life will almost certainly become more severe among 
all classes except the idle rich. The collective life of 
Europe, which has carried it on since the Renaissance 
in the most wonderful upward movement known to 
history, will have received a wound which may well 
prove mortal. If the war does not come to an end 



THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 121 

soon, it is to be feared that we are at the end of a 
great epoch, and that the future of Europe will not 
be on a level with its past. 

Is there any conceivable gain from the continuation 
of the war to be set against this loss? It is difficult 
to imagine any gain which could outweigh so terri- 
ble a loss, and none of the gains which are suggested 
can compare with it for a moment. But in fact even 
the gains which are suggested are illusory. It is 
fairly clear now that neither side can hope for the 
absolute and crushing victory which both expected at 
the outset, except at a cost which cannot be seriously 
contemplated. Sooner or later, negotiation will have 
to end the war. The claims of Belgium, which are for 
us an obligation of honour, will, it is known, be 
recognised by Germany in return for compensations 
elsewhere* The argument that, if we do not crush 
Germany, we cannot be safe from a recurrence of the 
present war in the near future, is probably the one 
that carries most weight. But in fact it will not 
bear a moment's examination. In the first place, 
most military authorities are agreed that it is im- 
possible to crush Germany. In the second place, there 
have been wars before in which Germany was not our 
enemy, and there may be such wars in future : unless 
the spirit of rivalry is checked, the removal of one 
rival is only the prelude to the growth of another. 
In the third place, if the* war lasts much longer we 
shall incur now all the evils which we might incur 
in the future if the war broke out again, and the 
present evils are certain while the future war is open 

•See e. g. "The Times", Sept. 4, 1915. 



122 THE DANGER TO CIVILIZATION 

to doubt. Germany has suffered appalling losses, 
and is in a very different mood from that in which 
it began the war, as may be seen by the growing con- 
demnation of the Hymn of Hate. A peace now, giv- 
ing no definite victory to either side, would probably 
leave Germany, for many years, determined not to 
go to war again; and no peace can insure us against 
wars a generation hence. In continuing the war, we 
are incurring great and certain evils for a very 
doubtful gain. The obligation of honour towards 
Belgium is more fully discharged if the Germans 
are led to evacuate Belgium by negotiation than if 
they are driven out at the cost of destroying what- 
ever they have left unharmed. Both on their side 
and on ours, the real motive which prolongs the war 
is pride. Is there no statesman who can think in 
terms of Europe, not only of separate nations? Is 
our civilisation a thing of no account to all our rulers ? 
I hope not. I hope that somewhere among the men 
who hold power in Europe there is at least one who 
will remember, at this late date, that we are the 
guardians, not only of the nation, but of that common 
heritage of thought and art and a humane way of 
life into which we were born, but which our children 
may find wasted by our blind violence and hate. 



THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 
A Reply to Professor Gilbert Murray. 

I. Introduction. 

There are some among us who hold that, if our 
foreign policy in recent years had been conducted 
with more courage, more openness, and more idealism, 
there is a likelihood that the present European War 
would never have occurred. In holding this view, 
we are in no way concerned to defend the German 
Government ; it is clear, at least to me, that the Ger- 
man Government is much more to blame than our 
own, both for the outbreak of war and for the way 
in which the war has been conducted. But Germany 's 
guilt is no proof of our innocence. And if we remain 
to the end wrapped in self-righteousness, impervious 
to facts which are not wholly creditable to us, we 
shall, in the years after the war, merely repeat the 
errors of the past, and find ourselves, in the end, 
involved in other wars as terrible and destructive as 
the one which we are now waging. 

The criticism of British foreign policy which seems 
to us necessary is not a personal criticism of Sir 
Edward Grey: he has been merely the instrument, 
the man who carried on an ancient tradition. I cannot 
discover any matter, great or small, in which the 
policy of the Foreign Office was different under his 
administration and under Lord Lansdowne 's.* It is 
not the man, but the maxims which he has inherited, 
that must be criticised. 

•South African affairs, mentioned by Professor Murray, are 
not under the Foreign Office. 



124 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

Professor Gilbert Murray, under the tutelage of 
the Foreign Office, has written an elaborate defence 
of Sir Edward Grey.* In criticising Professor Mur- 
ray, I shall not be concerned with Sir Edward Grey's 
personality, but merely with the policy which he 
inherited and developed. 

Before embarking upon the history of British for- 
eign policy, Professor Murray begins by a very mis- 
leading description of the state of mind of those whom 
he calls "pro-Germans", among whom he instances 
Mr. Brailsf ord and myself. They are, he says, ' l often 
very clever", but "not at present in a state of mind 
which enables them to see or even to seek the truth." 
"The Pro-Germans" — he says — "are in a very small 
minority and have to fight hard. And many of them 
become so wrapped up in their own immediate con- 
troversy that, as far as their combative feelings are 
concerned, the central enemy of the human race is 
Sir Edward Grey; next to him come the British 
Cabinet and the most popular generals. The Kaiser 
is to them a prisoner in the dock, a romantic unfor- 
tunate, to be defended against overwhelming odds. 
It needs great strength of mind for a member of a 
small fighting minority, like this, to be even mod- 
erately fair in controversy. ' ' 

Perhaps it does require some strength of mind, 
even to belong to so small a minority; but whatever 
strength of mind is required to be "even moderately 
fair" when one belongs to a great fighting majority 
has been denied to Professor Murray. He has fallen 

♦The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-15, by Gilbert 
Murray. Clarendon Press l-6d. 



INTRODUCTION 125 

into the absurd assumption — which no man makes in 
the private quarrels in which he is not personally 
involved — that if one side is to blame, the other must 
be innocent. 

As for the "central enemy of the human race", 
that is a melodramatic conception: most Germans, 
apparently, regard Sir Edward Grey in this light, 
while Professor Murray, like most Englishmen, 
regards the Kaiser in this light. Those whom he 
attacks as not "even moderately fair", protest against 
such sensationalism. We perceive that in previous 
wars similar views have been held on each side, to be 
unanimously discarded by subsequent historians ; and 
we do not believe that what has always been false 
before has now suddenly become true. If we seem 
to emphasise the faults on our side, that is because 
they are ignored by our compatriots; if we seem to 
say little about the faults on the other side, that is 
because every newspaper and professor throughout the 
country is making them known. Moreover it is more 
profitable to be conscious of our own faults than of 
the faults of our enemies : we can amend our own faults 
if we become aware of them, whereas we only increase 
hatred on both sides by proclaiming the faults of the 
enemy. As for the Kaiser, ever since I first began to 
know Germany, 20 years ago, I have abominated him ; 
I have consistently regarded him, and I now regard 
him, as one of the sources of evil in the world; and 
in what I have written on the war there is not a word 
or a syllable which could be construed, by any ingenu- 
ity, into a defence of the Kaiser. But if Professor 
Murray were "even moderately fair in controversy", 



126 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

he would perceive that the Kaiser's guilt cannot alone 
suffice to establish the immaculate sinlessness of our 
Foreign Office. 

With the whole of what Professor Murray says as 
to the wickedness of Germany's invasion of Belgium 
I am in complete agreement. But except the pleasure 
derived from denunciation, no good is achieved by 
dwelling upon the sins of our enemies, since they very 
naturally pay no attention to our opinions, while we 
become puffed up with self-righteousness. In the 
opinion that Mr. Brailsf ord and 1 ' ' are not at present 
in a state of mind which enables them to see or even 
to seek the truth", Professor Murray will find unani- 
mous agreement throughout Europe, not excepting 
Germany, Austria and Turkey. My pamphlet, which 
he regards as pro-German, has, I am informed, been 
prohibited in Austria* on the ground of the vehemence 
of its pro-English bias. It is a comfort in these times 
to find any matter upon which all the warring nations 
are agreed. The sinfulness of impartiality is such 
a matter, and to have brought out this fundamental 
agreement is perhaps as great a reward as we can 
hope for. 

When the war broke out, the view taken by most 
Liberals in England was that our participation was 
due to the German violation of Belgium and our obli- 
gations under the treaty of 1839. This was not the 
opinion of Unionists: it was repeatedly combated by 
"The Times" (see especially the leading article of 
March 8, 1915 ; see also Spectator, Dee. 19, 1914) and 

•But not apparently in Hungary. See "Morning Post', Sep. 
25, 1915. 



INTRODUCTION 127 

Belgium was not mentioned in the official Unionist 
communication of August 2,* a promising support to 
the Government if they took part in the war. Fortu- 
nately it was not the view taken by France and Russia ; 
unfortunately it was not the view taken by Germany. 
Professor Murray does not commit himself fully: he 
speaks of the German attack on Belgium as "one of 
the obvious and important events leading up to the 
war." This phrase is vague. But I do not think 
there can now be two opinions as to the part played 
by Belgium in our participation : if the Germans had 
not attacked Belgium, there would have been more 
resignations in the Cabinet and less unanimity of 
public opinion, but the Government would have found 
it impossible to stand aside while France was being 
crushed. France, not Belgium, was for us the deci- 
sive factor. But as Professor Murray seems anxious 
to suggest a doubt on this point, let us see what the 
evidence is. 

The German Ambassador asked Sir Edward Grey 
whether he could promise neutrality if not only the 
integrity and independence of France (including 
colonies), but also the neutrality of Belgium, were 
respected. Sir Edward Grey replied that he could 
give no such promise. (White Paper, No. 123.) On 
this Professor Murray comments as follows : 

*The following is the text of Mr. Bonar Law's letter to Mr. 
Asquith, of Aug. 2, 1914: 

Dear Mr. Asquith, Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to 
inform you that, in our opinion as well as in that of all the 
colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal 
to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in 
supporting France and Russia at the present juncture ; and we 
offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any meas- 
ures they may consider necessary for that object. 

Tours very truly, A. Bonar Law. 



128 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

"If Germany, from whatever motive, chose to use 
the Austro-Serbian dispute as an occasion for making 
war on France, then we must have our hands free. 
"We could not tell Germany how much we would take 
to stand aside while France was crushed.* We could 
not arrange with Germany for a limited crushing of 
France. . . . All such bargaining was both dis- 
honourable and illusory and dangerous." 

That is to say, honour or interest, or both, so bound 
us to France that we could not, even to save Belgium 
from invasion, stand aside while France was attacked. 
So far from Belgium being the cause of our interven- 
tion, we were precluded from making any effective 
diplomatic attempt to protect Belgium by the fact 
that we could not promise neutrality even if Belgium 
were respected. In this the situation differed from 
that of 1870, when Belgium was, for us, the decisive 
factor, and was, consequently, efficiently protected 
by our diplomacy. Professor Murray, who maintains 
that we did not know that Germany would invade 
Belgium, cannot reply that we were certain in advance 
of the fruitlessness of such a policy from the Belgian 
point of view. 

Before the question of Belgium had arisen, on Au- 
gust 2, we had already promised France to intervene 
if the German Navy attacked the Northern or West- 
ern coasts of France. (This was an obligation of 

•So far is this from being a correct statement of the case that 
even at the eleventh hour Germany snatched at the chance of 
France remaining neutral, which seemed to he presented owing 
to a misunderstanding. See telegrams published by Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Aug. 20, 1914, Sept. 5, 1914, quoted 
on pp. 256, 258 of Price's "Diplomatic History of the War." See 
also Sir E. Grey's reply in House of Commons to Lord R. Cecil, 
Aug. 28, 1914. 



INTRODUCTION 129 

honour, resulting from the fact that, as a conse- 
quence of our military and naval conversations with 
the French, their Navy had been withdrawn from the 
Mediterranean, leaving their Channel and Atlantic 
coasts only protected by our ships.) In Sir E. Grey's 
speech of August 3, Belgium forms only a small 
part of his case ; and in his later speeches it was chiefly 
France that he spoke of. He always made it plain, 
both in his speeches and in the despatches in the 
White Paper, that in his view we were bound to 
come to the help of France. And if any supporter 
of the war is asked: "Would you have been pre- 
pared to stand aside while France was crushed V he 
is all but certain to answer that he would not. Bel- 
gium showed Germany at its worst, but it did not 
show us at our best. It gave Germany an occasion 
for brutal violence; it gave our Foreign Office an 
occasion for hypocrisy. 

Not only should we have taken part in the war if 
Belgium had not been involved, but if our national 
interests had been on the side of Germany we should 
not have taken part, even though the Germans had 
violated Belgium. In 1887, there was severe ten- 
sion between France and Germany and war was ex- 
pected. The likelihood of the Germans marching 
through Belgium was admitted, and prominent news- 
papers of both parties discussed our obligations in 
case that should happen.* The conclusion they came 
to was that we need not regard our obligation as re- 
quiring us to go to war. Yet our obligation then, 

•Cf. "Standard", Feb. 4, 1887; "Pall Mall Gazette" Cat that 
time Liberal), Feb. 4 and 5, 1887; "Spectator", Feb. 5, 1887. 
What these newspapers said is given in Appendix A. 



130 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

whatever its nature, was precisely the same as in 1914, 
since it rested wholly on the treaty of 1839. What 
then had changed in the interval ? Our view of Brit- 
ish interests had changed, and nothing else. In 
1887, we had quarrels with France and Russia, but 
no quarrel with Germany; our leaning was towards 
the Triple Alliance, and in a European War we 
should have hoped for the victory of Germany. That 
is why we then made light of our obligation to Bel- 
gium. And in 1914 we made much of our obligation 
to Belgium because we were against Germany. So 
far at least as our Foreign Office is concerned, to say 
that we were against Germany because we were for 
Belgium is to invert cause and effect; the truth is 
that we were for Belgium because we were against 
Germany. 

It was clearly the desire and intention of the For- 
eign Office to support France in the event of a war 
between France and Germany. But no formal alli- 
ance could be concluded, because it was very doubt- 
ful whether Liberal and Radical opinion would, in 
quiet times, support the Government if it attempted 
to make such an alliance. Most Englishmen now are 
of opinion that the Government was wiser than its 
doubtful supporters; like Professor Murray, they 
hold that criticism which formerly seemed justified 
has been proved by Germany to have been ill-founded. 
This misses the point of the criticism. Almost all 
the critics had long believed in the existence of a 
powerful war-party in Germany, and in a wide-spread 
intention to use the German Navy for aggressive pur- 
poses. Criticism of our foreign policy does not rest 



INTRODUCTION 131 

upon denial of these now obvious facts ; it rests upon 
the fact that our foreign policy strengthened the war 
party in Germany, made the task of German friends 
of peace an impossible one, and supported France 
and Russia in enterprises which were inherently in- 
defensible. While German policy was still doubtful, 
while there was still a considerable chance that ag- 
gressive tendencies might be held in check, we, by 
our hostility, roused the combativeness and national 
pride of the Germans, and fostered the belief that 
they could only escape defeat by aggression. And it 
was this belief which precipitated the war. 

A candid defender of our foreign policy might, I 
think, state the case somewhat as follows: 

" During the Buer War, we were faced with the 
unanimous ill-will of Europe, and for some months 
there was grave danger lest France, Germany and 
Russia should combine against us. This danger was 
averted, partly by the unappeasable hostility of 
France to Germany, partly by the fact that the com- 
bined navies of France, Germany and Russia were 
at that time hardly a match for the British Navy. 
With the German Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900, how- 
ever, it became clear that we were entering upon a 
new epoch: we could no longer hope to be superior 
at sea to a combination of all the continental Powers. 
It became necessary to have friends on the Continent, 
in order to avoid the risk of a coalition against us. 
We had offered our friendship to Germany, through 
the medium of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain,* but this 
offer had been refused.** Germany's refusal, taken 

*Mr. Chamberlain's Birmingham speech, May 13, 1898. 
**See Biilow, Imperial Germany, pp. 31 ff, for grounds of 
Germany's rejection. 






132 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

in conjunction with the German Navy Law of 1900, 
made us believe that Germany was aiming at naval 
supremacy, and forced us to seek the friendship of 
France and Russia. As soon as the Boer War was 
ended, we began negotiations with France to settle 
outstanding questions, and in 1904, we concluded the 
Anglo-French Entente, in which we promised to 
support the French claim to Morocco in return for 
French recognition of our position in Egypt. Some- 
what parodoxically, the conclusion of the Entente was 
facilitated by recollection of the Fashoda incident, 
which had shown the French that their colonial ex- 
pansion could not be effected in opposition to Great 
Britain. 

"The conclusion of the Entente with Russia was 
a more difficult matter. For the protection of our 
interests in India and the Far East, we had allied 
ourselves in 1902 with Japan, which, under the shelter 
of the alliance, was able successfully to resist Russia 
in the war of 1904-5. This war produced great ten- 
sion in our relations with Russia, and would prob- 
ably have led to hostilities through the Dogger Bank 
incident, but for our Entente with France and the 
hope of an Entente with Russia. In the end, the 
Russo-Japanese war, like Fashoda, facilitated our new 
policy, since it showed Russia the difficulty of suc- 
ceeding in opposition to us. As soon as the war was 
ended, we effectively reconciled Russia and Japan, 
joined France in providing a much-needed loan for 
the Russian Government, and by the partition of 
Persia enabled Russia to secure peacefully a long- 
desired object which we should formerly have op- 



INTRODUCTION 133 

posed by force of arms. In this way our friendship 
with France and Russia was cemented by mutual 
advantage. 

"In this situation, we might reasonably hope that 
Germany would hesitate to attack so strong a group 
as the Triple Entente, and at first everything seemed 
to encourage our hopes. Germany's Bagdad Railway 
scheme lingered on in a state of suspended animation, 
smothered in the complications of international fi- 
nance. The French claim to Morocco, which we had 
been unable to sustain during the Russo-Japanese war, 
was successfully asserted in 1911, though Germany's 
face was saved by compensation in the Cameroons. 
Russia, being satisfied in Persia and definitely 
thwarted in the Far Bast, turned its attention to 
the Balkans^ where Germany had to submit to the 
defeat, first of Turkey, then of Bulgaria, in the two 
Balkan wars. Owing to German friendship with the 
Turk, the Tripoli war definitely estranged Italy from 
the Central Empires. In all these respects our policy 
was successful. Soon, owing to the Three Years' 
Service Law in France, the reorganisation of the Rus- 
sian army, and the projected strategic railways in 
Poland, the position of the Triple Entente would have 
been unassailable. But at this moment the Austrian 
attack on Serbia came as a challenge to the Triple 
Entente; Russia's prestige precluded surrender, and, 
though the moment was inopportune, the war was 
felt to be unavoidable." 

An equally candid defender of German foreign 
policy, with exactly the same national aspirations as 
those which inspire our diplomatists, would view the 



134 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

same series of events in quite a different way. His 
reply would be something like this : 

' ' Germany has been growing rapidly in population, 
in wealth, and in trade; more and more, the liveli- 
hood of Germans is becoming dependent upon the 
Open Door, the power of exporting manufactures, and 
security for imports of food. France, whose popula- 
tion and trade are stationary, has a Colonial Empire 
four times as great as ours. Austria-Hungary and 
Turkey, our only friends, are threatened with dis- 
ruption by the revolutionary activity and the ruthless 
warfare of the South Slavs, protected and favoured 
by Russia. England, by its Navy, can at any moment 
cut off part of our food-supply and strangle our 
trade. "We have tried every means of escaping from 
this situation without war, but in vain. In 1905, we 
asked that the status of Morocco, which had been 
decided by an international agreement (the Madrid 
Convention of 1880), should only be altered by a 
new international agreement. In spite of the obvious 
justice of our demand, England and France opposed 
us, and yielded only to the threat of force. At the 
resulting Algeciras Conference, we submitted to the 
asquisition of special rights by France and Spain, 
although at that time (when Russia was occupied in 
Manchuria) there could be no doubt that the pre- 
ponderance of force was on our side. 

''France secured a free hand for the Moroccan ad- 
venture by acknowledging the British position in 
Egypt, by withdrawing opposition to Italian ambi- 
tions in Tripoli, and by giving the Mediterranean 
coast of Morocco to Spain. When at last it became 



INTRODUCTION 135 

clear that France meant to occupy Morocco, we de- 
manded that, in justice, we, like England, Italy and 
Spain, should receive some compensation for our ac- 
quiescence. In this demand, also, it was only by 
threatening war that we succeeded, and then very in- 
adequately. In Mesopotamia, we discovered a coun- 
try capable of great fertility, but rendered barren by 
misgovernment. Here again, our plans were thwarted 
by the opposition of England, Russia's initial op- 
position being withdrawn after the Potsdam Agree- 
ment of 1910. The Tripoli war and the two Balkan 
Wars, of which we remained merely spectators, were 
all decided in a way inimical to our interests. At 
last it became clear that the ambitions of the Triple 
Entente must prosper at Germany's expense so long 
as peace was preserved among the Great Powers, and 
that the precisely similar ambitions of Germany could 
never prosper except by the use of our incomparable 
army. If we had remained longer inactive, the 
strengthening of Russia and the growth of the South 
Slavs would have rendered us powerless, and we 
should have been unable to obtain the share of the 
Empire which is our due. Our love of peace has been 
proved during the last forty-four years; only the 
intolerable policy of encirclement has at last com- 
pelled us to draw the sword.' ' 

This imaginary speech does not, of course, repre- 
sent my own views, any more than the speech which 
I put into the mouth of a defender of our policy. The 
two speeches are merely intended to represent the 
best that can be said for the two policies without 
actual denial of plain facts. I have presented our 



136 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 190-1-1915 

case and that of Germany without the moral indig- 
nation in which they are usually clothed. Germans, 
to account for the Navy Law of 1900, will point 
out how they longed, in 1899, to come to the rescue 
of gallant little South Africa, when we committed 
what was regarded as an international crime, the rea- 
sons for so regarding it being, as Professor Murray 
quaintly says, "perhaps four".* Germans will say 
that their inability to succour the oppressed on 
that occasion, their incapacity to defend right 
against might and democracy against militarism, first 
showed them that they must have a navy if justice 
was to prevail in the world and small nations were 
to be safe from their big neighbours. All this is of 
course hypocrisy on their part, and I have omitted 
it from the statement of their case. If there seem to 
be any omissions in the statement of our case, the 
motive is the same. 

Stripped of parliamentary verbiage, the funda- 
mental fact about the European situation is that all 
the Great Powers of Europe have precisely the same 
objects : territory, trade and prestige. In pursuit of 
these objects no one of the Great Powers shrinks from 
wanton aggression, war and chicanery. But owing 
to the geographical position of Germany and our 
naval supremacy, England can achieve all its pur- 
poses by wars outside Europe, whereas English and 
Russian policy has shown that Germany cannot 
achieve its aims except by a European war. We have 

*"Most decently-informed people in almost every region of the 

world regard the German attack on Belgium with vivid 

indignation as a obvious international crime. The reasons for so 
regarding it are perhaps four." Murray, p. 6. 



INTRODUCTION 137 

made small wars because small wars were what suited 
our purpose ; Germany has made a great war because 
a great war was what suited Germany's purpose. We 
and they alike have been immoral in aim and brutal 
in method, each in the exact degree which was thought 
to be to the national advantage. If either they or 
we had had loftier aims or less brutal methods, the 
war might have been avoided. As far as they are 
concerned, English readers will admit this at once; 
it is my object in what follows to prove that it is 
equally true of the Entente. 



II. MOROCCO. 

The influence of the Moroccan question in stimulat- 
ing warlike feeling, both in Germany and in France is 
little appreciated in this country, and could certainly 
not be discovered from Professor Murray's account. 
An Italian learned journal, ' * Scientia, ' ' has invited 
articles by learned men of all countries, and the Edi- 
tor has finally summed up his own editorial conclu- 
sions. On the subject of Morocco, the Editor says 
("Scientia," June- July, 1915, pp. 44, 45). 

"The first tangible result of the Triple Entente 
as it affected Germany was her complete and definite 
exclusion, at the risk, twice occurring, of a European 
War, from Morocco This exclusion was per- 
haps an error for the cause of European peace, 
because of the great disappointment and the lively 
invitation which the incident left throughout Ger- 
many. Contributing more than any other fact to 
strengthen the conviction among the German govern- 
ment classes and in Iperialist circles that Germany 
could never satisfy her imperialist aspirations without 
the conquest of colonies, it was this which established 
in the Imperialist German mind the determination, at 
any cost, not to let the last res nullius remaining, i. e. 
Turkey, which was really exceptionally important, 

escape from German influence It therefore 

became more imperative than ever that Austria 
should maintain her hegemony in the Balkans, for the 



MOROCCO 139 

sake of German designs, and ultimately of acquiring 
Salonika. ' '* 

From our point of view the history of Morocco be- 
gins with the Anglo-French treaty of April 8, 1904. 
This treaty consisted of two parts, one public and 
one secret. The secret part first appeared in French 
newspapers late in 1911, after the Morocco crisis of 
that year was past. 

The public Treaty contains a French acknowledg- 
ment of our position in Egypt, and an English ac- 
knowledgment, as regards Morocco, "that it apper- 
tains to France, more particularly as a Power whose 
dominions are coterminous for a great distance with 
those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, 
and to provide assistance for the purpose of all admin- 
istrative, economic, financial and military reforms 
which it may require." The two governments agree 
not to permit the erection of fortifications on the Moor- 
ish coast anywhere near the Straits of Gibraltar, and 
France agrees to come to an understanding with Spain 
in regard to this portion of the coast. England and 
France reciprocally promise each other diplomatic 
support in carrying out the agreement, and declare 
that they have no intention of altering the political 
status of Egypt or Morocco. 

The secret articles are concerned with what is to 
happen if, nevertheless, England or France should 
decide to alter the political status of Egypt or 

♦The history of Morocco has been so well told by Mr. Morel 
(Morocco in Diplomacy", Smith, Elder & Co., 1912, reprinted 
as "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, An Unheeded Warning", 
1915) that any new account not designed simply to whitewash 
the English and French Governments can only repeat what is to 
be found in this book, even when, like what follows, it is derived 
from other sources. 



140 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

Morocco. The article assigning the share of Spain 
is as follows : 

"The two Governments agree that a certain ex- 
tent of Morrish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, 
and other presides should, whenever the Sultan ceases 
to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere 
of influence of Spain, and that the administration 
of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not includ- 
ing, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall 
be entrusted to Spain. 

1 ' Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give 
her formal assent to the provisions of Articles IV 
and VII of the Declaration of today's date, and un- 
dertake to carry them out.* 

"She would also have to undertake not to alienate 
the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under 
her authority or in her sphere of influence. ' ' 

Thus the manner in which Morocco was to be par- 
titioned between France and Spain was already pro- 
vided for, in such a way as to allay our fear of seeing 
any strong naval Power established in the neighbour- 
hood of the Straits of Gibraltar. The Treaty contem- 
plated the complete absorption of Morocco by France, 
except along the Mediterranean coast, where our naval 
interests had to be safeguarded. 

When the Entente with France was concluded, 
there was almost universal rejoicing in England. 
Liberal-minded people were glad to co-operate with 
the great leader of continental democracy and liber- 
alism; the friends of peace were glad that all causes 

•These concern the Open Door, and the absence of fortifica- 
tions near Gibraltar. 



i 



MOROCCO 141 

of friction had been removed between two great na- 
tions which had always respected each other; but, 
strange to say, the Jingoes and Imperialists were also 
delighted, and the Entente was concluded by the 
same Government which had made the South African 
War. This should have made radicals and pacifists 
think, but it did not. Sir E. Grey, in blessing the 
Entente, said "it seemed as if some benign influence 
were at work, ' ' bringing friendship instead of enmity 
into the relations of England and France. Looking 
back now, we can see what the benign influence was ; 
it was the German Navy. This was the decisive factor 
that led us to swing over on to the side of the Franco- 
Russian Alliance. It was not love of French liberal- 
ism, nor even of Russian police methods, that produced 
the Entente: it was fear of Germany. "Our future 
is on the sea," said the Kaiser, and interpreted this 
as meaning: "Our future is over England's grave.' 
Now I do not say that our fear was irrational or 
groundless, and I do not say that we were wrong to 
take precautions. What I do say is that the measures 
which we actually took were ideally calculated to 
bring the danger nearer, to increase the aggressive 
temper which was beginning to grow up in Germany, 
to persuade Germans that we would yield nothing 
whatever to the claims of justice. I say that the 
measures we adopted were dictated by panic, and 
lacked the wisdom, the cool courage, which a calmer 
survey would have inspired. I say that the ends pur- 
sued by our foreign policy were exactly similar to the 
ends pursued by the German foreign policy, and were 
pursued by methods which made us accomplices in 



142 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

abominable crimes against humanity and freedom. I 
say that our policy revived warlike feeling in France, 
and fostered it in Germany. I say that in 1911 our 
readiness to provoke a European war was greater than 
that of Germany, and that our reluctance in 1914 
cannot therefore be wholly attributed to disinterested 
virtue. All this, I think, can be proved by an impar- 
tial recital of facts. In this recital, the first and most 
important chapter is Morocco. 

The foreign secretary in France at the time of the 
conclusion of the Entente was the same as at the time 
of Fashoda, and the same as the foreign secretary 
now, M. Delcasse. Before the negotiation of the En- 
tente, M. Delcasse, in pursuit of the policy of colonial 
expansion, was vehemently anti-English. Since the 
conclusion of the Entente, he has been vehemently 
anti-German, because the policy of the Revanche has 
again seemed feasible. Ever since the conclusion of 
the war of 1870, the fundamental desire of national- 
ist feeling in France has been for revenge on Ger- 
many and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. But for 
long years this policy has seemed so hopeless of suc- 
cess that French ambitions were turned in other direc- 
tions, and especially towards the acquisition of 
colonies. This policy produced friction with Eng- 
land, and as an anti-English policy it came to grief 
at Fashoda. The Entente produced a new possibility ; 
the combination of colonial expansion with the policy 
of the Revanche, both in co-operation with England. 
Anti-German feeling, which despair had made silent 
and subterranean, came again to the surface with 



MOROCCO 143 

the revival of hope, and found its protagonist in M. 
Delcasse. 

This policy was not that of Liberal elements in 
France ; it was that of the re-actionaries, the Clericals, 
the Militarists, and certain financial interests. Liberal 
opinion in France, seeing that colonial adventures 
and war-scares were the enemies of social reform, 
was anxious to abandon hostility to Germany and to 
be conciliatory as regards Morocco. This party, which 
had the majority of French Parliament, was feared 
by our Foreign Office and by "The Times," which 
allied themselves with all that was least liberal and 
least pacific in French opinion. If we had genuinely 
desired peace in Europe, we should have rejoiced 
in any sign of better relations between France and 
Germany. In fact, however, we did what we could 
to make the French nation suspicious of those French- 
men who tried to be conciliatory in their dealings 
with Germany, and to suggest that we regarded the 
progressive elements in French public life as lack- 
ing in loyalty to the Entente. 

M. Delcasse failed to notify the Morocco Treaty 
formally to the German Government, presumably in 
order to show his indifference to German opinion. At 
the moment, however, Germany showed no resentment. 

M. Delcasse next negotiated a secret treaty and a 
public declaration with Spain, concluded on October 
3rd, 1904. The public declaration states that France 
and Spain "remain firmly attached to the integrity 
of the Moorish Empire under the Sovereignty of the 
Sultan." The secret treaty delimits the respective 
spheres of France and Spain in Morocco, and arranges 



144 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

what is to happen "in case the continuance of the 
political status of Morocco and of the Shereefian 
Government should become impossible." The secret 
treaty first became known to the world through its 
publication by "Le Matin" in Nov. 1911. Not even 
the public declaration was officially notified by France 
to the German Government. 

To those who are unaccustomed to diplomatic 
methods, there is something repellent in the con- 
tradictory character of the public declarations and 
secret understandings of England, France and Spain 
in the matter of Morocco. Publicly, they stated that 
they "remained firmly attached" to the integrity of 
Morocco. Secretly, they arranged how the booty was 
to be divided in case this attachment should become 
less firm. If two men were to proclaim publicly 
that they had no intention of stealing their neigh- 
bour's goods, and were at the same time to draw up 
and sign a careful secret contract as to how his goods 
were to be shared in case they came into possession of 
them, they would not be believed if they declared, 
on being caught, that at the time they sincerely hoped 
they would remain honest. France and Spain had 
no right to Morocco except that of contiguity — the 
very same right which the King had to Naboth's 
Vineyard. The Moorish Empire was independent, and 
its international status was regulated by the Madrid 
Convention of 1880.* If misgovernment were to pro- 
duce a genuine need for European intervention, the 
obviously right course was to make the intervention 

*Which provided (inter alia) that all the signatories (among 
whom Germany was included) should enjoy most-favoured- 
nation treatment in Morocco. 



MOROCCO 145 

international, as in the case of the Boxers in China. 
But this was not the course adopted by England, 
France and Spain. While publicly declaring that they 
hoped the integrity of Morocco could be preserved, 
they secretly arranged who was to have what in case 
Moroccan independence came to an end. And this 
contingency was considered sufficiently probable for 
France to be willing, on account of it, to withdraw 
its long-standing, opposition to our occupation of 
Egypt. The analogy is exact with our illustration 
of the two burglars with the addition of a third who 
is paid to stand out of the job at the very moment 
when the two are publicly protesting their wish to 
remain honest. 

Professor Murray has a charmingly idyllic ex- 
planation of the secrecy which was preserved as to 
the terms of partition. No diplomat, I feel sure, 
could have thought of anything so idyllic — which 
shows the wisdom of summoning outside assistance 
for the defence of the Foreign Office. Professor 
Murray's explanation is, that the political status of 
Morocco would have been more difficult to maintain 
if it had become known that England and France 
contemplated the possibility of having to change it; 
and so anxious were the two Powers to do nothing 
to hasten the downfall of Morocco, that, like benevo- 
lent bedside doctors, they concealed the danger from 
the patient and from his friends. This was very kind, 
certainly. But the kindness did not end here. One 
of the doctors, who had expectations from the pa- 
tient's demise, paid the other to leave him in sole 
charge, and subsequently administered many small 



146 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 19Q4-1915 

doses of poison. Finally, the patient died, and the 
doctor came into his inheritance. Those who can be- 
lieve, with Professor Murray, that he grieved sin- 
cerely for the sick man's death, are to be congratu- 
lated on their charitable disposition. 

Germany, at first, raised no objections to the Anglo- 
French treaty or to the Franco-Spanish declaration. 
France proceeded to urge upon the Moorish Govern- 
ment a series of reforms which even Professor 
Murray regards as "perhaps too much concerned with 
French interest and monopolies." What ensued may 
be told in Professor Murray's words: 

"The Shereef procrastinated, the pressure contin- 
ued, when suddenly, on March 31st, 1905, the Ger- 
man Emperor in person descended in his private 
yacht on the port of Tangier, and made a speech to 
the world at large. He announced that he regarded 
the Shereef as a free and independent sovereign, not 
bound to obey any foreign pressure ; that sudden and 
sweeping reforms were undesirable in Morocco; and 
that German interests must be safeguarded. 

This speech was followed by a demand for a gen- 
eral Europjean conference to settle the affairs of 
Morocco." 

What are we to think of this characteristically 
dramatic action? In manner it was brutal, in sub- 
stance it showed more concern for German national 
interests than for friendly relations between the 
Great Powers. In both these respects it was to be 
condemned. There can be little doubt that it was 
encouraged by the weakness of Russia owing to the 
Manchurian defeats. But it should also be said that 



MOROCCO 147 

the existence of a secret Franco-Spanish treaty was 
known, and it is not improbable that its terms, as 
well as the secret articles of the Anglo-French treaty, 
had been discovered by the German secret service. 
However that may be, the Kaiser's action was inde- 
fensible, on the broad ground that it was calculated 
to provoke resentment in England and France. 

But I think we must give a different answer when 
we ask whether this resentment, however natural, 
was justified by the facts. The Kaiser's discourtesy 
was only a retort to the deliberate discourtesy of M. 
Delcasse in not notifying the German Government of 
the treaty of April and the declaration of October. 
The exclusive nationalism of the Kaiser's attitude 
was merely the parallel to the exclusive nationalism 
of England and France in attempting to dispose of 
Morocco as suited themselves, without considering 
the natural resentment likely to be felt in Germany. 
As regards the substance of the dispute, Germany's 
legal case was good and ours was bad. Let us take 
the points mentioned by Professor Murray. The 
Kaiser "announced that he regarded the Shereef 
as a free and independent sovereign" — Franch and 
Britain had made practically the same announce- 
ment in their public treaty. The Shereef could only 
cease to be free and independent owing to the military 
conquest of his dominions, or the financial strangula- 
tion which sometimes secures the same end more 
cheaply. The Kaiser had as good a right to declare 
him free and independent as we have to declare 
King Albert free and independent, and we had as 
little legal right to decree the subjection of Morocco 



148 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

as the Kaiser has to decree the subjection of Belgium. 
I admit that it was unplausible to maintain, "that 
sudden and sweeping reforms were undesirable in 
Morocco," at any rate, if it was so, Morocco must 
have differed from every other part of the earth's 
surface. But the men who wanted to reform Morocco 
were resisting reforms at home, and were demanding 
reform in their own interest, rather than in that of 
Morocco. So much is implied in Professor Murray's 
allusion to "French interests and monopolies." The 
assertion that "German interests must be safe- 
guarded," though not one with which I sympathise, 
is one which is considered the duty of every Govern- 
ment, and for which Professor Murray praises Mr. 
Lloyd George's Mansion House speech in 1911. The 
Madrid Convention of 1880 guaranteed to Germany, 
along with other Powers, most-favoured-nation treat- 
ment in Morocco, and Germany's right to safeguard 
this position was indisputable. Finally, we came to 
the Kaiser's demand for an international Conference 
to decide the status of Morocco. This demand was 
so unquestionably just that Professor Murray can 
find nothing to say against it. "The future of 
Morocco," he confesses, "was a matter of public in- 
terest, and the rest of Europe had the right to be 
consulted." And again: "France's case was not 
perfect ; if we had been absolutely disinterested arbi- 
trators in the matter, we should probably have de- 
cided that France ought to agree to a conference." 
He remarks, in his amiable way, that "the end, as it 
happened, seemed exactly to satisfy the demands of 
justice." But the demands of justice were not satis- 



MOROCCO 149 

fied until Germany had threatened war, until Eng- 
land had shown a complete willingness to fight in a 
quarrel in which Professor Murray admits that we 
were in the wrong, and M. Delcasse, in spite of our 
hot support, had been dismissed from office by the 
good sense of the French nation, not, as "The Times" 
has taught Englishmen to believe, at the insolent 
bidding of the Kaiser. 

Professor Murray deals with our initial opposi- 
tion to a conference in the following terms : 

"France, to whom we had promised our diplomatic 
support, seemed, in her indignation at being bullied, 
to be inclined to refuse a conference. And we took 
our stand firmly at her side. 

"It would be interesting to know what our repre- 
sentatives said in private to our friends' representa- 
tives. It is likely enough that there were private 
warnings and appeals for moderation. But in public, 
at any rate, Great Britain stood with perfect loyalty 
by the side of France. Here, no doubt, we strike 
upon one of Sir E. Grey's cardinal principles: if you 
make an engagement, carry out your engagement 
loyally and with no hedging. ' ' 

It is a comfort to know that Sir E. Grey 
possesses this virtue ; perhaps Professor Murray is also 
able to assure us that the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
does not embezzle public funds and the Home Secre- 
tary does not levy blackmail on burglars in return 
for immunity from arrest. I am sorry Professor 
Murray should have allowed himself to imply that 
Sir E. Grey is exceptional among British Foreign 
Secretaries in the practice of keeping his promises, 



150 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

the more so as he was not Foreign Secretary at the 
time that Professor Murray is dealing with. The 
Kaiser's visit to Tangier, and the opposition of Eng- 
land and France to a conference, occurred while Lord 
Lansdowne was still at the Foreign Office. 

What Professor Murray says about loyalty to en- 
gagements and the likelihood of ''private warnings 
and appeals for moderation" is exactly what, if he 
were a German, he would say about Germany's atti- 
tude to Austria during the twelve days. The cases 
are exactly similar; we do not know what was said, 
but such evidence as we possess tends to show that 
Germany egged on Austria and England egged on 
France. The evidence in each case is inconclusive, 
but it is considerably stronger in the case of Eng- 
land and France in 1905* than in the case of Ger- 
many and Austria in 1914. War did not result at 
the earlier date, because French public opinion saw 
the madness of M. Delcasse's policy; war was averted 
by democratic control. In Austria, with its monarch- 
ical constitution, this restraining force was absent. 

It is not very easy to draw conclusions as to the 
extent of our support of France in 1905 from the 
mass of contradictory evidence, of which I have 
given an account in the Appendix B. In view of the 
line which we know to have been taken later by Sir 
E. Grey, the most probable hypothesis would seem 
to be that Lord Lansdowne, while refusing to make a 
promise, consented to make a prophecy, and to state 
that, in his opinion, Parliament would support the 
Government if the occasion for giving armed assist- 

*See Appendix B. 



MOROCCO 151 

ance to France should rise. From the point of view 
of honour, such a prophecy has very nearly the same 
binding force as a promise. Any action which the 
French might have taken on the strength of it would 
obviously have compelled our Government to exert 
all its influence at home in order to secure the realisa- 
tion of its prophecy, and if our Government had 
failed, no one could deny that the French would 
have had a legitimate grievance against us. 

Whether or not our action in 1905 was as I have 
supposed, it certainly was of this nature in the later 
crisis of 1911, when the French case was scarcely 
better than in 1905. But before we come to the crisis 
of 1911, we must say a few words about the Con- 
ference of Algeciras and the subsequent actions of the 
French at Morocco. 

The privileges secured by the French under the Act 
of Algeciras were very few; it is misleading to say, 
as Professor Murray does, that the delegates "de- 
cided almost all points in favour of France and 
against Germany/ ' The sum-total of the conces- 
sions secured by France, Spain and England were 
the three following : 

(1) There was to be a force of native police, 
numbering between two thousand and two thousand 
five hundred, which was to be under Spanish and 
French inspectors numbering sixteen to twenty offi- 
cers, and thirty to forty non-commissioned officers — 
the whole being subject to an Inspector General, who 
was to be a superior officer of the Swiss Army. 

(2) A Morocco State Bank was to be established 
as the financial agent of the Moorish Government; 



152 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

this Bank was to be subject to French law, to have its 
capital subscribed in equal shares by the signatories 
of the Algeciras Act, and to have, in addition to the 
Board of Directors, and to a High Commissioner 
appointed by the Moroccan Government after consul- 
tation with the directors, four Censors, appointed re- 
spectively by the German Imperial Bank, the Bank of 
England, the Bank of Spain, and the Bank of France. 
The Censors were to see that the intentions of the 
Act were duly executed, but must "not at any time, 
or under any pretext whatsoever, be allowed to in- 
terfere in the conduct of the business or in the in- 
ternal administration of the Bank." The annual 
Eeport of the Censors was to be unanimous. 

(3) On the Algerian frontier, and in the Riff 
country, the carrying out of the regulations made by 
the Act as regards customs and the trade in arms and 
explosives should not be in the hands of an interna- 
tional authority, but in the hands of France and 
Morocco in the former region and Spain and Morocco 
in the latter. 

Thus France and Spain acquired a right to not more 
than sixty inspectors of police under the command of 
a Swiss; to a majority of three to one (counting Eng- 
land as on their side) among the Censors, whose 
powers, however, seem to have depended upon 
unanimity, and to exclusive co-operation with the 
Moors in carrying out certain provisions of the Act 
on the borders of their own territories. 

The last Article (No. CXXIII) of the Act is as 
follows : 

All existing Treaties, Conventions, and Arrange- 



C i 



MOROCCO 153 

ments between the Signatory Powers and Morocco re- 
main in force. It is, however, agreed that, in case 
their provisions be found to conflict with those of the 
present General Act, the stipulations of the latter 
shall prevail. ' ' 

It is clear that the Act gave to every signatory 
Power the legal right to give or withhold its consent 
before any action was taken which contravened the 
Act. This gave Germany its locus standi in subse- 
quent disputes. The formal correctness of Germany's 
position in the following years is thus indisputable, 
whatever we may think of the manner in which the 
Kaiser chose to press his claims. 

If the Moors had been capable of preserving order, 
the Act of Algeciras might have proved an insuperable 
barrier to French ambitions. It may be that, as Pro- 
fessor Murray maintains, order could not have been 
preserved by the Moorish authorities even if no Euro- 
pean had been at hand to profit by disturbances. 
However that may be, it is clear that the usual methods 
of proving the incompetence of a semi-civilised Gov- 
ernment were adopted. As Professor Murray ob- 
serves: "French intrigues, German intrigues, Span- 
ish intrigues, intrigues of financiers and speculators 
free from any particular national bias: All these 
causes are freely alleged to have been in operation, 
and it would need a bold man to meet such charges 
with a denial. ,, 

In any case France (and to a less degree Spain) 
profited by every failure of the Moors, and occupied 
one portion after another of Moroccan territory. In 
February, 1909, in a Franco-German declaration, the 



154 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

Germans acknowledged that France had special inter- 
ests in Morocco, while the French promised not to 
obstruct German economic interests in that country, 
and declared, as usual, their firm attachment to its 
independence and integrity. But this declaration 
proved only a halting-place, not a definite solution. 

In April, 1911, owing to the supposed danger to 
Europeans in Fez from neighbouring tribes in revolt, 
the French sent an expedition which occupied the 
town, and was followed by a larger force which suc- 
ceeded in putting down the rebellion. Frenchmen 
who were opposed to a forward policy in Morocco 
maintained, with much force or argument, that there 
never was any danger to Europeans in Fez. Those 
of us who remember the terrible accounts of (wholly 
imaginary) dangers to women and children in Johan- 
nesburg before the Jameson Raid will be slow to 
decide that the danger in Fez must have been real. 
I have no means of ascertaining the truth, and Pro- 
fessor Murray also has apparently been unable to find 
evidence of danger, for he says : 

"The Radical opposition in France maintain, 
rightly and wrongly, that the Europeans in Fez were 
in no real danger and that the expedition was unneces- 
sary ; but that difficult question does not come within 
our present purview.'' 

We may gather from this admission that, whether 
there was danger or not, our Foreign Office, at least, 
possesses no evidence of its existence. When the 
French expedition started, the French Government 
announced that it would withdraw after succouring 
the Europeans. But the pressure of the French 



MOROCCO 155 

Colonial Party proved too strong, and the troops 
remained in occupation of the capital. The Germans, 
from the first, adopted an attitude which was per- 
fectly within their rights. They raised no objection 
to the relief of Fez, but they pointed out that, if the 
occupation continued, it could no longer be maintained 
that Morocco was still independent. In these circum- 
stances, since the Act of Algeciras was to be modified, 
the Germans demanded compensation for their con- 
sent. France was obtaining an advantage which had 
been refused by the Act of Algeciras, and, since the 
old German policy of upholding Moroccan independ- 
ence had become impossible, Germany was willing to 
part with its rights in Morocco for a price. This is 
exactly the attitude which would be adopted in private 
life by a business man in a similar situation. It is 
not a noble attitude, not an attitude compatible with 
a keen desire for international amity; but it is an 
attitude involving only that degree of national self- 
seeking which is, unfortunately, taken for granted 
in the foreign policy of all Great Powers. It is no 
better, but also no worse, than the policy of other 
countries in similar circumstances. 

Professor Murray's comment on Germany's action 
is as follows: 

"If there was plunder going she insisted that she 
should have her share. Such a claim was not particu- 
larly creditable nor strictly just. But, in the atmos- 
phere of colonial policy, it was intelligible." 

With this account, in the main, I have no fault to 
find. I agree with the statement that the German 
claim was "not particularly creditable." It would 



156 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

have been far more creditable to say: "France, per- 
haps unavoidably, has broken the Act of Algeciras, 
and, if I stood on the letter of my rights, I might 
demand compensation. But goodwill between the 
nations is more important than the acquisition of 
colonies by Germany, and I will waive my rights in 
order to show that I wish to live at peace with all 
the world. ' ' This is what an enlightened and humane 
Government would have said, and this is not what the 
German Government said. But the English and 
French Governments, equally, were not inspired by 
enlightened and human ideas; if they had been, the 
crisis would never have arisen. 

To say that the German Government's demand was 
"not strictly just,'' seems to me to be going too far. 
Justice was the one merit which it might claim. 
France, rightly or wrongly, was acting contrary to 
the Act of Algeciras, and Germany had a clear legal 
right to expect payment for acquiescence. Germany 's 
formal case, as in 1905, was good. As in that case, 
what was wrong with Germany was brutality in 
method and indifference to international good will. 

France, with the support of England, showed an 
equal indifference to international good will, and 
England showed an almost equal brutality of method. 
Moreover, the French case was technically bad, 
whereas the German case was technically good. In 
view of the Act of Algeciras, the French ought, from 
the first, to have professed a willingness to seek the 
consent of the Powers before effecting any alteration 
in the status of Morocco. Assuming that the expedi- 
tion to Fez was justified by danger to Europeans, the 



MOROCCO 157 

French ought, at the moment of dispatching it, to 
have declared that, since the independence of Morocco 
had become impossible, they were willing to submit 
the decision as to its future to a new conference. Both 
legally, and from the broad point of view of human- 
ity and friendship between States, this is what France 
ought to have done, and what we ought to have ad- 
vised France to do. 

This, however, is not what France did, or what we, 
apparently, wished France to do. France, says 
Professor Murray, "saw no good reason why she 
should make sacrifices. The demands for compen- 
sation, whatever they were, were not accepted; the 
French Government showed unwillingness to come to 
a private understanding with Germany." France 
"saw no good reason !" The good reason was, first, 
that Germany's demand was legally justifiable; sec- 
ondly, that to refuse it obviously involved risk of a 
European war, with all its devastation, for the sake 
of an essentially petty question of territory in equa- 
torial Africa.* Thirdly, that by not giving way at 
once it would be made apparent to Germany that bare 
justice could not be obtained from the Triple Entente 
except by force or the threat of force ; fourthly, that 
the French action accentuated the division of Europe 
into two camps, and was ideally calculated to increase 
the growing militarism and aggressiveness of the Ger- 
mans. All this Professor Murray passes by in silence ; 
all this, which subsequent history has bitterly con- 
firmed, he regards as too unimportant to mention. 

•Territory in Morocco was never in question. See below. 



158 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

In the Agadir crisis** the methods and purposes 
of England and Germany were exactly similar; the 
despatch of the Panther was provocative and brutal, 
and so was Mr. Lloyd George 's Mansion House speech. 
The chief difference is that, in 1911, we were willing 
to fight and the Germans were not. The main facts 
are not in dispute, and are quite enough to establish 
the reckless folly of our policy at that time. 

After Prance had shown unwillingness to come to a 
private understanding with Germany on the question 
of compensation elsewhere for the recognition of the 
French protectorate in Morocco, the German Govern- 
ment sent a gunboat, the Panther, followed by a 
cruiser, the Berlin, to the harbour of Agadir on the 
south coast of Morocco. (July 1, 1911). This action 
was provocative and tactless; the only thing to be 
said in extenuation is that it was only taken after 
the French had shown themselves unwilling to yield 
to the claims of mere justice. It was intended to 
show that Germany was in earnest, and to produce 
a more yielding spirit on the part of France in the 
matter of compensation. What troubled our Foreign 
Office, however,* was not the fear of war between 
France and Germany, but, on the contrary, the fear 
that they might reach an agreement which would be 

** Professor Murray has performed a service to the critics of 
diplomacy and its methods by his account of the Agadir crisis. 
Most Englishmen who have not made a study of foreign policy 
find it difficult to believe that our Government can have done 
things which in fact it did do. The evidence is mostly contained 
in old newspapers, Land Blue Books, and is therefore somewhat 
inaccessible. But Professor Murray's statement of the facts is 
quite sufficient to establish the case against our Foreign Office, 
and includes everything that is stated without special authority 
in what follows. While intending to praise England and decry 
Germany, he involuntarily makes it plain that the facts totally 
fail to establish his client's innocence. 



MOROCCO 159 

prejudicial to our interests. We feared, or professed 
to fear, that the Germans might acquire a naval base 
on the Atlantic, and that our trade interests might 
be injuriously affected. Neither France nor Germany 
in the period from July 1 to Mr. Lloyd George 's Man- 
sion House Speech (July 21), kept us adequately in- 
formed of the course of the negotations, although Sir 
E. Grey, on July 4, informed the German Ambassador 
that we could not be disinterested in the matter of 
Morocco. We were afraid that the bargain was going 
to be conducted without our participation, and this, 
it was felt, could not be borne. 

Several reasons have been given why we had to 
intervene.* Let us examine them. 

(1) "We had our own definite interests in 
Morocco ; our Moroccan trade, and the strategical im- 
portance of the north coast. ' ' 

As regards our strategical interests, it is enough 
to point out that Germany made it clear from the 
first that what was sought as compensation was not 
a portion of Morocco, ** but a portion (or, some said, 
the whole) of the French Congo, where our strategical 
interests were too minute to deserve serious considera- 
tion. And so far as trade is concerned, our interest 

•The reasons examined are those given by Professor Murray. 
They are the same as those given by other apologists. The 
quotations are from him. 

**M. de Selves (the French Foreign Minister), stated in the 
Debate of Dec. 14, 1911, that, in reply to the French claim to 
Morocco, Germany replied : "Right, we accept. Take Morocco, 
establish your Protectorate there. But since you have made 
a treaty with England in this matter, since you have made a 
treaty with Italy, since you have made a treaty with Spain, on 
what basis will you treat with us? Our public opinion does not 
permit that we should not obtain elsewhere some compensation 
for our abandonment in your favour and the promise which we 
shall give you that our diplomacy will assist in getting the 
Powers to ratify the arrangement we arrive at." (Quoted by 
Morel, p. 177). 



160 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

is exactly the same as Germany's in any territory con- 
trolled by France, namely, the preservation of the 
Open Door. "We had secured this for thirty years in 
1904, the Germans secured it permanently in 1911. It 
should have been obvious to our diplomatists that any 
change demanded by the Germans as regards trade 
must be to our advantage. This first reason thus falls 
to the ground. 

(2) It is argued that we had to guard against two 
opposite dangers: Germany might force war on 
France, or might make friends with France and de- 
tach her from Great Britain. The first of these alter- 
natives seems to have troubled us very little; for if 
France felt a wish for our help, France could appeal 
for it, and make us a party to the negotiations. What 
troubled us was, that we were not a party to the 
negotiations; and in this France need not have con- 
curred except by her own choice. It is perfectly clear 
throughout the crisis that what we feared was not 
a rupture, but an agreement prejudicial to our inter- 
ests, and it seems that "The Times," at least, would 
have regarded as prejudicial to our interests any 
agreement which produced genuinety friendly rela- 
tions between France and Germany.* This is also 
the view of Professor Murray. He says : 

"Germany might try the policy of detaching France 
from Great Britain. We had ourselves had the ex- 
perience of her attempt to detach us from France. 
(See below, pp 115ff.) She might now be trying to 
persuade France privately to promise neutrality in 
Germany's next war, as she tried in the previous 

•See "Times" of July 20, despatch from Paris. 



MOROCCO 161 

year to persuade us. There was naturally a party in 
Prance which was somewhat shy of commitments to 
Great Britain, and might be glad to obtain temporary 
security at the price of dissolving the Entente. This 
danger would become greater if Great Britain took no 
step to show that she would stand by France in the 
present difficulty. So from this point of view, also, 
we are bound to show our interest in France." 

This paragraph is truly astonishing. On referring 
to p. 115, to see what Macchiavellian plot Germany 
had attempted to entice us into, we find the follow- 
ing, in the account of the Anglo-German negotiations 
of 1909: "The Chancellor's general proposal of co- 
operation centred in an engagement that, in the event 
of either Power being attacked by a third 
Power or group of Powers, the Power attacked 
should remain neutral." That is to say, the 
dark design of Germany, which put us on our guard 
during the Agadir crisis, was a design to induce us 
to promise not to take part in an aggressive war 
against Germany. We refused, according to Pro- 
fessor Murray, to give any such undertaking. And 
if we had given it, he says : ' ' The confidence between 
France and Great Britain would have been sapped." 

Of course, he goes on to say that we had no aggres- 
sive intentions. At the same time, Germany knew 
that we had been willing to fight in 1905, when 
France had a bad case and gave way; Germany was 
to find us still willing to fight in 1911, when France 
still had a bad case. Is it surprising if Germany, 
remembering that we had lately refused to promise 
neutrality if Germany were attacked, seeing that we 



162 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

were obviously afraid of friendly relations between 
France and Germany, and not afraid to threaten war, 
came to the conclusion that we desired a trial of 
strength between Germany and the Entente? As 
regards the immense majority of Englishmen, this 
was the absolute opposite of the truth. But the For- 
eign Office and "The Times" had so conducted our 
affairs that the Germans could not well come to any 
other conclusion. And it is only just to remember 
this fact when we condemn them — as we are right in 
doing — for their bellicose attitude in the summer of 
1914.* 

"There was naturally," we are told, "a party in 
France which is somewhat shy of commitments to 
Great Britain." There was indeed such a party, 
just as there was in England — a party which con- 
tained almost all the Eadical and Labour elements, 
and all who regarded the preservation of peace as the 
most important aim of foreign policy. The party in 
France which desired commitments to Great Britain, 
like the party in Great Britain which desired commit- 
ments to France, consisted of the militarists, imperial- 
ists, and reactionaries. In France, as in England, 
it was this party which controlled the acts of the 
Government, while the Radical party as a rule con- 
trolled its speeches. While the militarists saw with 
rejoicing the tendency of the acts of the two Govern- 

*It is in the light of Professor Murray's references to p. 115 
of his pamphlet that we must interpret his statement that 
Germany "might now (in July, 1911), be trying to persuade 
France privately to promise neutrality in Germany's next war, 
as she tried in the previous year to persuade us" (my italics). 
That is to say, Germany might be trying to persuade Prance 
to promise neutrality if Germany were attacked. It is this 
danger, apparently, which Professor Murray regards as justifying 
our provocative attitude in the Agadir crisis. 



MOROCCO 163 

ments, the Radicals in both countries, unsuspicious, 
anxious for promised reforms at home, and mostly- 
unversed in the details of diplomacy, were placated 
by soft words, and by assurances, misleading even if 
verbally accurate, that no obligation of support in 
war existed on either side. 

And so, in spite of the legal rectitude of Germany's 
claim, we stood by France, according to the Foreign 
Office apologist, in the hope of securing French sup- 
port on some future occasion when we might be ad- 
vancing some equally unjust claim. Truly an aston- 
ishing defence ! 

(3) Finally we come to the supreme reason for 
our intervention: the fetich of "prestige." What we 
are told is this : 

'Hardly less imperative was the mere matter of 
prestige. We had been for many years the chief 
commercial Power in Morocco ; we had vital interests 
in the north coast. We had taken a leading part in 
the various treaties. We could hardly submit to the 
indignity of being suddenly treated as non-existent, 
while Germany settled with France, in a manner 
which she refused to explain to us, the future of 
Morocco. ■ ' 

I am glad Professor Murray has written this para- 
graph. If I had written it, it would have been con- 
sidered a gross libel upon those who direct our policy, 
and it would have caused my printer and publisher 
to be sent to prison under the Defence of the Realm 
Act. But as Professor Murray has written it, we 
have it on unimpeachable authority that our prestige 
in the matter of Morocco was considered one of the 



164 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

grave and weighty reasons on account of which our 
Government told Mr. Lloyd George to speak as he 
did at the Mansion House, and behaved throughout 
the crisis in a way that must embitter our relations 
with Germany, and must have led to war if France 
and Germany had not both been more reasonable 
than England. 

There is a homely proverb that "sauce for the 
goose is sauce for the gander." It appears that 
Professor Murray does not believe this proverb, for, 
when discussing M. Delcasse's failure to notify the 
treaty of 1904 to the German Government, he says 
that M. Delcasse 

"Objected strongly to the idea that Prance must 
submit her important acts of foreign policy to Ger- 
many for approval, except in matters where Germany 
was directly concerned. Here he was doubtless right ; 
the claim which Germany afterwards made, that no 
treaty should be made in any part of the world with- 
out the approval of Germany, was not one which a 
self-respecting nation could admit." 

Yet this claim, which "no self-respecting nation 
could admit," was precisely analogous to the claim 
of prestige which we advanced in 1911, when we de- 
cided that "we could hardly submit to the dignity 
of being suddenly treated as non-existent." True, 
he had treaty obligations towards the French in 
Morocco, but what were they? To leave the French 
a free hand, and to give them diplomatic support 
when they wanted it. Our intervention in 1911 
amounted to refusing them a free hand, and inter- 
vening on the side of one party in their political dis- 



MOROCCO 165 

putes. This was not demanded of us by the treaty 
of 1904, and if it had been, the French would never 
have consented to conclude such a treaty. Our claim 
of prestige had nothing to do with treaty obligations ; 
it was a claim of national pride, exactly analogous 
to the German claim which we are all agreed in re- 
garding as preposterous. 

What was this " prestige " which we felt to be en- 
dangered by the negotiations between France and 
Germany? Apart from prestige, our trade inter- 
ests and our strategical interests were not endangered, 
since Germany claimed no territory in Morocco, and 
desired the Open Door, which was what our trade 
required. One vital interest we had, if our policy 
was to continue on the lines pursued since 1904: it 
was essential to our policy that France and Germany 
should remain on bad terms with each other. This 
purpose, which we could not avow, was achieved by 
Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech; but this 
was not a matter of mere prestige. Prestige is no- 
thing but standing on one's dignity — that foolish 
kind of "dignity" which is affected by people who 
feel their position insecure and are always looking 
out for insults. Mr. A., hearing that his friend Mr. B. is 
giving a dinner party to which he has invited his 
rival Mr. C, sends word to Mr. C. that unless Mr. 
B. is induced to invite him also, Mr. C. shall be 
starved, his outlying fields devastated, and anyone 
who attempts to defend them killed. Mr. C. replies 
that Mr. B. has a right to invite or not invite any- 
one he pleases, but if he yields to Mr. A.'s pressure, 
his house shall be burned down, his labourers put to 



166 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

death, and himself reduced to beggary. Mr. A. re- 
torts that Mr. C. is a brute; Mr. C. rejoins that Mr. 
A. is an insolent busybody. Meanwhile Mr. B., with 
infinite trouble, smooths the ruffled dignity of his 
angry neighbours, who have made him the pawn in 
their rivalry. Strange to say, he is expected to feel 
gratitude to Mr. A. for the dangers to which Mr. 
A. has exposed him. This is the Agadir crisis in a 
parable — except that Germany's attitude was more 
reasonable than that of Mr. C. 

It is not plain to every man possessed of either 
humanity or common sense that this whole game of 
prestige is childish and brutal? The only true in- 
terest of England, the only true interest of mankind, 
in the Agadir dispute, was that it should be set- 
tled in the manner least likely to lead to war or to 
leave a legacy of international ill-will. The Germans 
chose to press their rights to the utmost. In doing 
so, they were acting the part of the insecure parvenu 
saying: "I am a Great Power too; don't you for- 
get it!" But the conduct of England, instead of 
being such as to allay this mood, was such as to in- 
flame it. England's position as a Great Power, one 
would have thought, was sufficiently secure to be able 
to endure an outward yielding to the claims of a 
Power whose dignity is more recent and more un- 
easy. We ought to have met Germany's desire for 
school-boy triumphs with the tolerant smile of an 
elder brother. Instead of doing so, we refused to 
acknowledge the badness of our case, and reduced our 
manners to the German level by putting up Mr. Lloyd 
George to administer a scolding. 



MOROCCO 167 

We had desired from the first to be a party to the 
Franco-German negotiations, and on July 4, Sir E. 
Grey informed the German Ambassador that we could 
not recognise any arrangements that might be come to 
without us. As nothing came of this, Sir E. Grey 
made a more emphatic statement to the German Am- 
bassador on July 21, and on the very same evening 
Mr. Lloyd George spoke at the Mansion House. After 
the usual praise of peace, he proceeded as follows : 

"But I am also bound to say this — that I believe 
it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of 
this country but of the world, that Britain should 
at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige 
amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her potent 
influence has many a time been in the past, and may 
yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of hu- 
man liberty. It has more than once in the past 
redeemed Continental nations, who are sometimes 
too apt to forget that service, from overwhelming 
disaster and even from international extinction. I 
would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I 
conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance 
of international good will except questions of the 
gravest national moment. But if a situation were to 
be forced upon us in which peace could only be pre- 
served by the surrender of the great and beneficent 
position Great Britain has won by centuries of hero- 
ism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be 
treated where her interests were vitally affected as 
if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, 
then I say emphatically that peace at that price 
would be a humiliation intolerable for a great 



168 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 



i j 



country like ours to endure. 

The meaning of this speech could not be doubt- 
ful. It was a public threat to Germany, a clear inti- 
mation that we were prepared to go to war in defence 
of our interests in the Moroccan question. What 
those interests were, we have seen: Treaty obliga- 
tions towards France, which were not in question and 
were not invoked by the French; prestige, which no 
rational man can regard as anything but folly; and 
lastly, as the unavowed motive of the whole policy, 
a fear of good relations between France and Ger- 
many, lest France should fail us when the day came 
for a trial of strength between us and the Germans. 
That the German Government looked forward to 
such a day, I am not prepared to deny. But a plain 
narrative of events makes it evident that we were, 
at that time, even more willing to hasten the day 
than the Germans were. The clash between the 
Entente and the Central Empires was brought about 
by a series of steps, some great and some small. Some 
of these steps were taken by one side, some by the 
other. One of the longest steps towards war was 
taken by the British Government's action during the 
Agadir crisis, culminating in Mr. Lloyd George's 
diatribe at the Mansion House. For this reason, 
among others, the British Government cannot escape 
its share of responsibility for the final catastrophe. 

For a few days after the 21st, relations between 
England and Germany were strained almost to break- 
ing point. But the forces in Germany on the side 
of peace — apparently supported, at that time, by the 
Kaiser — exerted all their strength, and an agreement 



MOROCCO 169 

was arrived at. We became a party to the negoti- 
ations, the German claims were found not to conflict 
with our interests, and on November 4, Conventions 
were concluded between France and Germany recog- 
nising the French protectorate in Morocco in return 
for a cession of territory in the French Congo. So 
far as diplomacy was concerned, these Conventions 
constituted the final solution of the Moroccan question. 
The solution itself was not objectionable, and was 
such as might have been reached without difficulty by 
sensible men genuinely desirous of coming to an agree- 
ment. 

But although the diplomatic question was settled, 
the bad effects on public opinion remained. The Eng- 
lish, who believed Mr. Lloyd George to be a genuine 
lover of peace, were persuaded that he must have 
had grave secret reasons for his outburst ; the Panther 
at Agadir reminded them of the Kaiser's speech at 
Tangier in 1905, and they became convinced that 
German policy was wantonly aggressive, always 
troubling the international situation, always ready to 
plunge the world into war; misled by "The Times," 
the English people remained ignorant of the German 
case, and unaware that they and the French had been 
the real aggressors. The French, finding that the 
English Government was ready to stand by them in 
a war with Germany, became far more bellicose than 
they had been; the revanche began to seem a possi- 
bility, men who had been pacifists became jingoes, the 
Three Years' Service Law was introduced, and the 
whole tone of French politics was changed. As for 
the effect on Germany, it has been related with start- 



170 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

ling candour in the French Yellow Book.* The Ger- 
mans — unreasonably, as it seems to us, regarded the 
agreement which was reached as a humiliation, and 
decided that they would not again be compelled to 
submit to threats. The Kaiser — so it is stated — be- 
came convinced that war was inevitable before long, 
and joined the war-party which he had previously 
held in check. Preparations of every kind were pushed 
forward, and in 1914, the reasons, whatever they were, 
which made Germany fear war in 1911, no longer 
existed. There can be no doubt whatever that Ger- 
many's unyielding stiffness in 1914 was largely due 
to humiliation at having yielded to our threats at 
the time of the Agadir crisis, just as Russia's un- 
compromising attitude was caused by memory of hu- 
miliation in 1908 in the matter of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina. Both Germany and Russia had suffered one 
humiliation, and each felt that another would ruin 
its prestige. Each stood firm ; and the war is the price 
which all the nations have to pay for the past triumphs 
of their diplomatists. 

*See especially Chapter I, No. 5. 



III. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE 

On August 31, 1907, an Agreement was concluded 
between England and Russia, by which their outstand- 
ing differences were settled. In Tibet, both 
parties agreed to seek no advantages, either in 
the way of territory or of economic concessions. In 
Afghanistan, Russia recognized British suzerainty. 
In Persia, a Russian sphere in the north and a British 
sphere in the south were marked out, with a neutral 
zone between : each party recognized the independence 
and integrity of Persia, but nevertheless each recog- 
nized the other's special rights in their respective 
spheres. The Russian sphere included the capital, 
Teheran, and stretched as far south as Ispahan. The 
English sphere included about half of what remained : 
it gave us control of the Gulf, of the Baluchistan 
frontier, and of the oil wells which have since been 
used to supply fuel to our battleships. 

In the rather complicated negotiations which pre- 
ceded the conclusion of the Agreement, both England 
and Russia showed considerable skill : incidentally, we 
could not but help the Russian Government in sup- 
pressing the Duma, in reconquering Poland, and in 
depriving the Finns of the liberties which the Tsar 
had sworn to defend. On both sides, it was seen that, 
owing to the Franco-Russian Alliance, an understand- 
ing between England and Russia was necessary in 
order to complete the Anglo-French Entente. But 
certain difficulties stood in the way : on the one hand, 



172 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

our alliance with Japan, on the other hand, the strong 
tendency of Eussian policy to an understanding with 
Germany. 

The original Anglo- Japanese Alliance of 1902 bound 
England and Japan to come to each other's assist- 
ance in case either was attacked by two or more 
Powers. This treaty made it clear that it would not 
be to the interest of Russia to invoke the aid of France 
in the Japanese war of 1904-5, since the aid of France 
would entail the enmity of England. England and 
France were thus able to maintain the friendliness 
resulting from the recent Entente, but England and 
Russia were on very bad terms throughout the time 
of the Manchurian Campaign. Public opinion in 
England would have welcomed war with Russia in 
1904, when the Russian fleet fired upon our fishing 
boats under the impression that they were Japanese 
Destroyers. But the Cabinet, notably Mr. Balfour, 
foreseeing the need of an Entente with Russia, calmed 
public opinion and arrived at a friendly settlement of 
the dispute. Nevertheless, in August, 1905, at almost 
the same moment as the conclusion of peace between 
Russia and Japan, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was 
renewed and strengthened, each Power now binding 
itself to come to the assistance of the other even if 
only one Power were to attack it. Although this 
Treaty, like that of 1902, was essentially directed 
against Russia, it facilitated the conclusion of our 
Entente with Russia, since it destroyed any hope 
that Russia might otherwise have had of renewing 
the Far Eastern adventure under more favourable 
circumstances.* 



THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE 173 

The new policy is very clearly expressed in a 
resolution passed by the Latin-Slav League in Paris 
at the beginning of October, 1905.** This resolution 
is as follows : 

"As the war of Russia, protector of the Slavonic 
races, against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is defin- 
itely terminated, the political situation is entirely 
changed. German expansion constitutes the single 
danger for peace, as is shown by the Morocco incident. 
The Slavonic races are continually menaced by Ger- 
many and her Turkish satellites. The League has 
decided to protect Slavonic interests by the propaga- 
tion of an Anglo-French-Russian Alliance to stop the 
extermination of the Slavonic races and put an end 
to the enslaving of white races in Europe during the 
20th century." 

Meanwhile an influential party in Russia, headed 
by M. Witte, were in favour of an Agreement with 
Germany rather than with England. This project 
was used, both by the Russians and by the English 
advocates of the Entente with Russia, to make Eng- 
land yield claims and principles which otherwise 
might have formed an obstacle. Imperialists saw 
dangers in the Russian designs on Persia. Radicals 
disliked siding with the bureaucracy against the revo- 
lution which broke out in October, 1905. The Times 
St. Petersburg Government Correspondent, on Octo- 
ber 2, reports that the Russian Government quite 
recognizes the desirability of coming to terms with 
England, but is very much averse to having its 

•See e. g. St. Petersburg Correspondent in The Times, Sep- 
tember 5, 7 and 8, 1905. 
** Times, October 3, 1905. 



174 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

hand forced, and considers that what happens in 
Persia will show best whether England is anxious to 
be friends or not. The same Correspondent, mean- 
while, explains that the Witte school means to play 
off Germany against England (September 25). 

"It is no longer a secret, " he says on October 24*, 
"that Germany has exerted every effort to defeat the 
Anglo-Russian Entente, and has held out to the Rus- 
sian Government the most alluring inducements. The 
precise nature of Germany's offers has not yet been 
divulged. I am informed, however, that the proposals 
had reference to joint action in the Baltic and in the 
ultimate apportionment of Austria-Hungary.'' 

The German scheme, he said, found a ready ad- 
vocate in M. Witte, but emphatic opposition from 
France. The Paris Correspondent of The Times, on 
October 26, at the height of the Russian Revolution, 
gives details of Germany's offers to Russia on the oc- 
casion of M. "Witte 's visit to Berlin reported by the 
("Petit Parisien".) Germany, we are assured, 
offered military intervention in case of a Polish ris- 
ing, and the prospective partition of Austria, accord- 
ing to which Russia was to have Bohemia, the Polish 
provinces, and other Slav regions, while Germany 
took the German-speaking regions and thus secured 
a route to the Adriatic. In addition the Kaiser is said 
to have proposed to close the Baltic and to guarantee 
the Russian and German ports against attack. 

It is not credible that Germany should have really 
offered to partition so firm an Ally as Austria-Hun- 
gary for the benefit of Russia, which could never be 



*Timea, October 25 



THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE 175 

attached to the German interest by any very firm 
or reliable bond. The Russian motive in spreading 
such reports is obvious : fear of Germany made us 
more willing to come to terms with Russia. The mo- 
tive of The Times is less obvious ; presumably the ob- 
ject was to weaken the public opinion at home which 
looked with suspicion on any approach to alliance with 
the Russian bureaucracy. 

Meanwhile the Russian Government's need of sup- 
port, either from Germany of from England and 
France, was becoming desperate. The disorders 
throughout the country grew worse and worse, until 
on October 31 the Tsar was forced to grant a Consti- 
tution. The Kaiser's sympathies were of course 
against the revolution but in France and England 
every generous mind saw the progress of events with 
joy : all but a few extreme reactionaries watched with 
breathless sympathy the devoted courage of the Rus- 
sian reformers, and hoped passionately for the end 
of the most harmful of all tyrannies that weighed 
down the human spirit. 

At this point, high politics intervened. One main 
reason for the success of the Revolution was the 
mutinous condition of the Russian Army and Navy, 
which could not be remedied without considerable 
expenditure. In the disturbed state of the country, 
it was difficult to raise revenue. The partisans of the 
Duma, which had been granted nominal control over 
taxation, wished to secure its position and to carry 
much-needed reforms before relieving the Govern- 
ment of its financial embarrassments. The German 
Government, which would gladly have repressed the 



176 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

Revolution, had no capital to spare from its own 
needs. France, which had hitherto financed Russia, 
began to feel both that the security was shaky, and 
that support of the bureaucracy was unworthy of a 
Liberal Power. M. Clemenceau, in the ("Aurore"), 
warned the French against any participation in Rus- 
sian loans while the internal condition of affairs re- 
mained unsettled : ' ' After having furnished the Tsar, ' 
he wrote, "with the financial resources which were 
destined to lead to his defeat abroad, it now remains 
for us supply him with the financial resources des- 
tined to assure his victory over his own subjects."* 
According to "Gil Bias", the representatives of Pa- 
risian finance, during January, 1906, drew up con- 
ditions for any fresh loan to Russian, involving the 
granting of full control over finance to the Duma.** 
All Liberal opinion in Russia was against the conclu- 
sion of a loan while the powers of the Duma remained 
in doubt. On April 9, 1906, the Times Correspondent 
at St. Petersburg telegraphed : — *** 

"The Opposition organs continue their campain 
against the conclusion of a foreign loan before the 
Duma meets. A host of arguments is adduced in 
support of their contention, but all amount to this 
that they are afraid the Government, having secured 
a large sum of money, will try to terrorize the Duma 
just as it terrorized the elections. The Russian Press 
has, unfortunately, too deep and too lasting a mis- 
trust of its Government. ' ' 

The Correspondent, of course, considered this mis- 

• Times, February 1, 1906. 
••Times, February 1, 1906. 
•••Times, April 10, 1906. 



THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE 177 

trust excessive — with how little justice, events were 
soon to show. 

A few days later, the loan was concluded — a joint 
Anglo-French loan, the first (I believe) in which 
England had participated since the Crimean War. 
The part played by the Foreign Office in advising 
the City is not easy to ascertain, but no one can doubt 
that our financial magnates were perfectly conscious 
of co-operating with the Foreign Office when they un- 
dertook to lend money to the Russian Government.* 

The first Duma was opened by the Tsar on May 9, 
and dissolved on July 22. With its dissolution, the 
successful period of the Russian Revolution came to 
an end. Too late, The Times realized our mistake. 
Its leading article next day states that "the Govern- 
ment's arbitrary step, indeed, justifies only too com- 
pletely those Russian reformers who besought the 
friends of constitutional liberty in the West not to 
lend more money to the autocracy The Rus- 
sian Government obtained their loan by what now 
looks uncommonly like false pretences, but they can- 
not live on it for ever How can they hope to 

hold down for ever an exasperated people''? 

The hopes of The Times were vain, and its peni- 
tence was brief. Step by step, the Tsar recovered his 
power. The more venal of his opponents were bought, 
the rest were dispersed to the scaffold, the gaols, and 
the convict settlements of Siberia. Finland was 

♦Professor Murray mocks at opponents of the Anglo-Russian 
Entente, by suggesting that they considered "our first step, 
for example, should be the subsidizing of the Russian revolu- 
tionary parties !" He does not mention that our first step was 
the subsidizing of their opponents, nor explain how this could be 
reconciled with the policy, which he advocates, of non-interven- 
tion in the internal affairs of Russia. 



178 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

punished for its moment of freedom, Poland for the 
hundredth time tasted the bitterness of bondage, the 
army was reorganized, and soon the Tsar was at 
liberty to extend the blessings of his rule by the sup- 
pression of freedom in Persia. If the loan had been 
postponed for a few months, none of these results 
could have been achieved. Russia's gratitude is only 
to be secured by signal services, but fortunately for 
our Foreign Office the moment was one at which 
a signal service was possible. A Liberal Russia, which 
would have meant a new Europe and a new Asia, 
was prevented by our timely intervention.* 

There can be no reasonable doubt that it was the 
English and French command of capital that inclined 
Russia to reject the offered friendship of Germany. 
The experience of the Western Powers during the 
first Moroccan crisis, in 1905, had shown them the 
dangers of a policy of conquest while Russia was 
weak: deliberately and patiently they set to work to 
make Russia seem strong through the suppression of 
liberty. If the result has proved disappointing, it 
can hardly be denied that England and France have 

•There is reason to think that this is not the last occasion 
on which our Government defeated the hopes of Russian Liberals, 
as appears from the following passage in Alexinsky's "Russia 
and the Great War." (Fisher Unwin, 1915: p. 177): "The 
Russian journal Golos, published in Paris, stated, in its Petrograd 
letter, that there was a moment at the beginning of the war when 
Tsarism was ready to make great concessions in its domestic 
policy. This was the moment when Germany had already 
declared war upon Russia, but when the final decision of England 
was not yet known. The Russian Government was afraid to face 
Germany alone, and was conscious of its weakness ; it was 
anxious to win the sympathies of its people. With this object 
in view it was actually on the point of issuing a constitutional 
manifesto more comprehensive than that of October 30, 1905, 
but at the very last moment it received the assurance that 
England would join in the war, and, its external situation being 
strengthened, Tsarism no longer thought it necessary to make 
concessions to the people, and the manifesto was not issued." 



THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE 179 

deserved their disappointment. It is the Russian 
people, the innocent victim first of repression and now 
of invasion, that demands our sympathy and our re- 
pentance. 

After the dissolution of the first Duma, the negotia- 
tions for the Anglo-Russian Agreement continued 
smoothly. The only serious question at issue was the 
extent of Persian territory that was to be recognized 
as in the Russian sphere : Russia claimed the whole, 
but we only conceded rather more than half. In 
August, 1907, the Agreement was concluded, and no 
obstacle remained to the "peaceful penetration" of 
Persia. 



180 IV. PERSIA 

The history of Persia since the conclusion of the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement is one long record of 
perfidy, cruelty and greed. The conduct of the Rus- 
sians is closely analogous to that of the Germans in 
Belgium, and our conduct would have been paralleled 
in Belgium if we had not only brought pressure to bear 
on the Belgians to make them submit to German rule, 
but had ourselves taken Antwerp and Ostend as pay- 
ment for our support of the Kaiser. Persia is a long 
way off, and few Englishmen have travelled there or 
acquired a knowledge of the Persian language. In- 
convenient facts concerning such a remote country 
can easily be kept out of the newspapers, especially 
when silence serves the interest of both parties be- 
cause the Government belongs to one party while its 
policy is that advocated by the other. Neither the 
English Government nor the Russian wished the truth 
to be known, while other civilized Powers had diffi- 
culty in ascertaining it, and no direct interest to make 
them interfere. The almost incredible ignorance re- 
peatedly shown by Sir E. Grey in Persian affairs 
tends to prove that he left our policy in that part of 
the world to subordinates. But for the disinterested 
efforts of Professor Edward G. Browne — one of the 
few Englishmen who know Persia and the Persian 
language and literature intimately, without having 
any political or commercial end to serve — the facts 
which the English and Russian Governments wished 



PERSIA 181 

to conceal would have been very difficult to ascertain.* 
England and Russia had long been rivals in Persia, 
pursuing the usual method of loans to spendthrift 
sovereigns as a means of acquiring political influence. 
During the Boer War the Russians succeeded in be- 
coming the sole creditors of Persia, which paid off 
a previous English loan with money borrowed from 
Russia. The Russians wished to absorb Persia, while 
we wished to keep them away from the Persian Gulf 
and the neighbourhood of Baluchistan. For this pur- 
pose, we supported the integrity and independence 
of Persia — though not to the exclusion of our ambi- 
tions in the Gulf. With the conclusion of the Anglo- 
Russian Entente in 1907, the rivalry of England and 
Russia in Persia came to an end. 

The subsequent course of events is entangled in the 
internal affairs of Persia, and cannot be understood 
without some knowledge of the struggle between the 



*I have derived my knowledge of these facts largely from 
three pamphlets by Professor Browne, namely: 

A brief narrative of events in Persia, followed by an Appendix 
on the Persian Constitution. Luzac & Co., 46, Great Russell 
Street, W. C, 1909. ■ 

The Persian Crisis of December, 1911 ; how it arose and 
whither it may lead us. Compiled for the use of the Persia 
Committee. Privately printed. New Tear's Day, 1912. 

The Reign of Terror at Tabriz : England's responsibility. 
With photographs and a brief narrative of the events of Decem- 
ber, 1911, and January, 1912. Compiled for the use of the 
Persia Committee. October, 1912. 

I am compelled to suppose that Professor Murray has not 
seen these pamphlets. If he had, it seems impossible that he 
should have dealt with the Persian question as he has dealt 
with it, being, as he is, a man conspicuous for humane feeling 
and hatred of cruelty and oppression. 

The third of the above pamphlets is the subject of a memo- 
randum by Mr. Shipley (our Consul in Tabriz), No. 464 (p. 230), 
in The Blue Book Persia, No. 1 (1913, Cd. 6807. This 
memorandum is intended to mitigate the force of Professor 
Browne's indictment, but fails entirely in its object. 

Mr. Shuster's book, "The Strangling of Persia" (Fisher Unwin, 
1912), is very important to all who wish to understand the 
Persian question. 



182 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

Constitutionalists and the Shah, which began in 1906 
and continued until we procured the final defeat of 
the Constitutionalists in 1911. 

The Shah's extravagances had led him to need 
money, and the need of money had made him sub- 
servient to Eussia in order to get loans. His sub- 
servience to Eussia, and his misgovernment, had 
roused a continually growing opposition in Persia, 
which was encouraged in its hope of independence by 
the Japanese victory in the war of 1904-5, and by the 
subsequent revolution in Eussia. The English, at that 
time still more or less hostile to Eussia owing to the 
Japanese Alliance, showed sympathy with the Per- 
sian nationalists. In July, 1906, as the result of con- 
flicts between the people and the soldiers, the malcon- 
tents asked and obtained asylum in the gardens of 
the British Legation in Teheran, at first in small 
numbers, but finally to the number of 15,000. They 
demanded a Parliament, and the Shah, on August 
5, 1906, issued a proclamation agreeing to grant their 
request. The Assembly met on October 7. It pro- 
ceeded at once to the consideration of much-needed 
reforms, in which it appears to have shown judgment 
and patriotism. Its first Budget, which was presented 
in 1907, undertook the task of converting the annual 
deficit into a surplus, which was vitally necessary 
if foreign influence was to be diminished. Since it 
was not practicable to effect this by increasing the 
revenue, it had to be effected by diminishing the ex- 
penditure, and among the items that were cut down 
was the Shah's Civil List. This, though he had sworn 
repeatedly to observe the Constitution, increased the 



PERSIA 183 

hostility which he had never ceased to feel. Never- 
theless, if no foreign influence had intervened, the 
Nationalists could have easily continued, as before, to 
get the better of all the efforts of this perjured tyrant. 

But meanwhile the Anglo-Russian Agreement had 
been concluded (August 31, 1907), with its English 
and Russian spheres. This division into spheres 
naturally alarmed the Persians, in spite of the recog- 
nition of the integrity and independence of Persia. 
To their inquiry whether it was intended to partition 
Persia, our Minister replied, with the knowledge and 
co-operation of the Russian Legation, by the follow- 
ing official communication : 

i ' Information has reached me that the report is 
rife in Persia that the result of the Agreement con- 
cluded between England and Russia will be the inter- 
vention of these two Powers in Persia, and the parti- 
tion of Persia between them. Your Excellency is 
aware that the negotiations between England and 
Russia are of a wholly different character, since the 
Mushiru'1-Mulk recently visited both St. Petersburg 
and London, and discussed the matter with the Minis- 
ters for Foreign Affairs of both Powers, who explicitly 
declared to him the objects aimed at by their represtive 
Governments in Persia, which assurance he has no 
doubt duly reported. 

' ' Sir Edward Grey has informed me of the substance 
of his conversations with the Mushiru '1-Mulk, and 
also of the substance of M. Isvolsky's declarations, 
officially communicated to the British Government. 

"Sir Edward Grey informs me that he has ex- 
plained to the Mushiru 1-Mulk that he and M. Isvol- 



184 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

sky are completely in accord on two fundamental 
points. 

"Firstly, neither of the two Powers will interfere 
in the affairs of Persia unless injury is inflicted on 
the persons and property of their subjects. 

"Secondly, negotiations arising out of the Anglo- 
Russian Agreement must not violate the integrity and 
independence of Persia. 

"Sir Edward Grey also observes that hitherto an- 
tagonism has existed between England and Russia, 
each of whom has endeavoured to prevent the contin- 
uance of the other in Persia, and had this antagonism 
been prolonged in the present uncertain state of 
Persia, one or both of these two Powers might have 
been tempted to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Persia, so as not to allow the other to profit by the 
existing state of things, or to profit by it to 
the detriment of others. The object of the present 
negotiations between England and Russia is to pre- 
vent such difficulties from arising between them, and 
these negotiations are in truth in no wise directed 
against Persia, as M. Isvolsky has clearly explained to 
the Mushiru'1-Mulk, saying, 'Neither of the two Powers 
seeks anything from Persia, so that Persia can con- 
centrate all her energies on the settlement of her in- 
ternal affairs'. Both Ministers are entirely in accord 
as to the policy of non-intervention in Persia, and 
have left no possible ground for doubt in the matter. 
M. Isvolsky 's words, which include the intentions of 
England are as follows: 'Russia's general principle 
will be to refrain from any kind of intervention in 
the internal affairs of other countries so long as 



PERSIA 185 

nothing injurious to her interests is done; and it is 
quite impossible that she should deviate from this 
principle in this present case. ' 

'As to the reported partition of Persia between 
Eussia and England, concerning which it is asserted 
that the two Powers above-mentioned wish to define 
spheres of influence for themselves, Sir E. Grey 
and M. Isvolsky have explicitly declared that these 
reports have no foundation. What the two Powers 
desire is to come to an agreement which will prevent 
future difficulties and disputes from arising, by 
guaranteeing that neither Power will aim at acquir- 
ing influence in those parts of Persia which are ad- 
jacent to the frontier of the other. This agreement 
is injurious neither to the interests of Persia nor to 
those of any other foreign nation, since it binds only 
England and Russia not to embark on any course 
of action in Persia calculated to injure the interests 
of the other, and so in the future to deliver Persia 
from those demands which in the past have proved so 
injurious to the progress of her political aspirations. 
This is what M. Isvolsky says : 

'This Agreement between the two European 
Powers which have the greatest interests in Persia, 
based as it is on a guarantee of her independence 
and integrity, can only serve to further and promote 
Persian interests, for henceforth Persia, aided and 
assisted by these two powerful neighbouring States, 
can employ all her powers in internal reforms. ' 

From the above statements you will see how base- 
less and unfounded are these rumours which have 
lately prevailed in Persia concerning the political 



186 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

ambitions of England and Russia in this country. The 
object of the two Powers in making this Agreement is 
not in any way to attack, but rather to assure forever 
the independence of Persia. Not only do they not wish 
to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their 
object in these friendly negotiations was not to allow 
one another to intervene on the pretext of safeguard- 
ing their interests. The two Powers hope that in 
the future Persia will be forever delivered from the 
fear of foreign intervention, and will thus be perfectly 
free to manage her own affairs in her own way, 
whereby advantage will accrue both to herself and to 
the whole world." 

Nevertheless, within a few years, more than half of 
Persia had been absorbed by Russia, and more than 
half the remainder had come under our power. 

When questions were asked in the House about this 
declaration, it appeared that Sir Edward Grey had 
no knowledge of it.* 

About the end of February, 1908, three men, who 
were never caught, threw a bomb at the Shah 's auto- 
mobile when the Shah was in another carriage. The 
chauffeur was killed. Whether the bomb was thrown 
by extremists of the Constitutional party, or by ad- 
herents of the Shah in order to promote a reaction, is 
not known. On June 2, three months later, the Rus- 
sian Minister, supported apparently by the British 
Charge d'Aff aires, told the Persian Foreign Secre- 
tary that 

"The life of the Shah is in jeopardy. What busi- 

♦December 14, 1911. Mr. Acland, the Under-Secretary, had 
expressed equal ignorance on December 5. Professor Murray 
makes no mention of this Declaration. 



PERSIA 187 

ness have these Nationalists to interfere with His 
Majesty's personal servants, especially the old Amir 
Bahadur Zang, who watches over his master's safety 
like a faithful watch-dog ? The anjumans and Nation- 
alists have transgressed all bounds, and now wish to 
depose the Shah. This we cannot tolerate, and should 
it happen, Russia will be compelled to interfere, and 
will do so with the approval and sanction of Eng- 
land." 

In view of these threats, the Nationalist leaders 
decided that it would be useless to resist the Shah 
by force of arms, since the only result would be for- 
eign intervention. Meanwhile, the Shah, emboldened 
by Russian support, adopted a more vigorous policy. 
The very next day (June 3) he departed from the city 
to the "Shah's Garden" outside the walls, where he 
was less amenable to popular pressure. On June 5, he 
treacherously arrested some leading Nationalists whom 
he had invited to confer with him. On June 28 he 
caused his Cossacks, under their Russian Colonel Liak- 
hoff, to plant artillery round the Assembly, shoot 
down those who attempted to defend it, and disperse 
the remainder. In Teheran he was completely vic- 
torious, and for a time the hopes of the Nationalist 
movement seemed at an end. 

But outside the capital the supporters of the Parlia- 
ment proved more difficult to suppress. Especially 
Tabriz, in the north, near the Russian border, offered 
a vigorous resistance, and in April, 1909, was still 
withstanding a siege by the Shah's troops. It was 
said that the European Consuls in Tabriz were in 
danger, and on this ground Russian troops crossed 



188 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

the border, raised the siege and encamped just outside 
the town, where, until they occupied the town itself 
in December, 1911, they stayed in spite of the fact that 
(at any rate in the opinion of the British Government) 
there was no valid excuse for their remaining. 

The Russian intervention at Tabriz saved the Na- 
tionalist cause at that time, but this was of course no 
part of the motive with which it was undertaken. Sir 
Arthur Nicholson, then our Ambassador at Petrograd, 
now permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
expressed the official view of both Governments. ' ' It 
seems to me," he wrote, "that it would be the Nation- 
alists who would profit by the arrival of the Russian 
force, but I submit that the chief object to be kept in 
view is the safety of the Consuls, even at the risk of 
the measures which circumstances have rendered nec- 
essary proving of benefit to the popular movement at 
Tabriz. ' ' Sir Arthur Nicholson was quite right. For 
the moment, the Russians regretfully saved the Na- 
tionalist cause; but their troops at Tabriz proved 
themselves capable, when the time came, of striking a 
blow against human liberty which must have surpassed 
even that astute diplomatist's expectations. 

The Nationalist's cause prospered, and in July, 
1909, the Shah's Cossacks were defeated, Teheran was 
occupied and the Shah deposed.* 

*These Cossacks were under Russian officers, who, according 
to the Times* Correspondent, were "completely under the control 
of the Russian Government, owing to the fact that their pensions 
and their prospect of future re-instatement depend on their 
acting in accordance with the wishes of St. Petersburg." Profes- 
sor Browne points out that Sir E. Grey did not know of the 
unsuccessful resistance of the Shah's Cossacks to the National- 
ists, but stated on three separate occasions (July 27, November 
27, and December 14, 1911), that if their Russian officers "had 
interfered or lifted a finger, and used their influence in Teheran, 
the Shah would never have been expelled." 



PERSIA 189 

A Protocol was signed in August, 1909, between 
the Persian Government on the one hand, and the Rus- 
sian and British Governments on the other hand, by 
which the Persians agreed to pay the ex-Shah a pen- 
sion of £16,666 a year, while Russia agreed to pre- 
vent him from conducting any political agitation 
against Persia. If Russia failed to prevent this, Per- 
sia was to be free to stop his pension.** This contract, , 
as we shall see, was treated by Russia as a "scrap of 
paper. ' ' 

In the time which followed, the Russians increased 
the number of their troops in Persia, fomented dis- 
order as an excuse for intervention, and with our 
help prevented the Persian Government from borrow- 
ing the money required to suppress disorder, unless 
on terms which would have meant a virtual loss of 
independence. 

In November, 1910, Russia and Germany concluded 
the Potsdam Agreement, which gave Russia a free 
hand in Persia. This strengthened Russia's hands, 
not only by removing German opposition, but also by 
making England fear that Russia was being attracted 
into "the orbit of a single diplomacy", as Sir E. Grey 
expressed it. From this time on, we became com- 
pletely subservient to Russia in Persia, since we lived 



••The crucial article of the Protocol is Article II, which says: 
"The two representatives (i. e., the British Minister and the 
Russian Charge de'Affairs), undertake to give His Majesty 
Mohammed Ali Mirza strict injunctions to abstain in future 
from all political agitation against Persia, and the Imperial 
Russian Government promise on their side to take all effective 
steps in order to prevent any such agitation on his part. If His 
Majesty Mohammed Ali Mirza leaves Russia, and if it is proved 
to the satisfaction of the two legations that in any country other 
than Russia he has carried on political agitation against Persia, 
the Persian Government shall have the right to cease payment of 
his pension." — Cd. 5120. 



190 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

in terror of a rapproachement between the Tsar and 
the Kaiser.* 

A few days before the conclusion of the Potsdam 
Agreement, the Persian Foreign Minister informed 
the English and Russian Legations that he had dis- 
covered a treasonable correspondence of the ex-Shah 
with some frontier tribes, and that he proposed 
to stop that noble exile's allowance while the facts 
were investigated. The English and Russians re- 
fused to investigate the charges, and caused the Per- 
sian Minister to be shadowed like a criminal until 
the money was paid. He had been educated in Eng- 
land, and was suspected of Anglophil tendencies; by 
the end of December, he was forced to resign. Mean- 
while the ex-Shah left Russia and began organizing 
preparations for the invasion which he made in 1911, 
entering Persia from Russia by a Russian boat on 
the Caspian. This expedition led to a Civil War in 
which the ex- Shah and his partisans were defeated. 
But even after this the Persian Government was 
forced to continue to pay him a pension.* 

The situation of Persia at this time was difficult, 
but not yet hopeless. The Persians have been recog- 
nized throughout Islam as the most civilized of Ma- 
hometan races, and as the leader in poetry, philos- 

*For the effect of the Potsdam Agreement on Persia and on 
British policy in connection with Persia, see Sinister, "The 
Strangling of Persia," pp. 226 ff. 

♦Professor Murray says : — "I see no reason to suspect the 
Russian Government of having connived at this enterprise," 
namely the ex-Shah's invasion. But "when once the Shah had 
landed, Russia was not disposed to suppress him. She had put 
down one Royalist rebellion after another, when the constitu- 
tional Government had been unable to cope with them. She 
had by nature no liking for Constitutionalists as against 
anointed Kings, and she proposed to Great Britain to let the 
Shah have his chance and then support whatever Government 



PERSIA 191 

ophy and art. The country, however, contains many 
tribes who are more warlike and less civilized than 
the true Persians. The genuine constitutional en- 
thusiasm which was almost universal among the true 
Persians — except for a few who had some private in- 
terest in the old regime — was naturally beyond the 
mental capacity of most of the tribes. They took one 
side or the other for motives which had little to do 
with the issue of constitutionalism versus absolutism. 
The Government could have kept order if it could 
have got money, but this the English and Eussian 
Governments prevented. The consequent partial fail- 
ure of the Constitutionalists to keep order was used 
by Russia and England as an excuse for fresh inter- 
ventions and fresh military occupations; ever since 
April, 1909, the Russians had troops in the north, 
whose numbers were increased from time to time, and 
in October, 1911, we began landing Indian troops at 
Bushire.* 

At the request of the Persian Government, an 
American financial mission was despatched in 1911 
under the leadership of Mr. Shuster, an American 
financial official in the Philippines. Mr. Shuster 's 
mission, which had to deal with a very complicated 
state of affairs, seemed at first to promise the regener- 

proved to have the greatest hold on the country. Great Britain 
maintained firmly that he could not be recognized." The 
Protocol of August, 1909, is not mentioned by Professor Murray : 
no one could guess from his account that the attitude which he 
confesses to have been that of Russia constituted a breach of 
faith, though this appears even from the Blue Books (e. g. 
Cd. 6104, Nos. 218, 244). It is fairly clear that Russia desired 
disorders in Persia, as an excuse for intervention. What Russia 
seems to have feared most was a definitive victory for either 
party before her own schemes had matured. 

*Cd. 6105, No. 75 (p. 32). 



192 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

ation of Persia, but brought about instead the final 
catastrophe. Mr. Shuster and his coadjutors began 
their task of financial organization in May, 1911. 
They were dismissed as the result of a Russian ulti- 
matum presented on November 29, 1911. Everything 
possible has been done by The Times, Sir E. Grey 
and Professor Murray to represent Mr. Shuster as 
an impracticable and tactless idealist, whom the Rus- 
sians could not have been expected to endure. The 
charges against him, when carefully analyzed, amount 
to three: (1) that he devoted himself whole-heart- 
edly to the interests of Persia; (2) that his policy 
was calculated to restore order and independence to 
Persia; (3) that he supposed the Russians capable 
of some respect for their promises. All these charges 
have been proved up to the hilt ; and all right-minded 
people will therefore agree that he was unfit for his 
post.* 

In order to be able to collect taxes, Mr. Shuster set 
to work to organize a gendarmerie, of which he of- 
fered the command to Major Stokes of the Indian 

♦An interesting conversation between M. Neratof and our 
Charge d' Affaires in Petrograd, took place on October 19, 1911. 
"I (Mr. O'Beirne) reminded M. Neratof that Russia had recently 
vetoed the various proposals put forward with the object of 
enabling the Persian Government to restore order in the country 
— proposals which, for our part, we had welcomed as affording 
some hope of an improvement in the state of things in the 
south. Russia had objected to these proposals, but she had sug- 
gested nothing to take their place. I begged His Excellency 
to tell me frankly what it was that the Russian Government 
wished done. 

"M. Neratof replied that the first thing necessary was that 
Mr. Shuster should understand that he must act in concert with, 
and in accordance with the interests of, Russia, and of course, His 
Excellency added, of Great Britain also. The Persian reforms 
must be proceeded with gradually and in such a manner as to 
take Russian interests into account. It must be remembered 
that the question was not merely one of the good of Persia, but 
also of the special position of Russia." 

(My italics. Cd. 6105, No. 45, p. 19. Cf. ib., No. 56.) 



PERSIA 193 

Army. Russia objected, on the ground that no Eng- 
lishman must be allowed authority in the Russian 
sphere, and the gendarmerie would have to operate 
in the Russian sphere as well as elsewhere. Means 
were found by the British Government to bring pres- 
sure to bear on Major Stokes* and he resigned. Mr. 
Shuster's appointment of a British subject, Mr. 
Lecoffre, as his agent in Tabriz was made a ground 
of complaint by Russia — not unnaturally, since Rus- 
sia's conduct in Tabriz shortly afterwards was such 
as Englishmen must not witness if it could be pre- 
vented. (It must be remembered that the Russians 
had no rights in Tabriz except those of conquest — 
the very same that the Germans have in Belgium). 
But these difficulties could perhaps have been over- 
come; at any rate it was not through them that the 
Russians finally asserted themselves.** 

A brother of the ex-Shah, Shoa-es-Sultaneh, had 
taken part in the recent rebellion, and his property 
was declared confiscated by the Persian Government. 
But the Russian Bank asserted that his house was 
mortgaged to them, and objected to Mr. Shuster's 
attempt to take possession of it. The Persian Gov- 
ernment protested against the action of the Rus- 
sian Consul-General, who sent Russian Cossacks to 
the house with threats that they would fire on the 

♦See Cd. 6105, No. 209 (p. 89) ; Cf. ib., No. 97 (p. 40). 

**Sir E. Grey regretted that the Russians did not base 
their interference upon the appointment of Mr Lecoffre at 
Tabriz. The reply of the Russian Government is interesting. 
"M. Neratof pointed out that from a formal point of view, it 
would be difficult for them to protest against appointments such 
as that of Mr. Lecoffre to Tabriz, since such a protest would 
constitute an interference in the internal affairs of Persia." 
Cd. 6105, No. 113 (p. 46). Mr. Shuster's excellent grounds for 
the appointment of Mr. Lecoffre are given in the same Blue 
Book, No. 89. 



194 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

Persian gendarmes. The incidents of the dispute 
are differently related by the two sides:* they are 
complicated, and I have not the means of sifting the 
evidence. The dispute ended in the Eussians present- 
ing two successive ultimatums, which put an end to 
what remained of Persian liberty. 

The dispute about the house arose on October 9, 
and on October 10 it appeared to be closed owing 
to the Russian Minister dissociating himself from the 
Consul-General. But this appearance was deceptive. 
On November 2, the Russian Minister presented an 
ultimatum, demanding the removal of the gendarmes 
from the house, and an apology from the Persian 
Government. The Persian Government accepted the 
ultimatum, but Mr. Shuster and the Majlis resisted 
it. Although the Persian Foreign Minister tendered 
the required apology for an offence which, according 
to Persian accounts, had never been committed, the 

♦Professor Murray's account is as follows: — "The final clash 
came in a curious manner. Mr. Shuster had decided — not 
unjustly, as far as one can judge — to confiscate the large 
estates of a brother of the ex-Shah, Shoa-es-Sultaneh. Part 
of this prince's property was a house which was mortgaged to 
the Russian Bank — or so at least the Bank claimed — and which 
lay close to the Russian Consulate. Now Russians engaged in 
commerce and the Consular service seem, naturally enough, to 
have less sense of correct behaviour or less control over their 
feelings than ministers and diplomats. And when Mr. Shuster's 
Treasury Officials came to seize this house the Russian Consul 
sent men to drive them away, and is said to have been repri- 
manded by his Minister for doing so. Mr. Shuster immediately 
sent one gendarme with an explanation to the Consulate and 
a hundred gendarmes with rifles to the mortgaged house. There 
was resistance and some trouble, and, instead of apologizing, or 
negotiating, or attempting a compromise, Mr. Shuster, through 
the Cabinet, demanded the recall of the Russian Consul-General." 
Even in this account, the excuse seems hardly adequate for 
destroying a nation's freedom. This was also Sir E. Grey's view : 
"I said it was unfortunate, in the first instance that the Russian 
ultimatum had been based upon the question of the property of 
the Shoa-es-Sultaneh for the question was of comparatively 
slight importance, and the Russian case with regard to it did 
not seem to me very strong." (Cd. 6105, No. 212, p. 90: cf. ib., 
No. 109, p. 45). '.'.--' 



PERSIA 195 

Russians presented a second ultimatum (November 
29) demanding (1) the dismissal of Mr. Sinister 
and Mr. Lecoffre ; (2) an undertaking not in future 
to appoint foreigners in the Government service with- 
out the consent of Russia and England;* and (3) 
the payment of an indemnity** covering the ex- 
penses of the Russian expedition sent against Persia 
at the time of the first ultimatum, and not recalled 
or arrested in its march when the first ultimatum 
was accepted. Mr. Shuster and the Majlis continued 
to hold out, but the Persian Government was com- 
pelled to yield. Mr. Shuster was dismissed, the 
Majlis came to an end, and Persian liberty was killed. 
It has been made an accusation against Mr. Shuster 
that he was anti-Russian.* It would be exactly as 
rational to blame the Belgian Government for being 
anti-German. The Anglo-Russian Agreement, since 
Persia was not a party to it, gave the Russians no 



♦This was the demand which the Persian Government was the 
most reluctant to yield, since it constituted a sacrifice of inde- 
pendence. Both the English and the Russian Governments 
maintained that it only embodied the principle of the Anglo- 
Russian Agreeemnt and the practice since its conclusion." 
(Cd. 6105, Nos. 168, 243 ; but Russia finally agreed to a slight 
modification in this demand, ib., Nos. 273, 288, and Cd. 6264, 
No. 88, Enclosures 1 and 2). 

**This was the only one of the three demands that Sir E. 
Grey objected to. Professor Murray speaks of it as "the only 
cruel part" of Russia's demands. 

♦Professor Murray's remarks on this subject are curious. 
"He considered himself the servant of an independent Persia." 
"Mr. Shuster happened to be both a very headstrong and a 
prejudiced Russophobe. He acted like the head of an inde- 
pendent kingdom." He "made no concealment of his detestation 
of Russia." After the second ultimatum, "By the time the 
(Russian) troops had reached Kasvin the ultimatum was 
accepted, and a few weeks later Mr. Shuster had left Persia. 
It ought to have been mentioned that he had spent part of his 
scanty leisure in writing a fierce anti-Russian pamphlet, which 
was translated into Persian and circulated broadcast." This 
was his letter to "The Times" of Oct. 21, 1911, which is reprinted 
as an Appendix in his book, "The Strangling of Persia", 1912. 
pp. 313-326. 



196 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

rights in Persia. If there had been an Anglo-German 
Agreement to partition Belgium, that would not have 
given the Germans or us any rights against the Gov- 
vernment of Belgium. If the Persian Government 
chose to appoint Englishmen in the Russian sphere, 
it had a perfect right to do so.** Only four years 
earlier, in 1907, our Minister in Teheran had issued 
his declaration explaining that the purpose of the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement was to facilitate the main- 
tenance of Persian integrity and independence. 
Russia, deliberately and persistently worked to absorb 
the northern half of Persia. Whatever may have 
been the intentions of the Government in Petrograd,* 
the methods of Russian officials in Persia and on the 
frontier were the reverse of scrupulous, involving, as 
they did, the encouragement of disorder, brigandage 
and dissension, not to mention the breach of faith in 
regard to the ex- Shah. In opposing the Russians, 
Mr. Shuster was adopting a counsel of despair; but 
there could be no hope for Persia if Russia were not 
opposed.*-* And it is impossible to escape the con- 
clusion that the real grievance against Mr. Shuster 
was the hope of Persian regeneration which his vigour 



**This was recognized by Russia, as appears from the state- 
ment of M. Neratof quoted above (Cd. 6105, No. 113). 

*I do not think the Government in Petrograd can be absolved. 
Whoever doubts this should read the correspondence as to the 
second ultimatum in Cd. 6105, and the correspondence on the 
subject of a loan to Persia in Cd. 6807. In discussing the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, Professor Murray says: "It 
is clear that, if honestly carried out, it did not increase but 
greatly limited the freedom of the two Powers to interfere wih 
Persia." It would seem to follow that Professor Murray must 
think that the Agreement was not "honestly carried out", for 
it was constantly invoked as a general ground for inter- 
ference when Mr. Shuster, Major Stokes, and Mr. Lecoffre were 
being dismissed by Russia's fiat. 

**See Mr. Shuster's book, "The Strangling of Persia." 



PERSIA 197 

and honesty inspires. I was early offered," he said, 
"the plain choice between serving the Persian peo- 
ple and only appearing to do so, while actually serv- 
ing foreign interests bent on Persia's natural de- 
struction. I have no apologies to offer for my course. ' ' 
I do not think any unbiassed person can avoid the 
conclusion that Mr. Shuster was in the right, that 
Russia was brutal and tortuous, and that England 
was subservient and willing to profit by Russia's 
crime. 

At the end of December, 1911, the Russian troops, 
who had been stationed just outside Tabriz since 
April, 1909, entered the city and established a reign 
of terror.* They began by hanging eight of the lead- 
ing nationalists, including the chief Mullah of Azer- 
baijan, the Sikat-el-Islam, whose position corres- 
ponded to that of Cardinal Mercier.** It is said that 
he was anti-Russian, and, if so, of course he deserved 
to die. After they had executed these eight men, 
they admitted Samad Khan Shuja-ud-Dowleh, the 
man who had been leading the partisans of the ex- 
Shah in their attacks on Tabriz.* With their ap- 

*The best evidence for what occurred at this time is that of 
Mr. G. D. Turner, then of the Indian Y. M. C. A., now in the 
British army in France. He happened, in the course of mission- 
ary work, to be in Tabriz shortly after this time, and whil^ 
there he obtained photographs of atrocities, some of which are 
reproduced in Professor Browne's "Reign of Terror in Tabriz" 
The other evidence is mainly that of Persian refugees. (This 
evidence is more or less open to question, but is as good as the 
evidence on which much of the Bryce report is based.) On this 
evidence, see a letter from Professor Browne to the Manchester 
Guardian on February 9, 1912 ; the same paper, on September 
3, 1912, printed a communication from Mr. Turner giving his 
evidence. What follows is from these sources. The account in 
the Blue Books is hopelessly inadequate. 

. **Our Ambassador in Petrograd spoke of the execution of the 
bikat-el-Islam to M. Sazonof as "a most unfortunate occur- 
rence as well as a grave blunder". Cd. 6264, No. 52 

*He was superseded later, though Russia pressed for his 
retention. 



198 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

proval and that of the British Consul in Tabriz, this 
man became de facto Governor of Tabriz, and pro- 
ceeded to show what resolute government could do. 
The Eussians did nothing to interfere with Shuja's 
activities, and the British Consul did not report his 
atrocities. A few samples of what occurred must 
.suffice. 

"Mirza Mahmud of Salmas, one of the Ulema and 
one of those elected in the elections of the first degree 
to membership of the Majlis, was put to death in the 
house of Samad Khan with all sorts of torments. 
While he was still alive they plucked out his eyes and 
cut out his tongue (for he was an orator), after which 
they slew him. Samad Khan offered to let him go 
on payment of 400 tomans, but this sum he neither 
possessed nor could obtain." 

" Amongst the victims were two young lads named 
Hasan and Kadir, aged 18 and 12 respectively, whose 
only fault was that their elder brothers, who were 
national volunteers, had succeeded in escaping across 
the Turkish frontier, where they are still wander- 
ing, hungry and starved with cold." 

"He (Samad Khan) beheaded Na'il Yusef of 
Hukmabad and afterwards cut his body in two halves 
like a sheep, and suspended them on either side of 
the bazaar."* 

The foregoing quotations are from Nationalist 
refugees, and might therefore be doubted except 

•Photographs of the two halves are published by Professor 
Browne in "The Reign of Terror in Tabriz". These are not 
mentioned by Professor Murray, who says : "According 1 t» 
Nationalist statements, they cut this man (the chief Mullah, 
not Na'il Yusef), in two pieces and marched between them into 
the citadel." This statement gives no hint that the evidence 
for what really did occur is conclusive. 



PERSIA 199 

where the photographs obtained by Mr. Turner sup- 
port them. What follows is all from Mr. Turner's 
statement. 

"The relinquishment of rifle and bayonet was only 
the signal for the appearance of the gallows. Even 
before the installation of the Russians as Governor 
on December 30th, of Samad Khan Shuja-ud-Dowleh 
the hangings begans, and Russia is responsible not 
only for those carried out by her own officers but 
for those nominally directed by their appointed Gov- 
ernor. Nor can we hold Russia free from the re- 
sponsibility for atrocities perpetuated by this same 
Governor, such as beating men to death in water 
ponds, sewing up the mouths of certain who had 
spoken in favour of the Constitution, nailing horse- 
shoes on men's feet and driving them through the 
bazaar, and other unspeakable barbarities. Since 
last December the life of no man who was even sup- 
posed to be in favour of the Constitution has been 
safe, no matter how honourable his character or how 
high his position. 

"The Sikat-ul-Islam was the chief Moslem ecclesi- 
astic in Tabriz. He was a man of very unusual 
ability, of great personal charm, and singularly 
broadminded. He was on excellent terms not only 
with his co-religionists but with the Christians of 
the city. Early in December he had called on the 
British Consul to ask if he might seek protection in 
the Consulate in the event of danger to himself; the 
reply was that unless he was in some immediate 
danger the Consulate could not promise protection. 
He called also at the Russian Consulate and was 



200 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

assured that whatever happened his safety would be 
respected. In the disturbances already described he 
took no part whatever, although he was in sympa- 
thy with the Constitution and the struggle for Per- 
sian independence. Nevertheless he was seized by 
the Russians, his house was searched for a list of 
men in favour of Constitutional Government, and a 
large sum of money extracted from him in return 
for a promise of his liberty. 

"His trial followed, and I am told on good author- 
ity that it consisted of his being asked if he had 
written to a friend in Urumiah a letter something to 
the following effect : ' The Russians have attacked us 
and we have resisted them, so far effectively. We 
trust that you will do the same/ On admitting that 
it was his letter, he was dragged off to the gallows. 
The gallows, as one can see in a photograph in my 
possession, was gaily painted like a barber's pole 
with Russian colours. Eight were hung together, 
the Sikat-ul-Islam in the middle and lowest of all. 
The Persian servants employed as hangmen by the 
Russians refused to do their work in his case, until 
they were brutally beaten by Russian officers with 
their knouts. The Russian officers are to be seen 
standing in front of the bodies posing for their photo- 
graph It should be added that this execution 

took place without the knowledge of the English 
Consul, probably to avoid a protest on his part. ' ' 

"Some of those hung were known personally to 
Europeans in Tabriz, who are positive that they took 
no part in the fighting. They were hung simply be- 
cause they were constitutionalists, although the charge 



PERSIA 201 



brought against them probably was that they incited 
or encouraged the Fidais to resistance. ' ' 

Shuja ud-Dowleh, who was de facto Governor, and 
directed events after the first day of the Russian 
occupation, was objected to by the Persian Govern- 
ment. Both the Russians and the English urged the 
Persians to appoint him formally as Governor, even 
after all his atrocities had been committed. Thus 
Sir E. Grey telegraphed, on February 25, 1912, to 
the British Minister at Teheran: "Is there any 
prospect, in view of our combined action concern- 
ing the ex-Shah, of obtaining the consent of the Per- 
sian Government to the appointment of Shuja-ud- 
Dowleh to the post of Governor-General; and, if so, 
what confidence could they place in his loyalty to 
them?"* Finally the objections of the Persian 
Government were allowed to prevail, and another 
Governor was appointed, with Shuja as his assistant. 
Russian and British action extinguished the hopes 
of Persia, and it is not easy to see how they can be 
revived. A victorious Germany would, no doubt, at 
first proclaim itself the protector of Islam, and might 
temporarily restore Persian independence. But a 
Germany established in Mesopotamia and on the Per- 
sian Gulf would soon begin to treat Persia as Russia 
has treated it. All the Great Powers, in their deal- 
ings with weak nations, are predatory and brutal. 
In criticizing Russian action in Persia, I do not wish 
to suggest that Germany would have acted better; I 
wish only to make it clear that the guiding principles 

*Cd. 6264, No. 232 (p. 96). It is clear that Sir E. Grey did 
not know how Shuja had been behaving. 






202 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

of European policy, in Asia as in Africa, are such as 
must bring horror and dismay to every man with a 
spark of humanity in his nature.* The only hope 
for Persia, as for the rest of Asia, seems to lie in such 
a weakening of all the Great Powers of Europe, either 
in this war or in the subsequent wars foretold by Pro- 
fessors here and in Germany,** as shall enable the 
more backward nations to throw off the yoke fastened 
on them by the Cabinets and financiers of "civil- 
ized" States. There is indeed another possibility: 
some glimmering of justice and humanity might con- 
ceivably appear in the external policy of the Powers. 
But this cannot happen so long as their worst acts are 
whitewashed by their best citizens. So long as we 
continue to know the faults of our enemies, and to 
be ignorant of the faults of our friends and ourselves, 
it is possible for men who have no bad desires to 
join in the hatred produced by pride and fear, and 
to contribute, against their will, to the forces of an- 
tagonism which stand in the way of a better spirit. 
Righteousness cannot be born until self -righteousness 
is dead. 

**Cf. Professor Ridgeway as reported in The Times, 7th May, 
1915, who is reported as having said: "Far from this being 
the last war, the hard facts pointed rather to its being the 
first of a vast series of struggles different from those yet 
known" ; and in an exactly similar sense, Eduard Meyer in 
"Scientia", March, 1915. 



V. WHAT OUR POLICY OUGHT TO 
HAVE BEEN 

It is more difficult to say what we ought to have 
done than to see, now that war has come, that what 
we did was not the best possible. The most effective -j 
defence of Sir E. Grey consists in pointing to Ger- 
man aggressiveness and German strength and asking 
how otherwise it could have been met * To this 
there are answers of details, and there is a broad 
answer which challenges the whole spirit and pur- 
pose of the foreign policy pursued by all the Great 
Powers of Europe. 

Beginning with answers of detail, we find that 
England, on various occasions, pursued a policy of 
quite needless hostility to Germany, and acted in a 
way which was ideally suited to increase the hold 
of militarism and aggression on German public 
opinion. How we acted in regard to Morocco has 
already been shown. In helping to suppress the Rus- 
sian revolution, we were not only committing a crime 
against Russia, a crime against liberty, and a crime 
against humanity, but we were preventing the re- 
moval of the chief argument by which the military 

•This is the defence with which Pofessor Murray concludes 
his pamphlet. Speaking of Sir Edward Grey's policy in Persia, 
he says: "As a Liberal and a reasonable man, I cannot con- 
demn it, though I admit that it has failed to achieve its full 
object." And again, after enumerating various views with which 
neither he nor I agree, he says: "All these classes of politician 
have a right to attack and denounce Sir Edward Grey for his 
policy in Persia, but Liberals, as far as I can see, have no 
right." This line of defence is by far the strongest, but I do 
not think it will bear careful examination. 



204 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

party have appealed to the ordinary citizen in Ger- 
many. Militarists everywhere base their appeal up- 
on fear: powerful neighbors, they say, are ready to 
attack us, and unless we are prepared we shall be 
overwhelmed. The chief bogey used by German mil- 
itarists for this purpose was Russia. If the Russian 
revolution had been successful, this bogey would 
have ceased to be efficacious, and a Liberal move- 
ment in Germany would have had a far better chance 
of success. By rehabilitating the Russian autocracy, 
we took one of the surest means of reinforcing Ger- 
man militarism. 

Our opposition to German Colonial expansion was 
another source of encouragement to German aggres- 
siveness.* Apart from the Moroccan question, there 
was the Bagdad Railway question, which had a pro- 
found influence upon the fate of Persia. We op- 
posed the railway, and German enterprise in Meso- 
potamia, because it was intended that the railway, 
under German control, should have a terminus on 
the Persian Gulf, where we considered that we had 
special interests on account of India. It was sup- 
posed that a German naval base on the Gulf would 
constitute a strategic danger to our naval command 
of the Indian Ocean. On this ground, we opposed 
the railway unless it were either internationalised 
or not allowed to extend south of Bagdad. At first 

•Professor Murray quotes Sir Edward Grey's speech of Nov. 
27, 1911, in which he stated that we did not wish to indulge 
in a dog-in-the-manger policy, or to oppose German desires for 
an extension of territory by friendly arrangement, but that there 
were certain places which, on account of British interests, we 
should not wish to see in other hands. In practice, however, these 
places have been found, since 1904, to include all places that 
Germany in fact desired. 



OUR POLICY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN 205 

the Russians also opposed it, but after the Potsdam 
Agreement of 1910, they withdrew their opposition 
in return for a free hand in Persia. If we had been 
the first to withdraw our opposition, we could, if we 
had wished, have procured a quid pro quo which would 
have been a gain, and not a loss, to the general 
interests of mankind. We could, for example, have 
demanded German support in maintaining the in- 
dependence and integrity of Persia. The strategical 
danger which we feared was purely imaginary: so 
long as the Germans did not secure command of the 
sea, anything which caused them to divide their Navy 
was an advantage to us, as has been shown by the 
fate of their Pacific fleet. But on account of this 
imaginery danger, we opposed their colonial ambi- 
tions, and drove them to acquiesce in Russia's Per- 
sian crimes. 

Another example of the recklessness with which we 
allowed our relations with Germany to become em- 
bittered is the Naval Scare of 1909, which, though 
not connected with the Foreign Office, had such an 
influence on Anglo-German friction as to require 
mention.* 

In that year, Mr. McKenna, in his official state- 
ment as First Lord of the Admiralty, accused the 
German Government of secretly accelerating their 
naval programme, and of being able to construct 
eight Dreadnoughts at once instead of four, which 



♦Accounts of this scare may be read in G. H. Perris, "Our 
Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey's Failure" and "The War 
Traders : an Exposure" ; Hirst, "The Six Panics" ; J. T. Walton 
Newbould, "How Asquith Helped the Armour Ring" (National 
Labour Press, Id.) ; "Armaments and Patriotism," 6 articles 
In the "Daily News" for May. 1913. 



206 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

was their official figure. "We were told that they could 
build ships more quickly than we could, and that 
we ran a risk of being inferior to them at sea during 
the year 1912. Mr. McKenna estimated that in 
April, 1912, they would have 17 Dreadnoughts; Mr. 
Balfour estimated that they would have 21 or 25. By 
the middle of 1912, they had in fact 13. It was stated 
that Krupp's had increased the number of their em- 
ployees since January, 1907, from 64,000 to 100,000, 
when in fact, as appeared from "The Times' ' of 
January 4, 1910, there had been a slight decrease in 
the number during the two years from January, 1907, 
to January, 1909. The accusation of trickery against 
the German Government was made the basis of a 
terrific alarmist campaign, by our Government and 
still more by Mr. Balfour, the present First Lord of 
the Admiralty, according to whom it was too late to 
secure our naval supremacy in the year 1912, and we 
could only be meek and hope the Germans would do 
nothing until we had again caught them up. His 
lugubrious joy was part of the campaign against the 
"People's Budget, " and was carried on throughout 
the General Election of January, 1910. 

The "facts" upon which the Government based its 
Navy Estimates in 1909 were wholly false,* and, as 
the Government itself was subsequently forced to 
confess, the actual numbers of German Dreadnoughts 



♦Professor Murray on the subject of the scare says : "There 
were great suspicions of secret shipbuilding in this year and the 
next, and in 1909 facts which came to the knowledge of Mr. 
McKenna, the First Lord of the Admiralty, made him demand 
an unusual increase of the British programme. His fears were, 
as a matter of fact, not realised, though the statements of fact 
which he made were quite accurate." Professor Murray does 
not mention Mr. Mulliner, the hero of the melodrama. 



OUR POLICY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN 207 

in the following years fell far short of the numbers 
expected by our Admiralty.** As is customary in 
such cases, the Government did not reveal the source 
of its information. Fortunately the man who had 
informed them of our danger himself boasted, later 
on, of the part he had played in saving the Empire.*** 
The man from whom the Government derived its 
information was Mr. Mulliner, the enterprising Man- 
aging Director of the Coventry Ordnance "Works, a 
firm which obtained fewer orders from the Admiralty 
than it thought it deserved. On March 3, Mr. 
Mulliner gave evidence before the Cabinet as to the 
enormous acceleration in Germany in the production 
of armaments, and particularly of guns and gun- 
mountings. On March 16, Mr. McKenna introduced 
the Naval Estimates, in a speech based upon Mr. 
Mulliner 's evidence. He asked for an increase of 
nearly £3,000,000, on the ground that Germany was 
trying to steal a march on us and to emerge sud- 
denly with a Navy stronger than ours. The House 
of Commons was not told that these statements rested 
upon the assertions of an individual with a strong 
financial interest in the increased production of naval 
guns. In England, most men accepted the statements 
as gospel. The German Government, which knew them 
to be false, very naturally supposed that our Govern- 
ment wished to produce a quarrel. No doubt our 
Government was deceived; but the Germans were 
pardonable if they supposed it less simple-minded 
than it was. 



**See Mr. McKenna's reply to Mr. Robert Harcourt, House of 
Commons, February 8, 1910. 

***See "Times", January 3, 1910. 






208 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

After the scare, the Coventry Ordnance Works 
secured the orders it desired, but, with singular in- 
gratitude, it dispensed with the further services of 
Mr. Mulliner. 

The fear inspired by the scare, and by Mr. Bal- 
four's speeches on the Navy in the following months, 
did much to persuade the English people that war 
with Germany could not be permanently avoided. 
The effect on the popular imagination survived, and 
so did the effect in Germany produced by an official 
charge of underhand dealing preferred against Ger- 
many by our Government. 

The view now widely prevalent in England, that 
Germany, for many «ears past, has been deliberately, 
without provocation, planning and preparing for the 
present war, is not one which, in view of the facts, 
can be maintained.* It is clear that there were men 
in Germany, at first few, but gradually more and 
more, who expected war and prepared for it and even 
desired it. There were such men also in England, in 
France, and in Russia, though in the end probably 
not so many as in Germany. The way to diminish 
the number of such men would have been to show that 
every legitimate German aspiration would not be op- 
posed by other Powers. Instead of adopting this 
method, we made it plain, by our opposition to Ger- 
many's colonial ambitions, by our policy of Ententes, 
and by our suspicions and reckless accusations, that 
Germany's aims, even when they were exactly sim- 
ilar to our own, could only be secured by force or 

♦This view is taken by Professor Murray in the last section 
but one of his pamphlet, called "The Peril in the Background." 






OUR POLICY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN 209 

by a terrifying threat of force. All the evidence goes 
to show that in July, 1914, Germany supposed her 
threat of force so terrifying that Austria would be 
allowed to attack Serbia without interference. I do 
not in any way palliate the crime of Germany and 
Austria in so acting as to bring on war; but it is 
evident that the policy of the Triple Entente, through- 
out the previous years, had been such as to encourage 
the warlike elements in Germany, by showing on our 
side a readiness for war, an amazing unscrupulous- 
ness, and a desire to thwart Germany in ways in which 
no wise statesman would have wished to thwart her. 
If I had been a German, I should have done all in 
my power to discourage German ambitions, which I 
consider foolish and brutal ; being English, I should 
have wished to show that England's ambitions were 
of a nobler kind. But the history of the past years 
shows that our ambitions were of the same kind as 
those of Germany, and only our methods were differ- 
ent. 

How are we to prevent a repetition of this long 
history of deceit, cruelty, and preparation for war? 
The English people is, I believe, the most humane, 
generous, and peace-loving in the world :* consciously 
and of set purpose, it would never tolerate such a 
policy as its chosen rulers have carried on for the 
last eleven years. But public attention was en- 
grossed by the struggle in home politics: the fight 
over the Budget, the Parliament Act, and Home Rule 
made Radicals in Parliament unwilling to discredit 
the Government, and unable to obtain a hearing for 

♦Except, perhaps, the people in America. 



210 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

such criticism as they attempted. The first and most 
indispensable requisite, if this nation and others are 
not again to be led blindfolded into crime and disaster, 
is that everywhere men should learn to be interested 
in foreign affairs, to follow them closely, and to bring 
the pressure of public opinion to bear upon diplomacy. 
The war, we may hope, will have taught the democ- 
racies this lesson, that they cannot safely permit 
themselves to ignore dealings with foreign countries, 
or blindly follow the lead of men who say they de- 
serve their trust. 

The next thing to be achieved is to destroy the 
evil tradition of "continuity" in foreign policy. This 
tradition, like much that is worst in modern Liberal- 
ism, is due to Lord Roseberry. In the days of Glad- 
stone and Disraeli, Palmerton and Lord Derby, Fox 
and Pitt, Chatham and Lord North, and right back 
to the time of the Stuarts, the parties were hotly 
divided on foreign policy. The absence of division 
dates from Gladstone's retirement, when Lord Rose- 
bery dramatically dropped the agitation against 
Armenian massacres. Continuity represents no real 
need of national safety, but merely a closing up of 
the ranks among the governing classes against their 
common enemy the people. Ever since 1832, the 
upper classes of England have been faced with the 
problem of retaining as much as possible of the 
substance of power while abandoning the forms to 
the clamour of democrats. They have gradually lost 
eontrol over legislation, while retaining in the maim 
their hold of the administrative and judicial sides of 
government. In foreign affairs, their ascendancy, 



OUR POLICY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN 211 

threatened by the Manchester school and Gladstone, 
was completely recovered twenty years ago, and sur- 
vived, as we have seen, even the collapse of 1906. 
Only by reintroducing foreign affairs into the arena 
of party politics can this ascendancy be destroyed. 

So long as both the great Parties pursue the same 
foreign policy, there can be no continuous effective 
critisism. Effective criticism, criticism which shall 
be heard and felt throughout the length and breadth 
of the land, is only possible, at normal times, when it 
is voiced by well-known politicians and echoed by 
widely-read newspapers. The criticisms of back-bench 
Members can always be disposed of by the simple 
process of not answering or reporting them. There 
cannot, in the long run, be any effective democratic 
control of foreign affairs unless prominent states- 
men and newspapers are divided and are engaged 
in mutual criticism. But it is possible, at times when 
the nation is strongly stirred, for public opinion to 
impose a policy on a Party, as opposition to Chinese 
Labour was imposed on the reluctant Liberals in 
1905, or as Free Trade was forced on Sir Robert 
Peel in 1845. This must be attempted, in regard to 
our diplomacy, when the present war is at an end. 
Perhaps it may prove a less formidable undertaking 
than most people would now suppose. 

The interests of the British democracy do not con- 
flict at any point with the interests of mankind. The 
interests of the British governing classes conflict at 
many points with the interests of mankind. 
The conquest of a new colony does not raise the wages 
of British labour, but it affords posts for younger sons 



212 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

and attractive investments for capitalists. For this 
reason, a policy of adventure and national prestige 
appeals most forcibly to the rich, while the wage- 
earning class, if it understood its own interests and 
were not caught by the glamour of Jingo phrases, 
would insist upon a policy of peace and international 
conciliation. It is to be hoped that, when the dem- 
ocracy realises, as it now will, its vital interest in 
foreign policy, it will compel the Party representing 
it to adopt such a programme as all friends of human- 
ity would desire. v 

If our foreign policy is to become democratic, its 
aims must become such as to further the welfare of 
the democracy at home, and in consequence such as 
will not injure foreign nations. 

The aims of our foreign policy must become genu- 
inely unaggressive, and such diplomatic and financial 
influence as we exert on foreign countries must be in 
furtherance of peace and freedom. 

The first step should be to announce that the Brit- 
ish Empire is large enough, and that we firmly in- 
tend not to occupy any new parts of the earth's sur- 
face.* Alike in times of war and in times of peace, 
the British Empire has steadily grown and is still 
growing. Germany, which we regard as far more 
aggressive than ourselves, would be amply satisfied 

♦Professor Murray says: "The first principle of the present 
agreed and continuous Foreign Policy is that we seek no increase 
of territory." It may be that we do not seek it, but Germans 
may be pardoned for pointing out that we always get it. In this 
war, apart from annexing Cyprus and declaring a protectorate 
in Egypt, we have conquered German South West Africa, Togo- 
land, German New Guinea, Samoa, and many places pf less 
importance. If we are as successful as we hope to be, we shall 
keep all these (except perhaps Togoland), and probably also 
Mesopotamia. 



OUR POLICY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN 213 

if its colonial possessions increased at half the rate 
at which ours have increased during the last forty 
years. The desire for colonies is essentially a folly, 
based partly on vanity, partly on economic mistakes. 
Let us announce that we regard it in that light, and 
that we have no desire to increase the immense ter- 
ritory which we now hold. Let us announce also 
that we will not again, as in the case of Morocco, 
promise military and naval support to any other 
Power for purposes of colonial conquest. We should 
then be left with no cause for fighting except genuine 
self-defence. 

Self-defence depends mainly upon the Navy, and 
no defensive policy is possible for us without a Navy 
strong enough to defeat any probable aggressor. But 
the Navy is a weapon of offence as well as of defence, 
and it is in its offensive capacity that it is disliked 
abroad. Its powers of offence are chiefly two: it 
enables us to conquer an enemy's colonies, and it 
enables us to capture his trade. If we genuinely 
ceased to desire new colonies, the first of these of- 
fensive powers would become unimportant. The sec- 
ond ought to be definitely abandoned by surrendering 
the right of capture at sea. Before the war, this 
right was upheld by the English and German Ad- 
miralties* as a means of reconciling their subject 
populations to the burdens of naval expenditure. For 
offensive purposes, as we see at the present moment, 

♦Before the war, Liberal opinion was against the maintenance 
of this right. On the recent attitude (before the war) of the 
German Admiralty, see Mr. J. H. Robertson's Introduction to 
Wehberg's "Right to Capture on Land and at Sea," a most 
useful book, by a man who is now being persecuted by the 
German Government on account of his fair-mindedness. 



214 THE ENTENTE POLICY, 1904-1915 

it is a powerful weapon. But for defensive purposes 
it is a positive weakness, since it would render fatal 
even the briefest loss of our command of the sea. 
The Germans are now clamouring for its abolition. 
If we abandoned it, our Navy would become obviously 
defensive, and would cease to be a threat to foreign 
commence. Probably a naval agreement with Ger- 
many could easily be embodied in the Peace in return 
for our abandonment of this barbarous practise. 

In our relations with foreign States, we ought to 
endeavour to conclude arbitration treaties such as the 
one we have recently concluded with America. "We 
ought to make it clear that we shall not engage in 
war except when we are attacked,* and we ought 
to avoid all such alliances and understandings as 
might lead foreign Powers to expect armed support 
from us in the event of their being at war. Such 
diplomatic and financial pressure as we should be 
able to exert without threatening war ought not to 
be given to certain nations regarded as " friends' ' 
and withheld from certain others regarded as at least 
potential "enemies." It ought to be given accord- 
ing to democratic principles, for the support of free- 
dom and peace, not for the support of this or that 
State regardless of its behaviour. If we had fol- 
lowed this course in 1906, it is probable that Russia 
would now be a Liberal Power. If we had followed 
it in 1911, Persia would, in all likelihood, be free, 
prosperous, and Parliamentary. If we had followed 

♦Unless an International League of Great Powers could be 
formed to resist all aggression everywhere, and to insist upon 
the peaceful settlement of disputes. In that case, we might be 
willing to participate in a war to enforce its decisions. 



OUR POLICY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN 215 

it in regard to Morocco, neither the Tangier crisis 
nor the Agadir crisis would have occurred, and 
Franco-German relations would have continued, as 
before 1904, to become more friendly and less domin- 
ated by hopes of the "revanche." 

A rich creditor nation, such as England, has, with- 
out the threat of war, enormous influence in inter- 
national affairs through its power of granting or 
withholding loans. This power, hitherto, has become 
subordinated to the diplomatic game. But it might 
be used, as Palmerston used naval power, to further 
liberal ideas, to prevent oppression, and to promote 
the growth of democracy. In this way, we should 
not only assist to make the world at large a happier 
place, but we should secure the warm friendship of 
progressive parties and nations everywhere, as we se- 
cured the friendship of Italy and Greece by assist- 
ing them in their struggle for liberation. This role 
is worthy of a great and free people: to lead the 
nations peacefully along the road to freedom, to be 
not merely the most astute politicians in the tragic 
and futile game of armed force, but effective pioneers 
in the aspiration towards international peace and con- 
cord. This is the role of true glory, of true honour, 
and, at the same time, the surest and bravest policy 
for our own prosperity and safety. Generosity and 
wisdom alike urge this course; against it, stand the 
money market and aristocratic prejudice. Which will 
the nation follow? 



APPENDIX A. 

Press Interpretations of Our Guarantee to Belgium 

in 1887. 

On Feb. 4, 1887, The Standard contained a letter 
signed "Diplomaticus", and a leading article which 
"is generally believed to have been semi-official".* 
The letter was as follows : 

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM. 
To the Editor of the Standard, 

Sir:— It is with no wish to add to the fears that 
prevail on all sides at the present moment, but sim- 
ply from a desire, which I think you will hold to be 
pardonable, that the English people should reflect, 
in good time, what may prove to be the nature and 
extent of their difficulties and responsibilities in the 
event of war between France and Germany, that I 
take up my pen to urge you to lay before them the 
following considerations. 

Military experts are of opinion that France has 
spent so much money, and spent it so well, during 
the last sixteen years in providing herself with a fresh 
military frontier, that a direct advance by the Ger- 
man Armies into France, past the new fortresses 
and forts that have been erected and linked together, 
would be, even if a possible, a very hazardous under- 
taking. 

But if Germany was, or considered itself to be, 
provoked into a struggle of life and death with 

•"England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg", by C. P. 
Sanger and H. T. J. Norton. Allen and Unwin, 1915, page 99. 



APPENDIX A 217 

France, would Prince Bismarck, with the mighty 
forces he can set in motion, consent to be baffled by 
the artificial obstacles to which I have alluded, so 
long as there existed a natural and undefended road 
by which he could escape from his embarrassment? 

Such a road or way out does exist. It lies on Bel- 
gian territory. But the neutraliy of Belgium is pro- 
tected by European guarantee, and England is one of 
the Guarantors. 

In 1870 Earl Granville, then at the head of the 
British Foreign Office, alive to this danger, promptly 
and wisely bound England to side with France if 
Prussia violated Belgian territory, and to side with 
Prussia if France did so. 

Would Lord Salisbury act prudently to take upon 
himself a similar engagement, in the event of a fresh 
conflict between those two countries ? It is for English 
men to answer the question. But it seems to me, as 
one not indifferent to the interests and greatness of 
England, that such a course at the present 
moment would be unwise to the last degree. However 
much England might regret the invasion of Belgian 
territory by either party to the struggle, she could not 
take part with France against Germany (even if Ger- 
many were to seek to turn the French flank by pouring 
its Armies through the Belgian Ardennes), without 
utterly vitiating and destroying the main purposes of 
English policy all over the world. 

But, it will be asked, must not England honour its 
signature and be faithful to its public pledges? I 
reply that your Foreign Minister ought to be equal to 
the task of meeting this objection without committing 



218 APPENDIX A 

England to war. The temporary use of a right of way 
is something different from a permanent and wrong- 
ful possession of territory ; and surely England would 
easily be able to obtain from Prince Bismarck ample 
and adequate guarantees that at the close of the con- 
flict, the territory of Belgium should remain intact as 
before ? 

You will see, Sir, that I raise, in a very few words, 
an exceedingly important question. It is for the 
English people to perpend and pronounce. But it is 
high time they reflected on it. 

I am, Sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

Diplomaticus. 

Feb. 2. 

The article in the " Standard " ran as follows: 

"We are reminded this morning, by a Correspond- 
ent who speaks with high authority, that while we 
are all wondering how long it will be before a fresh 
conflict breaks out between France and Germany, 
Englishmen are shutting their eyes to a question 
closely, and perhaps inevitably, allied with that con- 
tingent event, and affecting the interests of this coun- 
try more vitally than they could be affected even by 
any probable result from the struggle between those 
two powerful States. ' ' Diplomaticus ' ' writes with un- 
professional terseness ; but his observations are to the 
point, and are expressed with significant lucidity. 
Nor can there be any doubt as to the nature or as to 
the gravity of the question raised in his communica- 
tion. In the event of war between Germany and 
France, and in case either Germany or France were 



APPENDIX A 219 

to disregard the neutrality of Belgian territory, what 
ought England to do? That is the question, and he 
indicates pretty plainly a reply with which, we may 
say at once, we do not believe the English people will 
be disposed to quarrel. In order, however, to enable 
them to respond to the inquiry with full knowledge 
and deliberate judgment, it is necessary to lay before 
them the facts and contingencies of the situation some- 
what more amply and more in extenso than is done by 
' ' Diplomaticus. ' ' On the Declaration of War by 
France against Prussia, in 1870, Earl Granville, as 
we all know, with more promptness and decision than 
he usually displayed, sought to secure respect for 
Belgian territory by notifying that, should either com- 
batant ignore the neutrality secured to it by public 
treaty, England would side actively with the other 
combatant. It may be said, why cannot the same 
course be pursued once more, in the event of a similar 
condition of affairs coming into play? The answer is 
that a similar condition of affairs no longer exists. In 
the first place, in 1870 neither of the combatants had 
any pressing temptation to resort to a violation of 
Belgian territory, in the execution of their military 
designs. The territory of Germany was avowedly 
vulnerable in several places; and France was so as- 
sured of its military superiority, and so confident that 
"A Berlin!" not "Nach Paris!" would prove the 
successful war cry of the struggle, that no precautions 
had been taken against the possibility of France be- 
ing invaded. As the event proved, even such magnifi- 
cent fortresses as Metz and Strasburg, with their large 
civil population and their imperfect stores of provis- 



220 APPENDIX A 

ions, proved an encumbrance and a source of danger 
rather than one of safety; and, these once invested, 
there was nothing to stop the march of the victors of 
Sedan towards the French capital. Metz and Stras- 
burg are now German fortresses ; and no one requires 
to be told that Germany has neglected no precautions 
or expedients to render an invasion of the territory 
of the Fatherland a difficult if not an impracticable 
undertaking. Armed to the head for offence, Ger- 
many is likewise armed to the heel for defence. She 
is more invulnerable than Achilles, for there is no 
point uncovered. 

How stands it with France as regards defence 
against invasion? During the last sixteen years all 
that money profusely spent, and military skill judi- 
ciously applied, could do to provide her with a strong 
military frontier against Germany, has been quietly, 
but steadily and unremittingly, carried forward. Not 
only does France possess a first line of fortresses, con- 
tiguous to German territory, in Belfort, Epinal, Toul, 
and Verdun ; but all four are linked with each other, 
in succession, by another line of detached forts. Not 
to encumber ourselves here with military details, the 
full exposition of which would demand considerable 
space, we may say that ' * Diplomaticus ' ' is guilty of no 
exaggeration when he declares that military experts 
are of opinion that France has spent so much money, 
and spent it so well, since the last war in providing 
herself with a fresh military frontier, that a direct 
advance by the German Armies into France past the 
new fortresses and forts that have been erected and 
linked together would be, even if a possible, a very 



APPENDIX A 221 

hazardous undertaking. There are, however, two 
other ways of entering France from Germany. One is 
through Switzerland; the other is through Belgium. 
Both are what is understood by "neutral territory'*; 
but the mountainous character of Switzerland renders 
access to France through its passes more arduous and 
less available than through the territory of Belgium. 
In case the German armies found themselves practi- 
cally prevented from engaging in offensive military 
operations against France by the admirable line of 
defence with which she has provided herself, would 
Prince Bismarck, and the great soldiers whom he 
would inspire, consent to be thwarted by the inviola- 
bility of Belgium as guaranteed by European Treaty ? 
"Diplomaticus" puts the question with undiplomatic 
bluntness. He forbears from answering it; and so 
must we. But it will be obvious to everybody that 
there is a possibility, a danger, of Germany not being 
willing to be debarred from invading France by an 
obstacle that has grown up since the Treaty guaran- 
teeing the neutrality of Belgium was signed. Our 
readers will at once perceive that the situation is ab- 
solutely different from the one that existed in 1870, 
when Earl Granville quickly and cheerfully imposed 
on England the obligation to take part against either 
combatants that violated Belgian soil. Neither 
combatant was much tempted to do so; and thus 
the engagement assumed by England — a very proper 
one at the time — was not very serious or onerous, and 
saved appearances rather than created responsibility. 
Now the position is entirely changed. If England, 
with a view to securing respect for Belgian territory, 



222 APPENDIX A 

were to bind itself, as in 1870, to throw its weight into 
the balance against either France or Germany, should 
either France or Germany violate Belgian ground, we 
might, and probably should, find ourselves involved in 
a war of giants on our own account. 

We think that "Diplomaticus" understands the 
English people when he hints his suspicions that such 
a result would be utterly alien alike to their wishes 
and to their interests. For, over and above the fact 
that, as we have seen, the temptation to violate Belgian 
territory by either side is much greater than it was in 
1870, the relations of England with the European 
Powers have necessarily and naturally undergone con- 
siderable modification during that period. We concur 
with our correspondent in the opinion he expresses 
that for England and Germany to quarrel, it matters 
not upon what subject, would be highly injurious to 
the interests of both. Indeed, he is right when he 
says that the main outlines of our policy would be 
blurred and its main purposes embarrassed, if not 
defeated, were we suddenly to find ourselves in a state 
of hostility to Germany, instead of one of friendliness 
and sympathy. No doubt, if Germany were to out- 
rage the honour, or to disregard the interests, of Eng- 
land, we should be ready enough to accept the chal- 
lenge thrown down to us. But would the violation 
of Belgian territory, whether by Germany or France, 
be such an injury to our interests? It might be so, 
in certain circumstances ; and it would assuredly be so 
if it involved a permanent violation of the independ- 
ence of Belgium. But, as ' ' Diplomaticus " ingeni- 
ously suggests, there is all the difference in the world 



APPENDIX A 223 

between the momentary use of a 'right of way/ even 
if the use of the right of way be, in a sense, wrongful, 
and the appropriation of the ground covered by the 
right of way. "We trust that both Germany and 
France would refrain even from this minor trespass. 
But if they did not ? If one or the other were to say 
to England, 'All the military approaches to France 
and Germany have been closed; and only neutral ap- 
proaches lie open to us. This state of things is not 
only detrimental, but fatal to our military success, 
and it has arisen since the Treaty guaranteed the 
sacredness of the only road of which we can now 
avail ourselves. We will, as a fact, respect the inde- 
pendence of Belgium and we will give you the most 
solemn and binding guarantees that, at the end of the 
conflict, Belgium shall be as free and independent as 
before. ' If Germany, — and, of course, our hypothesis 
applies also to France — were to use this language — 
though we trust there will be no occasion for it — we 
cannot doubt what would be the wise and proper 
course for England to pursue, and what would be the 
answer of the English Government. England does not 
wish to shirk its true responsibilities. But it would 
be madness for us to incur or assume responsibilities 
unnecessarily, when to do so would manifestly involve 
our participation in a tremendous War." 

On the same day the "Pall Mall Gazette," then 
Liberal, published the following article : 
ENGLAND AND BELGIUM. 
Are We Bound to Intervene? 
There Is No Guarantee. 
The 'Standard' this morning gives special prom- 



i i 



224 APPENDIX A 

inence to a letter signed 'Diplomaticus,' on the neu- 
trality of Belgium. It also devotes its first leading 
article to the subject. The gist of these utterances 
may be summed up in two propositions: (1) Eng- 
land is under a treaty of obligation to defend the neu- 
trality of Belgium; (2) But circumstances have al- 
tered since the contraction of the said obligation, and 
as against Germany, at any rate, England must pocket 
its pledges, and allow France to be invaded through 
Belgium without protesting or interfering. 

" Considerable importance is likely to be attached 
to these conclusions abroad owing to its being under- 
stood that the ' Standard' is at present the Governmen- 
tal and Salisburian organ. Each of the propositions 
laid down by our contemporary is, it will be seen, 
likely to be taken hold of. Germany might read the 
second as an invitation to invade France through Bel- 
gium; France might read the first as an admission of 
our obligation to prevent, or rather to punish, such an 
infringement of neutral territory, if we dared. 

"It becomes important, therefore, to point out that 
the ' Standard V argument rests on a false asumption. 
We do not for the present argue whether in the con- 
tingencies contemplated it would be England's inter- 
est to intervene by declaring war against whichever 
belligerent might violate the neutrality of Belgium; 
we confine ourselves to the preliminary statement — 
essential for clearing up the case — that it is not Eng- 
land's obligation to do so. 

"The origin of the mistaken views prevailing on the 
question is undoubtedly a confusion between the Spe- 
cial Treaty of 1870 and the preceding General Treaties 



APPENDIX A 225 

of 1831 and 1839 which it temporarily superceded. By 
the treaty of 1870 the obligation of England was, of 
course, clear and specific. Here is the pledge which 
was given in the identical treaties concluded mutatis 
mutandis with both France and Prussia : 

" 'Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland declares that if during 
the said hostilities the armies of Prance (or Prussia) 
should violate the neutrality of Belgium, she will be 
prepared to co-operate with his Prussian Majesty (or 
the Emperor of the French) for the defence of the 
same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, 
employing for that purpose her naval and military 
forces to ensure its observance. ' 

"There could be no doubt about that pledge; but 
then it expired twelve months after the conclusion of 
peace. At the expiration of that period, so the treaty 
continued : 

" 'The independence and neutrality of Belgium 
will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respec- 
tively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the 
first article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of 
April, 1839. ' 

"Now, what some people do is to read this treaty of 
1839 by the light of the more specific treaty of 1870, 
and to deduce from the former the same obligation on 
the part of England to intervene against any infringe- 
ment of Belgium's neutrality as was contained in the 
1870 treaty. 

"This, however, is a completely untenable proceed- 
ing. The treaty of 1839 must stand on its own legs, 
and these, it will be seen, are by no means very 



226 APPENDIX A 

strong. The following are the terms of its second ar- 
ticle : 

I i ' H. M. the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary 
and Bohemia, H. M. the King of the French, H. M. 
the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, H. M. the King of Prussia, and H. M. the 
Emperor of ALL the Russias, declare that the articles 
hereby annexed to the treaty concluded this day be- 
tween his Majesty the King of the Belgians and his 
Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of 
Luxemberg, are considered as having the same force 
and value as if they were textually inserted in the 
present Act, and that they were thus placed under the 
guarantee of their Majesties.' 

I I Here, then, we are sent off from the treaty between 
the Great Powers to the treaty between Belgium and 
the Netherlands. The seventh article of this treaty 
(which is identical with the same article of the 1831 
treaty) runs: 

I { ' Belgium will form, within the limits indicated in 
1, 2, and 4, an independent and perpetually neutral 
State. She will be bound to observe this same neu- 
trality towards all other States.' 

I I In this treaty it will be seen there is nothing about 
any guarantee; all that can be elicited from it, and 
from the one cited as referring to it, is this, that this 
clause is placed under the guarantee of 'their said 
Majesties/ that is, England, Austria, France, Ger- 
many, and Russia. 

"But that is not all. This constructive guarantee 
must be considered in relation to the party to whom 
it was given — namely, to the Netherlands. For the 



APPENDIX A 227 

treaty of 1839 was one between the five Powers on the 
one hand and the Netherlands on the other ; and what 
the five Powers did was to guarantee to the Nether- 
lands the treaty contracted between it and Belgium, 
one clause of which treaty said that Belgium should 
form 'an independent and perpetually neutral State,' 
and should 'be bound to observe such neutrality 
towards all other States.' 

"In the treaty of 1831, it is true, there was a 
further article guaranteeing the execution of all pre- 
ceding articles (including, therefore, the one just 
cited in similar terms from the 1839 treaty) to the 
King of the Belgians, but in the 1839 treaty, on which 
the independence of Belgium is now said to rest, Lord 
Palmerston omitted any such guarantee. 

"There is, therefore, no English guarantee to Bel- 
gium. It is possible, perhaps, to 'construct' such a 
guarantee; but the case may be summed up as follows : 
(1) England is under no guarantee whatever except 
such as is common to Austria, France, Russia, and 
Germany; (2) that guarantee is not specifically of the 
neutrality of Belgium at all; and (3) is given not to 
Belgium but to the Netherlands." 

The ' ' Spectator, ' ' on Feb. 5, said : 
". . . the general idea (is) that England will 
keep out of this (war). . . That she will try to do 
so we do not doubt, but there is the Belgian difficulty 
ahead. Our guarantee for her is not a solitary one, 
and would not bind us to fight alone; but there are 
general interests to be considered. The probability 
is that we shall insist on her not becoming a theatre 



228 APPENDIX A 

of war but shall not bar — as indeed we cannot bar — 
the traversing of her soil. ' ' 

The above extracts are reprinted in Sanger and 
Norton, (op. cit.) and in the "Labour Leader" of 
Feb. 4, 1915. Messrs. Sanger & Norton sum up their 
discussion as follows : 

"From all the evidence it is clear that in the past 
the British Government has not considered that the 
Treaty of 1839 imposed a binding obligation to go to 
war with any Power which infringed the neutrality of 
Belgium" (p. 109). 



i APPENDIX B. " 

What Support Did We Offer to France in 1905 ? 

The evidence as to our attitude during 1905 con- 
sists partly of leading articles in "The Times", partly 
of revelations in the * 'Figaro' ' and the " Matin " in 
October, 1905, partly of Sir Edward Grey's con- 
fession that he authorised military and naval con- 
versations with the French in January, 1906, during 
the General Election of that month. 

"The Times" is universally believed on the Con- 
tinent to be inspired by the Foreign Office, and care- 
ful readers will find that, until the last few months, 
it has invariably, in its articles on foreign affairs, 
represented the policy of the Foreign Office when- 
ever it is known what that policy was. It is natural 
to suppose that it has also represented the Foreign of- 
fice at times when the policy of the Foreign Office is 
not otherwise known. Now from the moment of the 
Kaiser's first demand for a Conference, "The Times" 
opposed the very idea. Never once did it hint that Ger- 
many was "justified in asking for a Conference", as 
Professor Murray now concedes. Everything that "The 
Times" could do, it did, to encourage France to 
resist the German demands, and to make France feel 
that our support would be given whatever the conse- 
quences of resistance might be.* 

Sir Edward Grey, in his speech on August 3, 1914, 
told us that, in January, 1906, just when the Algeciras 

♦See "Times", April 6, June 16, 1905. 



230 APPENDIX B 

Conference was assembling, a sudden crisis arose, 
and he, at the request of the French, authorised the 
discussion of plans for military and naval co-opera- 
tion in the event of England and France being jointly 
involved in war with Germany. He gave this au- 
thorisation after consulting only three other mem- 
bers of the Cabinet; the Cabinet as a whole, by his 
own confession, was not informed of his action until 
a much later time. Now the occurrence of these con- 
versations at this time proves that we were at any 
rate not opposed in principle to the military support 
of France in its policy of Moroccan conquest, even 
if that policy should entail all the horrors from which 
Europe is now suffering. 

The remaining evidence is contained in revelations 
made by the "Matin" and the "Figaro " of which 
the substance may be read in "The Times" of Oc- 
tober, 1905. "The Times" of Oct. 9, 1905, contains 
the following note from its Paris Correspondent on 
the Matin revelations concerning the proceedings 
at the Council of Ministers which ended in M. Del- 
casse's resignation. 

"He (M. Delcasse) declared that France could not 
go to the proposed international conference (i. e. 
Algeciras that was to be) without belittling herself 
and running the risk of submitting to the discussion 
of Third Powers two agreements which bore her 
signature and which had been ratified by her Parlia- 
ment. He furnished documentary evidence that Eng- 
land, Spain, Italy, Russiaii and the United States 
were ready to refuse their adhesion to the Conference 
scheme. . . . He further informed his colleagues 



APPENDIX B 231 

that Great Britain was ready, whatever might hap- 
pen, to back up France to the very end, and that in 
the improbable eventuality of an unexpected ag- 
gression Great Britain would side with her. In a 
footnote the Editor of the Matin states that England 
verbally informed the French government that, if 
France was attacked, she was ready to mobilise her 
fleet, to seize the Kiel canal, and to land 100,000 men 
in Schleswig-Holstein, and that the French Govern- 
ment was subsequently informed that if they wished 
it this offer would be made in writing.' 
"The Times'' leading article on this says: 
"M. Delcasse, it (the "Matin") affirms, informed 
his colleagues that England was ready to support 
France and that in the event of an unexpected act 
of aggression directed against France, England would 
side with the Republic. With that statement we have 
no fault to find. We do not all doubt that in such a 
contingency the English Government would have sup- 
ported France with the hearty approval of the nation. 
But we very much doubt the further announcement 
which the Matin makes upon its own responsibility 
that England had verbally informed the French Gov- 
ernment that she was prepared to take certain specific 
action in that contingency. We believe on the con- 
trary that the French Government very wisely re- 
frained from asking for any assurances of the kind 

mentioned. ' ' 

On Oct. 13th, the Paris Correspondent notes that 
Jaures declared in a speech at Limoges that he knew 
things did really take place as stated. 

On Oct. 13th, the Paris Correspondent says that 



232 APPENDIX B 

Jaures has written in I'Humanite: I was not aware 
that it was in Schleswig-Holstein that England was 
to land 100,000 men, but, with the exception of this 
precise statement, I heard at the moment of the crisis 
from a direct and safe French source everything that 
M. Delcasse said at the Council of Ministers as to the 
intervention offered by England. I heard at the 
time that she wanted to engage herself towards us, 
even by a written treaty, to support us against Ger- 
many, not only by the mobilisation of the Fleet, but 
by the landing of 100,000 men." 

On Oct. 14th, the Paris Correspondent writes that 
the following semi-official note is published by the 
Havas Agency : 

"We are authorised to declare that the accounts 
which have appeared in the newspapers as to the in- 
cidents that accompanied the retirement of M. Del- 
casse and particularly the details as to the Minister- 
ial Council which preceded this retirement are inac- 
curate.' ' 

The correspondent goes on to say: "The Editor 
of the 'Matin', M. Stephane Lauzanne, declares that 
every line which appeared over his signature and 
which described what took place at the Council of 
Ministers on June 6 was strictly accurate. M. Lau- 
zanne refers to the speech delivered by M. Jaures 
at Limoges on Sunday and to the article published 
on Thursday in VHumanite. ... He also in- 
vokes the testimony of the "Daily Mail" of yester- 
day and of the "Petite Republique" of the same date. 
. 'For three days past', says M. Louzanne — 
'Prince Billow's press has been calling upon the Eng- 



APPENDIX B 233 

lish and French Governments to contradict officially. 
. . . To this summons the British government 
replies by a contemptuous shrug of the shoulders 
but the French Government bows before the order 
coming from the other side of the Rhine. The note 
communicated to-day has a new name. It is not 
called a dementi. It is called 'une complaisance/ " 
The Paris Correspondent continues to note that the 
"Figaro" gives facts of the British offer during the 
year which elapsed after the conclusion of the Anglo- 
French Agreement. "The British Government, ' ' it 
says, "approached our diplomatists on three occa- 
sions in order to ascertain whether France was will- 
ing to conclude a definite treaty of alliance. The 
French Government, from regard no doubt for Rus- 
sia, who was engaged in a war with Great Britain 's 
ally, declined to take this question into consideration. 
But when the Franco-German conflict reached an 
acute stage, French diplomacy took up the question 
for itself. Our Ambassador in London, M. Cambon, 
obtained from Lord Lansdowne the verbal assurance 
of effective support from England in the event of a 
conflagration, and M. Cambon was able to announce 
to M. Delcasse that, the casus foederis once given, 
Great Britain would reiterate this assurance in writ- 
ing. Thus it was that about the 15th of June, Lord 
Lansdowne was able to declare to some friends that 
in the event of a Franco-German war, there would 
not be the least doubt about the intervention of Great 
Britain. I was told in Berlin from a highly official 
source that Germany had been informed of these 
events towards the middle of May by Count Wolff- 



234 APPENDIX B 

Metternich, the German Ambassador in London. ' ' The 
German Emperor, the Figaro writer goes on to say, 
took immediate action by communicating the infor- 
mation through Italy to France, thus bringing about 
the resignation of M. Delcasse. 

The same note goes on to state that : 

"Reuter's Agency is enabled to state authoritatively 
with regard to the recent sensational revelations in 
the French Press that Germany has been informed 
by Great Britain that the question of the latter 's 
offering assistance to France never arose, that France 
never asked for assistance and further that Great 
Britain never offered it." 

"On enquiry in British Government circles with 
reference to the above, Renter's Agency is informed 
that His Majesty's Government is not making any 
statement on the subject." 

The "Times" leading article on the 16th of Oct. 
says: 

"We do not know, and we do not pretend to know, 
how the French nation came to understand, as they 
did understand with good reason, that in the event 
of an unprovoked attack upon them arising out of 
the Anglo-French Agreement we should support them. 
But as M. Clemenceau argues with unanswerable 
force in the Aurore, what conceivable grounds can 
Germany or any other peaceable power have to 
complain of that? 

"Our support would be given only in the case of 
unprovoked aggression. Germany declares that she 
never dreams of unprovoked aggression against any- 



APPENDIX B 235 

body and certainly not against France at the present 
time. "Why then does she cry out? 

"That the French ever asked for assurances of our 
intervention, or that we ever gratuitously offered 
them, we do not for a moment believe. That the Ger- 
mans should be exceedingly inquisitive as to our re- 
lations with France is not surprising. That they will 
discover anything more than has already been openly 
proclaimed to the world we do not think likely." 
On Oct. 27, the Paris correspondent says that : 
"M. Andre Mevil in Echo de Paris writes: 
' Towards the middle of June we informed England 
that the ill-will of Germany became daily more evi- 
dent and that the crisis, instead of passing away, was 
only being aggravated. On June 20, M. Paul Cam- 
bon, who had spent 48 hours in Paris, returned to 
London, with precise instructions from the French 
Government. On the afternoon of the 21st he had a 
long conversation with Lord Lansdowne at the For- 
eign Office, in the course of which he informed him of 
the situation. When once the British government 
knew exactly what was taking place they decided to 
intervene energetically. I remember that on the even- 
ing of June 21 a rumour was current in London that 
next day, or the day after at the latest, Count Wolff- 
Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, 
would have a significant interview with Lord Lans- 
downe. Being in London at the time I heard the 
news. The truth is that Lord Lansdowne had officially 
declared to Count Wolff-Metternich that if ever Ger- 
many attacked France, all the military forces of the 
British Empire would come to the assistance of the 



236 APPENDIX B 

latter. Thus twice in less than a month England had 
offered her support to France. ' ' ' 

None of this evidence is conclusive on either side, 
and I have not found any way of arriving at certainty 
as to our promises in 1905. 



INDEX 

Absurdity of war, 31. 

Adversary, overcome by understanding your, 56. 

Afghanistan, British suzerainty in ,171. 

Agadir crisis, the, 158, 170. 

Aggression, German, 74. 

Agreements in Morocco, secret, 145. 

Alarmist campaign, an, 206. 

Algeciras, conference at, 90, 134, 151; act of, 153, 230. 

Alien, distrust of the, 61. 

Alliance and democracy, the, 33. 

Alliance and Entente, the game of, 95. 

Alsace, Lorraine, 83, 96. 

Ambitions and methods, English and German, 209. 

America, community of interests in, 93; the champion of 

mankind, 96; peace loving, 209. 
American-Indian war of conquest, 28. 
Ammunition and vested interests, 118. 
Anachronisms, 38. 
Anarchy, international, 59. 
Ancient wars, 28. 
Angell, Norman, 27. 

Anglo-French Entente in 1904, 83; loan to Russia, the, 177. 
Anglo-German enmity, 69; negotiations in 1909, 161. 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 172. 
Anglo-Russian Entente, 171. 

Animal mechanism and freedom of thought, 11. 
Archangel, and the myth of the Russian army, 5. 
Aristocracy and money grubbing, 91; foreign policy of the, 

98; problem of the English, 210. 
Articles concerning Egypt, secret, 139. 
Artificial obstacles, 217. 
Asquith, Mr., 127. 
Atavistic moral notions, 3. 
Athenian civilization, 106. 
Atlantic, German naval base in the, 159. 

Atrocities in all the armies, 111; German, 6; in Persia, 198. 
Atrocity myths, 4, 7. 
Attila, 106. 

Attrition, effects of a war of, 109. 
Austria-Hungary, 174. 

Bagdad railway, the, 73, 133, 204. 
"Balance of power," 98. 
Balfour, Mr., 172. 



238 INDEX 



Balkan wars, the, 30, 36, 133. 

Bayonets and artillery, 63. 

Belgium, the Russian army in, 5; the grey book, 9; sufferings 
of, 25; claims of, 121; Germany's invasion of, 126; the 
occasion for violence and of hypocrisy, 129; not the occa- 
sion of interventions, 129; the secret treaty, 131; and 
Morocco, 147-148; and Persia, 180, 193; neutrality of, 216; 
the temporary use of right of way, 218. 

Berlin, the German cruiser, 158. 

Bessemer process in 1879, the, 76. 

Bethmann-Hollweg, 10. 

Bismarck, Prince, 76, 217. 

Blame not all one one side, the, 125. 

Blessings of war, 28. 

Boers, the, 45, 131. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 84. 

Boxers in China, 145. 

Brailsford, Mr., 125-126. 

British democracy, interests of the, 211. 

British foreign policy, 123. 

Browne, Professor Edward; and Germany and Persia, 180. 

Brute within us, the, 88. 

Bureaucracy, and radicals, 173. 

Burglar agreements in Morocco, 145. 

Bushire, 191. 

Byzantine attitude, the, 116. 

Cabinet of nations, England's place in the, 167. 
Caliber of the next generation, the mental, 115. 
Cameroons, the, 133. 
Casablanca, 57. 

Case for the Entente, 133; for the Germans, 134-135. 
Cavaliers, 32. 
Chamberlain, Joseph, 131. 
Charles II and Dutch wars, 32. 
Christ, Jesus, 34. 
Civilization, modern, 68. 
Clemenceau, M., 176. 

Compensation in Morocco, German demands, 156-7. 
Condorcet, 53. 

Conference on Morocco, Kaiser's just demand for an interna- 
tional, 148. 
Continent, a necessity of friends on the, 131. 
Conversations with the French, naval, 129. 
Co-operation and competition, prehistoric, 87. 
Council of the powers, a, 41. 
Coventry ordnance works, 208. 
Creditor nation, England a rich, 215. 
Credulity in war time, 5. 
Criticism, effective, 211. 



INDEX 239 



Crushing Germany, 121. 

Cubans, American interference and the, 45. 

Economic injury in war, 25; organization, 88; exhaustion, 117. 
"Egging on" to war by England and Germany, 150. 
Egypt, agreement concerning the political status of, 139. 
Encirclement of Germany by the Entente, the, 133. 
Enemy, internal and external, the, 55; of the common people, 

210. 
England's violation of Belgium's neutrality, 9; and the Triple 

Alliance in 1887, readiness to provoke war in 1911, 142. 

Enjoyment of war, 60. 

Epoch? are we at the end of a great, 121. 
European rule over uncivilized nations, 50. 

Evidence for false beliefs in war and in religion, 5; contra- 
dictory, 150. 
Evils produced by war, 12, 24. 

False stories, an accident of war, 8. 

Pashoda incident, the, 132, 142. 

Feeling as an ethical factor, 20. 

Ferocity developed in war, 16. 

Financiers, the yoke of, 202. 

Finland, 14, 171, 177. 

Food supplies, threatening a nation's, 50. 

Foreign office, the immaculate sinlessness of the, 126; criti- 
cism of the, 130; The Times, 162; and the common people, 
210. 

France, not Belgium, the decisive factor, 127. 

Freedom of the sea, 79. 

French yellow book, 170. 

Friends of peace, 97. 

German navy, the, 141; colonial expansion, 204; defenses, 220. 
Governing classes the enemy of the common people, 210. 
Government impossible without the consent of the governed, 

49. 
Granville, Earl, 217. 
Grey, Sir E., 123; and the neutrality of Belgium, 127, 141; his 

cardinal principles, 149; mention of, 159, 167, 183, 184, 192, 

201; and Persia, 180; and the secret treaty with France, 

227 et seq. 
Grievances against Mr. Shuster, 196. 

Hatred of the enemy, 6; a biological instinct, 11; interna- 
tional, 26; of England, 67; called a noble indignation, 71; 
menace to civilization, 112; hymns of, 122. 

Hegemony of the Balkans, the, 36. 

Highwayman ethics, 50. 

Homer and the Old Testament, imagination dominated by 31. 

Homicide, instinct to, 58. 

Homo sapiens, 15. 



240 INDEX 

Horse dealer diplomacy, 91. 
Hymns of hate, 122. 

Ideals supported by force, 33. 

Idle rich, the, 51, 120. 

Incentives to war, 62. 

India, English tribute from, 52; and British aggression, 45. 

Industrial progress, German, 76. 

International consciousness, 13; law, 21. 

Intrigue, the game of, 90-91, 153. 

Investigation of atrocity stories, 7. 

Isvolsky, M., 184. 

Jameson Raid, the, 154. 

Japan, alliance with, 132, 172, 182. 

Jingo phrases, and the wage-earning class, 212. 

Judgment by formula, 21. 

Kaiser, the, 125, 168, 189, 190. 
Knout in Persia, the Russian, 200. 
Knowledge with elevation of mind, 18. 
Kostyleff, N., 2. 

Labour Leader, the, 7. 

Land Blue Books and old newspapers a source of information 

on secret acts of the foreign office, 158. 
Landowners of England, the, 26, 51. 
Landsdowne, Lord, 123, 150. 
Latin-Slav league in Paris, 173. 
Leibniz, on war, 1. 
Le Matin, 144. 
Liakhoff, Colonel, 187. 

Liberals, and English Russian loan, 178. 
"Lies," 8. 

Lloyd-George, 148, 
London papers, 126. 
Love, falling in, 15. 
Loving our enemies, 27. 
Luxemburg, the Duchy of, 35. 

Motives for war, 114. 
Mulliner, Mr., 207. 
Murray, Prof. Gilbert, 124, 145. 
Mushiru '1-Mulk, the, 183. 
Myths, national, 70. 

Napoleonic wars, the, 26. 

Nation, as an entity, the, 63. 

National humiliation, a cause of war, 170. 

Navy, the German, 71-72, 77, 132, 205. 

Naval estimates based on false facts, English, 206. 

Nervous endurance will decide this war, 16. 

Neutrality of Belgium, 9; neutral territory, 221. 

Newspapers, 174. 



INDEX 241 

Nicholson, Sir Arthur, 188. 

Non-combatants, 24. 

Non-resistance, the principle of, 35, 42-43; its possible opera- 
tion, 47-48. 

Open Door and Germany's colonization plans, the, 134, 140, 
160. 

Pacifism, difficulties of, 65, 86. 

Pack, the human, 57. 

Panic, measures dictated by, 141. 

Paper guarantees, 79. 

Parable of the Agadir crisis, 165-6. 

Pareto, V., 2. 

Parties and foreign policy, 211. 

Passive resistance, 44, 47-8. 

Patriotism, 14, 62, 66; in its degraded form, 93. 

Panther, the German gunboat, 158. 

Peace, 11; universal, 42; conditions for a lasting, 94; the 

Kaiser on the side of, 168. 
Peloponnesian war, the, 13. 
Pericles, 117. 
Persia, 14, 22, 85; partition of, 132, 185; peaceful penetration 

of, 179; and Belgium, 180; Russian intervention in, 187-8; 

highly civilized, 190; ultimatum to, 195; Sir E. Grey and, 

203, 214. 
Phrases, influence of, 31. 
Plato on non-resistance, 43. 
"Playing Off," the game of, 174. 
Poland, reconquering, 171, 178. 
Policies of the Great Powers, the, 203. 
Policing Morocco, 151-152. 
Potsdam agreement, the, 135, 189. 
Prestige and war, 36, 57, 163, 165. 
Pretexts for war, 22. 
Pride as a virtue, 53; stronger than self interest, 80; national, 

92; motive for continuing war, 122. 
Primitive poetry and war, 16. 
Principle in this war, no great, 13, 32. 
Professorial parasites, 17. 

Professors, German and English, views of, 68-69. 
Pro-Germans, English, 124. 
Promises to Prance in 1905, England's, 236. 
Protestant and Catholic wars, 31. 
Prussian, the, 53. 

Public opinion and diplomacy, 210. 
Punic wars, the, 68. 

Quakers and non-resistance, 40. 
Questions of right and wrong, 20. 

Radical and labour elements, and the foreign policy, 162. 



242 INDEX 

Rectitude of Germany's claims in Morocco, legal, 163. 

Renaissance, the, 120. 

Revanche, policy of the, 142. 

Revolution, the Russian, 174. 

Right of "way, temporary use of the, 218. 

Rights under the Algeciras Act, German, 155-156. 

Rivalry of states, 83. 

Romain, Rolland, 2.^ 

Roman civilization, 106. 

Roseberry, Lord, and "continuity" in foreign policy, 210. 

Roundheads, 32. 

Rum and colonization, 50. 

Russian loans and the Duma, 175-6. 

Sacred fires, guardians of the, 18. 

Salonika, 139. 

Sarajevo murders, the, 36. 

Savage, the noble, 29. 

Scientia, The, 1, 67, 138. 

"Scraps of paper," 90, 189. 

Secret diplomacy, 38, 84, 144. 

Self deception, 10. 

Servia, 34. 

Shah and Anglo-Russian loans, the, 182. 

Shaw, Bernard, 2. 

Shereef and the Moorish government, the, 146. 

Shibboleths, political, 98. 

Shuja-ud-Dowleh, 201. 

Shuster, Morgan, 191, 195-6. 

Signatory powers in Morocco, 151-153. 

Sikat-ul-Islam, the, 199. 

Slavdom, 34. 

"Smashing" a nation, 30. 

Socialism and political sanity, 27, 98. 

Socialists and the intellectuals, 10. 

Social justice, 26. 

Spiritual freedom, 53. 

Starvation, defeat by, 76. 

Strike, defense by general, 49. 

Submarines and naval power, 78. 

Subtle untruths, 1. 

Supporting a state, effects of, 214. 

Supremacy, naval, 72. 

Swiss International Review, 1 (note). 

Tangier, the German Emperor and, 146. 

Teheran, 171. 

Thirty years' war, the, 106. 

Three years' service law, the, 169. 

Times, The, 160, 169. 

Tolstoy, 34, 41. 



INDEX 243 

Transvaal and British aggression, the, 45. 

Treaties have not the binding force of private contracts, 22; 
of neutrality, 224; secret, 143. 

Trevelyan, George, 32. 

Triple Entente policy in 1911, 133; no justice for Germany, 
157. 

Tripoli war, the, 133. 

Truth neutral in its essence, 2; ideals of, 18. 

Turner, G. D., 197, (note). 

Unrequited hatred, 54. 4 

Victory and the fundamental irrational belief, 11. 

Wage earners and the war loss, 120. 

"Wallace, Graham, 60. 

War, justifiable? 20; four kinds of, 28; evils and blessings of, 
27; condemned by Christ and Tolstoy, 34; a disaster to 
neutrals, 80; physical and moral effects of the present, 
109; steps toward, 168; the price of the diplomatic game, 
170; causes national humiliation, 170. 

Washington, the neutral atmosphere of, 96. 

Wells, H. G., 60. 

Whitewashing, political, 139. 

William the Conqueror, 50. 

Witte, M., 173, 174. 

Wolff -Metternich, Count, 233. 

Yoke of cabinets and financiers, the, 202. 






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